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This study investigates how managers contribute to the strategy of their firm, 
specifically focusing on an occupational group of hotel managers. Following the call of 
the Strategy-as-Practice (S-a-P) research community for heightened awareness of the 
managers' role and contribution to strategy, and based on the observation that strategy 
formation is context-specific, it attempts to generalise about the managers' contribution 
within a specific context. 
Generalising about the practitioners' contribution to strategy is problematic, however, 
requiring a conceptual linkage between managerial activity and organisational strategy. 
Drawing upon the S-a-P literature and the literature on managerial work activity, this 
study suggests that the managers' response to uncertainty provides that integrative link. 
This is supported by a simplifying assumption, namely the unitary view of organisation, 
whereby the central role of the managers within a firm is assured, assuming that power 
is concentrated upon them. 
The research inquiry itself spans levels of analysis: the level of the individual manager, 
the organisation, and the organisation's context. In turn, it requires breadth to account 
for the reciprocal influence among those levels of analysis. This need is accommodated 
by a case study approach. Nine independent hotels from the island of Crete were chosen 
as the sample for the study, while the data collection methods used included 
observation, interviews and document analysis. 
The results show that the hotel managers' contribution focuses on developing value- 
generating strategies for their firm; a necessity as they are at disadvantage: they are 
fragmented, in a saturated sector, equipped with an undifferentiated product, and 
ultimately reliant upon their suppliers to reach their markets. Value-generating 
strategies are developed through the management of the intangible resources of the firm 
and by building a positive history of collaboration with the suppliers. In addition, the 
managers' contribution is inextricably linked to their everyday activity, which supports 
the development of value-generating strategies. 
It is argued that an activity-based view of strategy can unearth some otherwise 
unobservable constructs that become apparent only through its micro-analytic 
approach. A focus on practitioners and their contribution can also be an additional level 
of analysis in strategy research, perceiving strategy formed through the practitioners' 
activity. As such, strategy can be redefined as an outcome, formed at multiple levels, 
with strategy practice (or the practitioners' activity) to partly account for that outcome. 
Generalising about the managers' contribution to strategy requires a trade-off, a choice 
between content and context specific generalisations. This choice ultimately depends on 
the reference group of practitioners in question, which delineates the boundaries of the 
context. In pluralist organisational contexts, that reference group is confined within the 
organisation's boundaries. On the other hand, unitary organisational contexts allow the 
selection of wider reference groups. In either case, only local generalisations can be 
made, taking into account the bounded nature of strategy formation. The study 
concludes with an analysis of its contribution to the existing body of knowledge, its 
limitations, and further proposes potential avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: STRATEGY FORMATION AND STRATEGISTS 
1.1 Scope of the research 
1.1.1 'Strategy-as-Practice': Rediscovering the practitioner 
Strategy research has long focused on the content and the process of strategy, with 
the first examining how strategic choices such as diversification, restructuring and 
expansion impact on organisational performance, and the second examining how 
strategies are actually implemented. Authors (Child, 1972; Mintzberg, 1972; 
Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Pettigrew, 1977; Porter, 1991), however, have 
variously taken a critical approach to examining strategy formation and how 
strategies emerge; although strategy formation has been examined from a number 
of different perspectives, two appear dominant in the literature. The first examines 
contingent relationships between organisational and environmental variables 
(Child, 1972; Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985; Meyer et al, 1993; Doty et al, 1993), 
whilst the second examines the process of strategy formation primarily through 
intraorganisational factors (Lindblom, 1959; Pettigrew, 1977,1985; Quinn, 1980, 
1989; Johnson, 1987). In essence, these two perspectives represent two levels of 
analysis: the interaction between the environment and the organisation, and the 
intraorganisational level. 
A growing number of researchers (Mintzberg, 1987a; Quinn, 1980; Liedtka, 1997; 
Whittington, 1996), however, suggest that the aforementioned perspectives are 
insufficient to provide a comprehensive account of strategy formation, as they 
neglect a third level of analysis: the role and contribution of individuals in shaping 
the strategy of the firm. Whittington's (1996: 734) call is characteristic: 
`Since the 1960s we have learnt a great deal about different kinds of 
strategies. What we need to know more about is strategising. ' 
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Since Whittington's (1996) acknowledgment of the need for a focus on strategy 
practitioners, there has been growing research interest in this area, which has 
emerged as a sub-field within strategy research: the `Strategy-as-Practice' 
(henceforth abbreviated to 'S-a-P') community. The focus of the S-a-P community 
is to build upon the existing body of knowledge in strategy research, and 
particularly upon strategy process research, but with a heightened concern about the 
role and impact of practitioners upon strategy. The community sees strategy as 
social practice, looking at how individual managers (rather than organisations as a 
whole) `do' strategy on a day-to-day basis and the social processes within which 
they participate, and through which they affect, organisational outcomes 
(Whittington, 1996; Johnson et al, 2003; Whittington et al, 2004). Balogun et al 
(2003: 199) locate the S-a-P stream within the wider strategy literature: 
`.. strategy content research is about `what' strategies, and strategy process 
research about the `how', S-a-P research looks for `know how', `know 
when' and `know where. ' 
The S-a-P stream therefore, whilst acknowledging the importance of the interface 
between environment and firm as well as the intraorganisational processes, focuses 
on the contribution of practitioners to the strategy of the firm. In order to achieve 
that, it shifts the analytical focus to practitioners rather than concentrating on 
organisations. 
Furthermore, the S-a-P stream claims to investigate strategy at a more `micro' level 
of analysis than conventional strategy research. In literature published to date, the 
`micro' level has often been referred to as the senior managers' work and practices, 
language and detailed interaction patterns (Blackler et al, 2000; Eden and 
Ackerman, 1998; Jarzabkowski and Wilson 2002; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2003; 
Samra-Fredricks, 2003). The studies are also characterised by an ethnographic 
approach, which is applied in order to extract in-depth and detailed data that 
represents the micro level of strategising; an approach which was later labelled by 
Johnson et al (2003) as the activity-based view of strategy, referring to those studies 
that adopt a `micro' lens in the study of strategy formation. According to 
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Whittington (2002), studies of this kind are useful in understanding how strategy is 
actually formed: 
`Understanding strategy as a social practice provides one kind of answer. 
Clifford Geertz (1973: 5) tells us that if you want to understand what a 
science is, you should look first to what its practitioners do: anthropologists 
do ethnography. The same holds for strategy. We shall understand what 
strategy is the more we study what strategists do. ' (Whittington, 2002: 15) 
What the S-a-P stream essentially contributes is an additional perspective to 
understanding strategy formation. If strategy content research looked at the 
interface between the environment and the firm, and strategy process research at 
intraorganisational processes, S-a-P research reasserts the role and contribution of 
the practitioners. By adding strategy practitioners as the primary unit of analysis, it 
examines strategy from a manager's perspective, offering insights not given by the 
previous perspectives: reflexivity amongst managers and an understanding of what 
they do at that level and its effects on the strategy of the firm. 
1.1.2 Building on 'Strategy-as-Practice': The problem of generalising about the 
managers' contribution to strategy 
The contribution of the S-a-P stream to strategy research is evident; however, in 
pursuing the S-a-P research agenda, researchers have been confronted with the 
conceptual challenge of linking managerial activity and organisational strategy. 
Traditionally, strategy has been attached to organisations and it is evident 
throughout the mainstream strategy literature (Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971; 
Mintzberg, 1978; Schendel and Hofer, 1979). Therefore, when trying to provide 
accounts of `strategy practice', one has to acknowledge the controversy of the term. 
Strategy is something an organisation `has' whereas practice is something an 
individual `does'. So far, this issue has been dealt with by treating strategy as an 
activity, something that is evident in various papers by authors within the S-a-P 
community (Chia, 2004; Clark, 2004; Hendry and Seidl, 2003; Whittington, 2002), 
thereby avoiding acknowledging the incommensurability of the terms. Hendry and 
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Seidl (2003), for instance, make use of the term `strategic practice' without defining 
what is strategic about practice, although they acknowledge the problem: 
`Strategy research can be usefully advanced by framing it in the context of 
social theories of practice... however, it runs up against the familiar 
problem that strategy as an activity is not well defined. ' (Hendry and Seidl, 
2003: 175) 
The aforementioned presumption is still maintained under the umbrella of the view 
of strategy as social practice; however, it does not operationalise how managerial 
practice, or the managers' inputs, can contribute to the strategy of the firm. 
Overall, the insufficient emphasis on the problem of incommensurability has 
resulted in limited generalisations of the managers' role and contribution to the 
strategy of the firm. For instance, existing empirical studies such as Samra- 
Fredericks' (2003) and Jarzabkowski's and Wilson's (2002) provide details on how 
the managers' detailed activity contributes to strategic outcomes, but do not 
generalise their results to a wider group of practitioners. While this problem is 
recognised by authors within the S-a-P field, the current empirical body of literature 
focuses almost exclusively on single organisations, and the problem of 
incommensurability remains neglected: 
`micro studies are constrained in terms of their scope and unit of analysis... ' 
(Johnson et al, 2003: 16) 
`there is a need to conduct systematically comparative cases in order to 
understand the patterns of micro-activity associated with particular 
organisational actions and outcomes' (Whittington et at, 2004: 20) 
The apparent difficulty of the S-a-P literature to generalise about practitioners is 
surprising, however, as one of its founding assumptions has been that strategy 
practice is bounded within its context. Authors within the S-a-P stream in 
particular, have followed this assumption; therefore to attain an understanding of 
the managers' effect on strategy requires an understanding of the social context in 
4 
question (Lain and Vaara, 2005; Lowendahl and Revang, 1998; Whittington, 
1996,2001). This assumption is essentially a more explicit integration of previous 
findings into the strategy research agenda. Various exemplars (Calori et al, 1998; 
Kagono et al, 1985; Schneider. 1989; Schneider and De Meyer, 1991; Sorge and 
Maurice, 1990; Sorge, 1991) have provided evidence on how strategic approaches 
differ across nations. Others advocated that strategy formation is also dependent on 
the industry in question. Spender (1980,1989) supported this theory by stating that 
the managers of an industry draw from a shared pool of knowledge, which he 
termed as `industry recipes'. Birnbaum-More and Weiss (1990), in their study of 
158 firms from 12 industries, found that strategic actions systematically vary across 
industries. 
We can reach the conclusion that, if strategy formation is context-specific, research 
should be able to generalise about particular contexts; hence, within the S-a-P 
research agenda, it should be possible to generalise about practitioners within a 
given context. Existing research within the community has avoided doing so, 
however, focusing almost exclusively on strategists within single organisations. 
Authors within the S-a-P community (Balogun et al, 2003; Whittington et al, 2004) 
have raised the issue of generalisability, but they have called for methodological 
ways forward. This thesis suggests that the issue is primarily conceptual. The S-a-P 
literature, failing to operationalise the contribution of managerial activity on 
organisational strategy, has avoided generalising about practitioners within specific 
contexts. 
1.2 The focus of the study 
This thesis aims to provide an operational linkage between managerial activity and 
organisational strategy, drawing empirical data from a particular reference group; 
an occupational group of senior managers within a specific national, geographical, 
and industry/sectoral context. It therefore seeks to explore and describe the 
managers' role and contribution to strategy formation within that specific context. 
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For the purpose of the study, an occupational group of hotel managers has been 
chosen from independent hotels from the island of Crete. The choice of a local hotel 
sector specifies a relatively narrow institutional environment, and ensures that the 
managers are subject to more or less the same social forces. It was also useful to 
examine strategy practice on different contextual foundations to that previously 
studied in the S-a-P field. Even though the context-specific nature of strategy 
formation is recognised in the literature, management research and, in effect, 
research on the specific industry/sector remains largely ethnocentric, following a 
Western view of management (Litteljohn, 1999; Tse and Olsen, 1999). Costa's 
(1997) thesis of strategic planning and environmental scanning in the Portuguese 
hotel sector is a rare example of a study which challenges predominant views in the 
literature. In particular, Costa concluded that the strategic approaches used by the 
hotel units in the resort-intensive country of Portugal are substantially different 
from those one would expect, taking into account the previous research performed 
in Anglo-Saxon contexts. Consequently, being of a non Anglo-Saxon background, 
this study provides added insights. 
The lack of previous research in this context substantiates the purpose of this study. 
In the Greek context, there is no specific evidence on how hotel managers 
strategise. There are, however, some general studies about Greek management and 
their management styles and preferences (Bourantas et al, 1990; Cummings and 
Schmidt, 1972; EEDE, 1986; Koufopoulos and Morgan, 1994) and strategic 
planning in Greek enterprises (Bourantas and Mantes, 1988; Kanelopoulos, 1991; 
Papadakis, 1993; Papalexandris, 1986). On the other hand, research referring to 
hotel managers is limited and scattered. This is rather surprising, since the tourism 
industry in Greece is well developed and makes the largest contribution to the 
national GDP when compared with other industries. The Greek hotel sector is 
fragmented and typically consists of independent hotels, which are considered to be 
small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), as they typically employ less than 250 
employees (European Commission, 2005). The limited scope and range of activities 
of these typical hotel units may explain why the sector has not attracted much 
research. 
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In literature written about territories outside the Greek borders, there is general 
disagreement as to whether, and in what manner, hotel managers strategise. Jauncey 
(2000) argues that the hotel managers' work is mainly reactive, but he recognises 
that his research has a methodological bias. Lenehan's (1995) research concurs that 
managers focus on operational issues and do not engage in strategy formulation; 
however, others such as Eccles and Teare (1996), Olsen et al (1998) and Tse and 
Olsen (1999) suggest that hospitality managers do adopt strategic thinking, because 
they utilise multidisciplinary skills and carry out a wide variety of activities in order 
to manage hotels, which are multifunctional businesses. Edgar and Nisbet (1996) 
argue along similar lines. They point out that whilst SMEs in the hospitality 
industry are unlikely to benefit from strategic planning, they have to adopt 
innovative practices in order to sustain competitive advantage. They also have to 
become increasingly adaptive to respond to an ever-changing environment. This 
approach necessarily differs from the traditional long-range courses of action that 
planned strategies impose. 
Given that neither this industry sector, nor this occupational group, has attracted the 
attention of strategy researchers, this thesis has the potential to contribute new 
empirical data that complements the existing S-a-P body of research. In addition, its 
uniqueness as non Anglo-Saxon based research provides a template for comparison 
with future studies. Comparisons among the selected organisations of the study are 
facilitated by their unitarist nature, and make the effects of the managers' input 
more evident. As shown later in this study, the view of hotels as unitarist 
organisations is part of a simplifying assumption. In unitarist organisations, power 
is centralised on one (or a few) individuals, allowing us to behold the hotel 
managers as the focal actors, or strategists, within the organisation. Despite the 
plethora of existing data suggesting a non-strategic stance by hotel managers, in this 
study they are reassessed in light of a new theoretical and conceptual background. 
Finally, a further outcome of this study is the addition of practice-based strategy 
research that reflects the real work of practitioners within the specific context in 
question. 
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1.3 Using the literature 
Given the infancy of the S-a-P stream, the question of how to study strategy as 
practice still raises a lot of discussion and debate (Balogun et al, 2003; Chia, 2004; 
Ezzamel and Willmott, 2004; Johnson et al, 2003; Hendry and Seidl, 2003; 
Whittington, 2002); however, it is acknowledged by all that the field needs further 
empirical support and adequate theoretical frameworks. As some authors note: 
`what is required is a stronger grasp of what is going on outside particular 
local episodes... in effect mandates the broadening of the empirical range 
within the field' (Whittington et al, 2004: 15) 
`... micro research can draw on the extant bodies of theory to increase their 
leverage... there is no shortage of theoretical perspectives upon which to 
build... the challenge here is to span levels: i. e. the level of individual 
interaction, the organisational level and the level of the organisation's 
context' (Johnson et al, 2003: 16-17) 
Therefore, the decision to study the managers' contribution to strategy does not 
come with a clear set of theoretical and methodological assumptions. Leading 
contributors (Johnson et al, 2003; Whittington, 1996; Whittington and Melin, 2002) 
further acknowledge that the practice view on strategy can be informed and draw 
upon a multiplicity of fields. As a result of this, it is necessary to begin by assessing 
the location of the study in relation to the most relevant bodies of literature. 
As this study has to generalise about the occupational group in question, an obvious 
starting point seemed to be previous research exploring strategy across groups of 
practitioners, in particular the `strategic groups' stream (Porac et al, 1989; Reger, 
1990; Reger and Huff, 1993; Daniels et al, 1994) and the standalone study by 
Spender (1980,1989), wh o emphasised the context-bound, socially constructed 
nature of strategy, with a focus on senior managers within specific industries. On 
further investigation, however, it became clear that neither of the above captured 
sufficiently the managers' contribution to the strategy of their firm. In particular, 
the strategic groups literature, although taking a specific `micro' lens of managerial 
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cognition, is limited to making abstractions to the firms' competitive environment, 
as constructed by communities of managers. On the other hand, Spender's (1980, 
1989) study appeared more useful, as it looks at strategy formation by communities 
of managers within specific industries, but it focused on how strategy is constructed 
at the knowledge level, and not at the more `micro' activity level. Therefore, 
because of their different agenda and scope, they both leave the question `what 
managers do and their effect on strategy' unanswered. Instead, it was deemed 
appropriate to selectively use classic strategy literature and critically examine how 
the managers' role and contribution are perceived within it. The review of the 
literature shows that managerial inputs to strategy have been largely ignored in 
mainstream literature. On the other hand, the S-a-P literature has so far adopted a 
rather narrow empirical focus, hampering generalisation attempts beyond strictly 
organisational boundaries. 
The aforementioned empirical gap is addressed in the present study by using the 
field of managerial work activity, drawing upon its extensive empirical grounding. 
Although Whittington (1996) deemed that future research on strategy-as-practice 
should draw upon existing literature on managerial work activity, it has not been 
utilised as such. Whilst the empirical and theoretical background of the managerial 
work activity field is much greater than that of the S-a-P stream, it has not been 
utilised as a comparative or explanatory template for the purposes of the S-a-P 
agenda. The review of the field confirms the indeterminacy of managerial inputs to 
organisational outputs, which can be inferred as strategies, thus disproving some 
assumptions of the S-a-P stream such as that of treating strategy as an activity. 
While the selected strategy literature and the sources on managerial work proved 
that they can offer insights in understanding the managers' contribution to strategy, 
it was also necessary to conceptualise strategy in a way that accounts for the 
managers' contribution. Influenced by a part of the strategy literature, which sees 
strategy as the interaction between the environment and the firm, and by the 
sociological conception that the term `strategy' can be understood as a reaction 
against structuralism which is unavoidable (Crow, 1990; Thurley and Wood, 1983), 
this study conceived strategy to be the resulting pattern of a response to the external 
environment, which itself is a source of uncertainty. This conception, which later 
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becomes empirically validated, allows the linkage of managerial activity and 
organisational strategy, which in other circumstances would have been clearly 
distinct. 
The literature review is, therefore, developed around classic strategy literature and 
the literature on managerial work. The first represents organisational strategy while 
the latter represents managerial practice. If there are any links to be made between 
the two, they are identified through a process of systematic bracketing of their 
assumptions and conclusions. Finally, the study attempts to unify the two fields and 
provide a conceptualisation of the managers' contribution, drawing upon their 
bridging elements. The use of these two seemingly diverse bodies of literature is 
necessary because the existing S-a-P body is not yet solidified in theoretical or 
methodological terms. Essentially, the study adopts an approach of meta- 
triangulation (Lewis and Grimes, 1999), whereby it builds upon multiple paradigms 
in order to construct its own research paradigm. 
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1.4 Aim and objectives 
Following the path suggested by the S-a-P stream, this study seeks to understand 
strategy from a practitioners' perspective. It also attempts to bridge a gap within S- 
a-P theorising and answer a fundamental question, which the existing literature has 
left unanswered: what is the managers' role and contribution to organisational 
strategy? In doing so, it departs from previous studies in the field by choosing to 
study an occupational group, influenced by the observation that strategy formation 
is context specific. As a result, it addresses both theoretical and methodological 
problems in the study of strategy-as-practice and informs practitioners about the 
effect of their inputs to their organisation's strategy. Finally, the managers' 
contribution to strategy is explored within the context of a local hotel sector; in 
effect, contributing both to the theory of strategy making and the practice within the 
hotel sector. 
In sum, this study aims to: a) look at how the managers' contribution to strategy can 
be examined, and b) generalise about the managers' contribution in the context of 
the local hotel sector. In order to achieve this aim, the following objectives have 
been set: 
1. To operationalise the managers' contribution to the strategy of the firm by 
providing a conceptual linkage between managerial activity and organisational 
strategy; 
2. To establish the epistemological and methodological bases for conducting the 
study; 
3. To develop a descriptive model of the managers' contribution to strategy in the 
context of the local hotel sector. 
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1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into ten chapters. The chapters following this introductory 
section are: 
Chapter 2- Reviews the strategy literature, focusing on how it perceives the 
managers' role and contribution. It is found that existing operationalisations of 
strategy are unable to capture the managers' role and contribution to the strategy of 
a firm. It goes on to reflect on the practice turn in strategy research, indicating its 
narrow empirical underpinning and pinpointing the need to operationalise how 
managers contribute to the strategy of the firm. 
Chapter 3- Provides an overview of the literature on managerial work activity 
attempting to fill the empirical gap identified in the previous chapter. It is found 
that the problem of incommensurability between managerial activity and 
organisational strategy can be traced back to the more basic problem of the 
indeterminacy of managerial inputs to outputs at the organisational level. It goes on 
to review role theory as the main analytical tool of managerial work and critically 
reassesses the view of planning as equivalent to strategic activity. The chapter 
concludes by showing the way forward as well as the limitations of the field in the 
study of Strategy-as-Practice. 
Chapter 4- Draws together conclusions from the previous chapters in order to 
unify managerial and organisational action. It suggests a unitary view of 
organisation, a simplifying assumption which allows a relative conflation of the two 
levels. It conceives the managers' contribution to strategy as their response to 
uncertainty, which can be manifested both in the observable domain of their work 
activity as well as in their interpretive accounts. Finally it describes the conceptual 
framework of the study. 
Chapter 5- Presents the research methodology. It starts by explaining the 
embedded case study approach, followed by a discussion of the data collection 
methods and how they were used. Further information is given on the preparation 
for fieldwork and gaining access. The return journey from the fieldwork is 
explained by a presentation of the methods of data analysis. The chapter also 
addresses the issues of validity and reliability and goes on to define the sample of 
the study. 
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Chapter 6- Gives information on the context of the study. It starts by reviewing 
the history and development of the Greek tourism industry, with a specific 
emphasis on the hotel sector on the island of Crete. It further describes the structure 
of the industry and the role of key actors: the state, the tour operators (T. Os) and the 
Greek National Tourism Organisation (GNTO). 
Chapter 7- Presents the findings of the study. These are given in two main 
sections: a) the managers' subjectively meaningful action categorised into themes 
and constructs, and b) the hotel managers' work activity. The chapter also presents 
supplementary data, which represents experimentation on additional levels of 
inquiry. 
Chapter 8- Analyses the findings in order to provide an answer to the research 
question: how the focal managers contribute to the strategy of their firm. 
Chapter 9- Draws together key points of the findings of the study and relates them 
back to the literature. The discussion pinpoints emergent theoretical and conceptual 
themes that are useful in explaining the outcomes of the study. 
Chapter 10 - Draws conclusions and summarises the key issues highlighted in the 
analysis of findings. It summarises the contribution of the study, presents its 
limitations and makes recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE STRATEGY LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter one suggested that the study of the managers' contribution to the strategy 
of the firm through the `micro' lens of strategising is insufficient to permit 
generalisations about managers within a given context. The problem was the 
incommensurability between organisational strategy and managerial practice and 
the need to operationalise that link. This issue, however, has not been questioned in 
existing strategy literature, which has typically been dominated by competitive 
advantage frameworks, which tend to favour the organisational and industry levels 
of analysis. In trying to reassert the role and contribution of managers in shaping 
strategy, this chapter focuses on how managers and their input to strategy are 
perceived within current literature. It starts by reviewing the concept of strategic 
choice (Section 2.2), which has set the stage for the assumptions that have been 
made thereafter regarding the role of managers in strategy formation. It goes on to 
illustrate the limitations of existing approaches to studying strategy to account for 
the managers' contribution (Section 2.3). Reflecting on the practice turn in strategy 
research (Section 2.4), we observe that, while it has given insights on the various 
forms the managers' contribution to strategy can take, researchers have voluntarily 
confined themselves to abstractions within single organisations. It is argued that 
this narrow empirical focus on single organisations has been seen as a 
methodological necessity, driven by the need to link the managerial and 
organisational levels of action. The chapter concludes with a suggestion that the 
problem of incommensurability needs to be resolved primarily at a conceptual 
level. 
2.2 Strategic choice and the managers' role in shaping strategy 
Early strategy research saw the managers' role in shaping the strategy of the firm as 
deterministic. Being heavily based upon contingency theorising, it saw 
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organisational action being influenced by the organisation's environment (Burns 
and Stalker, 1961) and structure (Laurence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). 
Child (1972) saw contingency theorising as unjustifiably deterministic, critiquing 
the existing approaches for neglecting issues such as the strategic choice available 
to management, or the ability of organisations to reshape and affect their 
environment. 
Child linked the two broad types of contingency theories, arguing that the existing 
literature did not make clear the associations between dimensions of organisational 
structure and contextual factors such as the environment. He argued that 
contingency theory denies choice, since it is deterministic in nature, and continued 
his critique by stating that the types of contingencies are inappropriately narrow, 
consisting of only five basic types: complexity, variability, illiberality, technology 
and size. Child went as far as to suggest that economic constraints (the predominant 
factor at that time) were not the only factor to determine structural variables and he 
suggested the role of `power holders' within the organisation and their discretion to 
exercise strategic choice. His argument was that the choice of organisational goals 
is an integral part of strategy making. These goals may reflect managerial 
preferences and have been referred to as strategic choices. 
Since Child's influential article, the extent of strategic choice has been debated 
amongst organisation theorists (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983; Bourgeois, 1984; 
Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Reed, 1985), who see it as a division between 
determinism and voluntarism; the first denying, the latter affirming managerial 
agency; however, the extent of managerial agency is often assumed rather than 
questioned (Johnson et al, 2003). The result, according to Johnson et al (2003), is a 
poor accumulation of knowledge. An understanding of the role and contribution of 
managers in strategy formation requires a more direct confrontation with the 
complexities of managerial and organisational action, something insufficiently 
examined in the current literature. 
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2.3 The problem of operationalising strategy: existing approaches and 
their limitations 
Following on from the previous section, a review of three widely used approaches 
to studying strategy to examine how existing approaches in classic strategy 
literature perceive the managers' contribution is conducted. These approaches are: 
strategy studied as a plan, as the product of decision-making and as part of the 
process of organisational change. This review illustrates the inability of these 
common operationalisations of strategy to account for the managers' contribution. 
At best, managers are seen as the medium through which strategies are formed, but 
the literature tends to diminish their input by relegating it into single-dimensional 
forms or by neglecting the origin of those inputs. 
2.3.1 Strategy as a plan 
Strategy has been conceived by early authors as a grand plan (Ansoff, 1965; 
Andrews, 1971; Schendel and Hofer, 1979; Porter, 1980), where management had 
to determine the long-term goals of the firm and drive it towards achieving those 
goals. Strategy as a plan is seen as an instrument used by the most powerful 
members of an organisation. The role of management was relegated to formulating 
those plans based on long-term forecasts of the state of the external environment 
and the resources and capabilities of the firm. Schendel and Hofer's (1979: 4) early 
definition of strategy is representative: 
`The basic characteristics of the activities top management engages in order 
to match organisational competencies with its environment' 
Schendel and Hofer assert that top management's task is to drive the organisation's 
performance and adapt it based on the state of the environment. The environment 
became a key theme and its association with organisations took the form of 
contingency theorising between environmental (contextual) and organisational 
variables. Chandler (1962), for instance, in his influential work had suggested a 
dynamic sequential relationship between the environment, business' strategic 
behaviour and the consequent changes in the internal configuration, referred to as 
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structure. According to this school of thought, the key to successful organisational 
strategy is to be able to analyse the state of the external environment and plan 
accordingly; planning here is seen as the means of strategy development. 
Chandler's (1962: 13) definition is characteristic of this view: 
`The determination of the basic long-term goals of an enterprise, and the 
adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for 
carrying out these goals' 
Strategy as a plan is the result of analysing the environment and taking into account 
the organisation's resources and capabilities. As a plan, it implies linearity in 
organisational strategy as well as deliberate human action. In this sense, planning 
can be interpreted as being synonymous with strategic activity. 
Nonetheless, the above convention has been challenged through the years. 
Mintzberg (1994) and Wilson (1994) argued that strategic planning has rather been 
synonymous with analysis, disregarding creative human judgment. In this respect, 
strategic planning does not necessarily imply strategy making, as it emphasises 
analysis but ignores synthesis. Furthermore, the linearity in strategy formation has 
been dismissed by the processualists. Drawing primarily from behavioural concepts 
such as bounded rationality, satisficing and political behaviour, various authors 
(Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970; Cyert and March, 1963; Lindblom, 1959; March 
and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1957) demonstrate that these factors limit the achievable 
rate of analysis. For instance, Herbert Simon's work shows that man is incapable of 
conforming to a model of comprehensive analysis, because he cannot comprehend 
all the possible choices and also because he reasons sequentially and not 
synoptically. The decision maker does not seek the best solution, which may be out 
of reach, but he always seeks a `rational' solution which is consistent with his own 
criteria of rationality. Whilst Herbert Simon emphasised human limits, Charles 
Lindblom (1959) elaborated on process limits and his contribution in this area is 
more than worthwhile. Lindblom argued that the comprehensive model would be 
superior if all the required information and the resources were available, if there 
were no ambiguity of objectives, and if all the participants share the same values. 
This, of course, can never be the case. Firstly, it would be extremely difficult to 
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gather all the information a priori. Even to attempt to do so is pointless, as much of 
the information emerges only in the course of action, as a result of complex 
negotiations and mutual adjustment. The initial objectives may be ambiguous; 
agreement would be difficult if one had to clarify those objectives in advance. It is 
not taken for granted that the involved parties will share identical values. The 
supply of available resources is not stable; new resources may emerge in the course 
of action, while existing ones may become exhausted. Lindblom's study shows that 
management makes an indefinite, and apparently disorderly, series of small moves 
away from the ills of the day rather than striving towards defined goals. This 
approach is remedial and deals with practical difficulties in small increments by 
disjointed or uncoordinated processes, which led to the conclusion that strategy 
may not always be planned or linear but, rather, is incremental in nature (Lindblom, 
1959; Alford, 1976; Quinn, 1980). Based on these observations, the centrality of 
planning and synoptic analysis is greatly reduced. As Alford (1976: 61) puts it: 
`a company's strategy may be the integral of a series of relatively short term 
tactics... and because, in such cases, strategy is an outcome and not a 
planned course of action' 
The view of strategy as a plan equates planning with strategic activity, effectively 
narrowing down the managers' contribution to, as the processualists have shown, 
this single-dimensional input. This view unjustifiably assumes analysis, 
comprehensiveness, deliberateness of action and linearity in organisational strategy; 
it disregards the human and process limits that make strategy non-linear, emergent 
and therefore independent of the managers' deliberate plans of action. 
2.3.2 The decision approach 
Mintzberg (1972) was first to advocate research on strategy making from a decision 
perspective, which subsequently became hugely popular (see Bourgeois, 1981; 
Fredrickson, 1983a; Papadakis et al, 1998; Schoemaker, 1993; Shrivastava, 1983; 
Simon, 1979; Weick, 1979). Mintzberg argued that, if patterns in decision-making 
are the basis for strategy formation, then what is left is to find the origins of such 
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patterns or streams of decisions. At that time, there seemed to be no question 
regarding the capacity of decisions to reflect strategy formation. Earlier, Simon 
(1960: 1) had gone as far as to suggest that management is synonymous with 
decision-making. The benefit of a decision approach, according to Mintzberg, is to 
avoid treating strategy as an explicit set of guidelines developed in a priori, as it 
constrains our ability to study the strategy making process. In other words, the 
decision approach was developed as an advancement of the planning approach. 
Despite having defined strategy making as ̀ a pattern in a stream of decisions', the 
question that begged to be answered even then was `what decisions? '. These are 
what Mintzberg claimed to be strategic decisions, identifying `strategic' in terms of 
importance. This was done retrospectively (1972,1978), as he referred to decisions 
that turned out to be important in the end. Shirley (1976,1982), among others 
(Alford, 1976; Bourgeois, 1978), elaborated on the decision approach to strategy. 
She cast doubt onto Mintzberg's assumption that strategic decisions are 
synonymous with the terms `important' and `significant'. For that purpose, she 
developed a set of criteria to identify strategic decisions. According to her criteria, 
strategic decisions must: 
Be externally oriented, defining the organisations' relationship with its 
environment 
- Relate to the total firm, taking the organisation as the unit of analysis 
- Depend on multifunctional inputs 
- Provide constraints on administrative and operational activities and; 
Be important to the success of the enterprise 
In effect, Shirley suggests that decisions made one way or another should be linked 
to organisational outcomes. In her view, this is displayed by all-encompassing 
outputs; however, she also comments that: 
`Just because a decision is important is not sufficient cause to give a 
strategic label; at the same time, it should be recognised that some strategic 
issues are more important than others and therefore demand more analytical 
time and top management attention. ' (Shirley, 1982: 265) 
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Despite the maturity of the decision approach, however, it has been criticised for 
being unable to capture the process of strategy formation, and thus, being unable to 
account for the managers' contribution. In particular, its weakness lies in its 
fundamental assumption: that decisions reflect the managers' output at the 
organisational level; or in other words, that all decisions (taken by the top echelons 
of the firm) result in actions, which eventually manifest themselves as 
organisational outcomes. Subsequently, the decision approach downplays the fact 
that the choosing of actions does not necessarily mean they will be carried out. 
Brunsson (1982) has written the most effective critique to date, explaining that the 
decision approach to strategy has concentrated its efforts on the study of individual 
behaviour rather than organisational. This might make sense, because an individual 
has less difficulty moving from decision to action than an organisation. This 
emphasis on individual behaviour might explain why the choosing of actions has 
received much more attention than the carrying out of actions. In a similar vein, 
Mintzberg and Waters (1990) noted that decisions, at best, denote a commitment to 
action. Moreover, they also noted that commitment to action may precede 
decisions, or in other words, organisational actions may develop in the absence of 
decisions. Thus, they criticised the capacity of the decision approach to explain 
strategic outcomes. Based on the above critiques, we can conclude that the decision 
approach appears to fail to capture the managers' contribution to strategy, as it has 
an inherent tendency to conflate managerial inputs and outputs. This assumes that 
(strategic) decisions necessarily entail action, which translates into outputs at the 
organisational level. 
2.3.3 The organisational change approach 
It has been quite some time since strategy was conceived as the pattern resulting 
from the organisations' adaptation to the external environment, with Chandler's 
(1962) study being the seminal reading for years (see also Galbraith, 1977; Miles 
and Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1979; Rumelt, 1974). Subsequent researchers focused 
on narrower strategic problems, attempting to track simultaneously and over time, 
contextual factors, strategies, decision processes, administrative systems and 
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outcomes. Burgelman's (1980) research on internal corporate venturing, and Van 
de Ven et al's (1989) work on innovation are characteristic examples of this line of 
research. 
Andrew Pettigrew (1985,1987,1990) attempted to simulate the richness of the 
latter and the generalisability of the first by suggesting that the blending of content, 
context and process produces a unique outcome. His holistic approach is based on 
the process (and not just the pattern) of organisational adaptation to changes in the 
external environment. He argued that the complexities of strategy processes should 
rely more on the concept of `change' than on `choice' or `decision'. The 
organisational change approach does not merely examine the patterns of 
organisational adaptation to the state of the environment, but critically reassesses 
that interface through the lens of intraorganisational processes. Pettigrew's (1985) 
study of ICI and Johnson's (1987) study of Coopers corporation are excellent 
examples of how strategies, operationalised as the process of organisational change, 
can be inhibited by intraorganisational complexities such as the organisational 
culture, the actors' subjective interpretations and political games. 
If early operationalisations of strategy were solely concerned with patterns of 
organisational outcomes, the change approach shed light on the formation of those 
outcomes, attempting to reconstruct the inputs and processes that created them. The 
biggest advantage of the change approach to strategy is that it allows 
generalisations across organisations and places strategy within context (see for 
instance Hislop, 2000; Webb and Pettigrew, 1999). Although the change approach 
allows abstraction of the research results at an organisational level, it cannot 
generalise about managers. Even in integrative studies (Johnson, 1987; Pettigrew, 
1985; Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991) there is no reference to how managerial inputs 
relate to those outcomes; instead they prefer to identify `processes' that render 
certain outcomes possible. Therefore, we can safely say that strategy as the process 
of organisational change can encompass managerial inputs but it cannot make 
deductions based on individual actors. 
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2.4 The Practice Turn 
2.4.1 Studying the managers' contribution to strategy: the micro context of action 
The previous discussion (Section 2.3) demonstrated the inability of some widely 
used approaches to studying strategy to account for the managers' contribution. The 
S-a-P literature, on the other hand, sees strategy as social practice, reasserting the 
role and contribution of the practitioners advocating an activity-based view. As 
Johnson et al (2003: 3) called for: 
`an activity-based view of strategy that focuses on the detailed processes 
and practices which constitute day-to-day activities and which relate to 
strategic outcomes' 
The activity-based view is explored in a number of informative empirical studies. 
Blackler et al's (2000) comparative study of three strategy development teams 
points to the decisive impact of inappropriate investment in computer presentation, 
while Eden and Ackerman (1998) demonstrate the non-trivial effects of the shape 
and arrangement of `Post-it' notes used in discussions at strategy workshops. 
Moreover, Samra-Fredericks (2003), in her study, shows how strategic outcomes 
are influenced by the managers' talk-based interactive routines. Similarly, 
Huisman's (2001) conversation analysis shows how decisions are made through a 
form of talk-in-interaction and the importance of communicative norms within the 
groups in question. Heracleous and Barrett's (2001) longitudinal study of electronic 
trading in the London stock market shows the role of discourse in shaping 
organisational change through its influence on actors' interpretations and actions. 
The demand for such micro-analytic studies, according to Johnson et al (2003), 
comes from the nature of the current economic markets. Their increasingly 
unpredictable and competitive environments reduce returns to macro assets. In such 
cases, it is the micro rather than the macro assets that increase economic rents. 
Thus, micro-analytic studies achieve a better understanding of what those micro- 
assets are, and how they can be consciously leveraged by strategy practitioners. 
22 
2.4.2 Putting the micro within the macro context of action 
The micro-analytic focus of the practice turn in strategy research has tended to go 
alongside the analysis of the macro context. Johnson et al (2003) note the 
importance for fine-grained studies on strategising to be located in their wider 
context. Similarly, Whittington (2001) asserts that actors in micro contexts are not 
acting in isolation but are drawing upon the regular, socially defined modes of 
action that arise from the plural social institutions to which they belong. In addition, 
much of the infrastructure with which micro practice is constructed has macro and 
institutionalised properties that are transmitted within and between contexts by 
social action (Hung and Whittington, 1997; Jarzabkowski, 2004). 
This integrative treatment is reflected in a number of empirical studies within S-a-P 
literature, employing multiple levels of analysis. Maitlis' and Lawrence's (2003) 
study of strategic failure in the British symphony orchestra, for instance, is 
instructive. Focusing on failures in organisational strategising, the authors 
conceived strategising to be all those activities generated in order to produce an 
objective. They also saw organisational discourse and politics as fundamental 
elements of strategising. In doing so, they identified patterns of organisational 
politics leading to a breakdown of strategic processes, such that no strategic 
outcome is produced. Concluding their study, they formalised their results by 
linking aspects of strategising failure to the context in which it occurs. Within this 
frame, the failure of the British symphony orchestra does not seem surprising. 
Similarly, Jarzabkowski and Wilson (2002), in their study of top teams and strategy 
in a UK university, suggested that in order to understand how strategy is practiced, 
analysis needs to focus on how patterns of action are associated with the 
characteristics of both the team and the wider organisation. 
This emphasis on S-a-P literature linking micro and macro levels of action can be 
interpreted as a means of providing a link between the focal micro level and 
outcomes at the macro level. A preoccupation of S-a-P research on activities and 
processes at the micro level of action would dangerously lead towards a downward 
spiral of studies, focusing increasingly on micro, having little to say about how 
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these micro activities and processes contribute to outcomes (Johnson et al, 2003; 
Whittington et al, 2004). Whittington's et al (2004: 9) appeal is representative: 
`... connect the micro-activities to both organisational actions and the 
institutional context... otherwise we face the risk of providing de- 
contextualised minutiae or accounts of strategic irrelevance' 
In this sense, the micro-action integration is more of a methodological necessity, 
which allows the linkage between micro activities and processes and outcomes at 
the organisational level. Such an approach, according to authors within the S-a-P 
community (Hung and Whittington, 1997; Jarzabkowski, 2004; Johnson et al, 2003; 
Whittington, 2001), would be best served by an integrative framework that links the 
micro and macro levels of action. An integrative framework would simplify 
generalisation attempts and provide the ground for systematically comparable 
studies. 
2.4.3 Generalising within contexts: A matter of choosing the reference group 
The extent of the generalisation achieved by the above studies is, however, limited. 
The accounts given by the existing empirical studies regarding the managers' 
contribution to strategy vary from experiential to strictly content specific, focusing 
on the specific forms that contribution can take. Moreover, given the in-depth 
nature of inquiry demanded by the activity-based view, empirical studies are 
restrained within the boundaries of single organisations. As some authors have 
noted (Jarzabkowski and Seidl 2005; Whittington et al, 2004), how can any degree 
of generalisability be inferred if all that is achieved are complex and detailed 
descriptions of action. The emphasis on the micro detail of strategising even raised 
concern for being able to provide relations with strategic outcomes at the 
organisational level. On this matter, Whittington et al (2004: 19) suggest setting 
lower-end limits on the scope of their analysis: 
`Requiring that strategy practice research demonstrate actual or potential 
links to organisational actions sets an effective lower limit to the micro- 
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activities of concern, a necessary bulwark against descent into an endless 
spiral of increasingly micro detail' 
As a consequence, S-a-P literature has offered little on the context-specific 
understanding of the managers' contribution to the strategy of their firm. Empirical 
studies within S-a-P literature (see, for instance, Eden and Ackerman, 1998; 
Huisman, 2001; Samra-Fredericks, 2003) have tended to make abstractions based 
on the micro-analytic forms that the managers' contribution to strategy can take, 
rather than a holistic view of the managers' understanding of strategy as such. 
One of the reasons why S-a-P literature has avoided generalising about practitioners 
within contexts is the choice of taking a unifying unit of analysis the `community of 
practice' (see for instance Brown and Duguid, 2001; Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 
2002; Samra-Fredericks, 2003). Communities of practice have been typically 
associated with organisational contexts, although not exclusively. The term 
`community of practice' itself implies participation in an activity system within 
which participants share an understanding regarding their actions and what they 
mean to them and their communities (Lave and Wenger, 1991: 98). As the study of 
communities of practitioners does not extend beyond the context of organisational 
boundaries, generalisations of empirical findings are limited. Whittington et al 
(2004: 4) have particularly called for a: 
`need to link organisational and supraorganisational levels... explore the 
potential of larger in population and systematically comparative studies' 
This persistence within strictly organisational boundaries can be explained as a 
result of the methodological necessity to link micro-activities and processes to 
outcomes at the organisational level (as concluded in section 2.4.2). Generalisations 
about practitioners are therefore obstructed by the voluntary confinement of S-a-P 
literature within organisational boundaries. As a consequence, the micro-macro 
integration pursued by the S-a-P community is also restrained. If the organisation, 
or even the organisation's context, represents the macro level of analysis, then 
abstractions to communities of practitioners outside the boundaries of the 
organisation are limited. As long as the reference group of practitioners is confined 
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within strictly organisational boundaries, empirical research offers little in the way 
of context-specific generalisations about the practitioners' contributions to strategy. 
2.4.4 The activity-based view and the pursuit of generalisability 
The previous discussion illustrated that the S-a-P literature, although emphasising 
the focal managerial level, gives content rather than context specific accounts of the 
managers' contribution to strategy. This is attributed to the narrow focus of the S-a- 
P literature on organisational contexts, which is necessitated by the need to link the 
focal micro-activities and processes to strategic outcomes at the organisational 
level. The consequent choice of a similarly organisationally bound reference group 
limits context-specific generalisations about the practitioners' contribution to 
strategy. 
Achieving generalisability is therefore dependent on the choice of a reference 
group, and at the same time, the ability of the research inquiry to make logical 
inferences about the practitioners' contribution to strategy. Within the S-a-P 
literature, the pursuit of the latter determined the choice of the first. This, as I will 
go on to argue, can be attributed to a gap in the development of the activity-based 
view. The activity-based view advocated by the S-a-P literature focuses on what 
practitioners `do' and the impact of their activity on strategic outcomes has been 
developed in an experiential-like manner, lacking a conceptual understanding of the 
linkage between the practitioners' activity and organisational strategy. Upon 
establishing this conceptual linkage, it would be possible to avoid the 
methodological confinement on strictly organisational boundaries and provide 
context-specific accounts of the practitioners' contribution to strategy by selecting a 
wider reference group. 
Moreover, S-a-P literature has not drawn sufficiently from an empirically and 
theoretically rich body of literature on managerial work activity. Within that field, 
exemplars such as Mintzberg (1973), Kotter (1982), Stewart (1967,1976,1982), 
and Hales (1986,1987,1999) have managed to generalise about the managers' 
work, providing equally rich accounts of their activity through ethnographic 
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studies. The field of managerial work activity achieves generalisations that the S-a- 
P literature does not make. Researchers on managerial work activity take 
occupational groups as a reference while, within the S-a-P literature, this is 
something that represents an `untouched' level of abstraction to the macro 
community level. 
The field of managerial work activity is not extraneous to the S-a-P field; early on, 
Whittington (1996: 734) had suggested that the field of managerial work activity 
may provide relevant insights. Indeed, they both share a focus on the practitioners' 
detailed activity and, while the S-a-P field also emphasises the process of social 
interaction, this is not exclusive in the managerial work literature. Exemplars within 
the field of managerial work activity have long noted that, when we observe 
managers at work, what we see is a lot of talk (Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 1982; 
Stewart, 1982; Watson, 1994,1995). As Tsoukas (1996: 23) also suggests, know- 
how and expertise are expressed and embedded in social interaction. Some authors 
(Hardy et al, 2000; Roos and Von Krogh, 1996) went as far as to suggest that the 
outcome of the strategy process depends to a large extent on factors such as who 
talks to whom, why they talk, what they talk about, and when these conversations 
take place. The process of social interaction looked for by the S-a-P community can 
be well accommodated within the same ethnographic focus. 
On the other hand, the study of managerial work activity carries a potential 
problem, which authors within the S-a-P field have so far avoided: the conceptual 
linkage between managerial activity and organisational strategy. So far, the S-a-P 
field has tackled this problem via multi-layered modes of inquiry linking micro 
activity to strategic outcomes. This is represented in what Whittington et al 
(2004: 15) noted as the requisite breadth in research approach: 
'While the foundation of strategy practice research will remain such 
intimate research engagements as ethnography, making links between 
managerial and organisational action will require as well a stronger grasp of 
what is going on outside particular local episodes' 
27 
The required breadth in research approach can be inclusive of the study of 
managerial work activity, which, combined with a conceptual linkage between 
managerial activity and organisational strategy, will allow context specific 
generalisations of groups of practitioners. 
2.5 Summary and conclusion 
The review of the classic strategy literature demonstrated that existing 
operationalisations of strategy are unable to capture the managers' role and 
contribution to the strategy of the firm. More recent conceptions of strategy as 
social practice, as advocated by the S-a-P literature, have given rise to micro- 
analytic studies on strategy, which allow the managers' contribution to surface. 
However, the S-a-P literature has provided content, rather than context specific, 
accounts of the managers' contribution to strategy, focusing more on the forms 
managers' contribution can take, rather than generalising about groups of 
practitioners. 
The aforementioned narrow level of abstraction is the result of the S-a-P literature 
remaining confined strictly within organisational boundaries. Section 2.4.3 
demonstrated that this narrow empirical focus is a methodological necessity for the 
S-a-P community, driven by the need to link managerial and organisational levels 
of action. Given the apparent difficulty of linking focal micro-activities and 
processes to strategic outcomes at the organisational level, the reference group of 
practitioners `needs' to be within single organisational boundaries in order to limit 
the analytical complexity of such empirical accounts. 
Context specific generalisations about the managers' contribution to the strategy of 
their firm can, however, be given if the focal reference group of managers is wide 
enough to make abstractions within context. While the sheer complexity of the 
micro-analytical approach and the difficulty of making links to strategic outcomes 
obstruct the selection of wider reference groups, a solution can be found through a 
conceptual linkage of managerial activity and organisational strategy. In other 
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words, a solution requires a conceptual confrontation of the problem of 
incommensurability between managerial activity and organisational strategy. 
This conclusion points to a gap in the development of the activity-based view of 
strategy. While the S-a-P literature has emphasised what managers' do and its 
effects on the strategy of the firm, it has progressed very little in terms of theory 
development to achieve a conceptual understanding of the linkage between 
managerial activity and organisational strategy. To do so, as argued in section 2.4.4, 
it is necessary to take a closer look at what managers actually do, something that 
requires the use of the research body on managerial work activity. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE FIELD OF MANAGERIAL WORK ACTIVITY 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to bridge the empirical gap in the development in the 
view of activity-based strategy. The chapter starts with an overview of the field, 
providing an informed understanding of what managers actually do and the nature 
of their activity. Taking into account the empirical observations made in the field of 
managerial work activity, section 3.3 assesses the assumption of taking such 
activity to be `strategic'. The discussion highlights the problem of the 
indeterminacy of managerial inputs to outputs at the organisational level; 
managerial activity may not have any observable outputs at the organisational level 
because outcomes are the result of interrelated activities and collective action. 
Section 3.4 reviews role theory as the main analytical tool of managerial work and 
examines its capacity to be of use to the study of strategy-as-practice; the chapter 
concludes by showing the way forward, as well as the limitations of the field. 
3.2 Overview 
3.2.1 The nature of managerial work activity 
The managerial stream of research seeks to describe and explain `why' and `what' 
managers do in their workplace. These questions were instilled in a number of early 
classical studies that had an impact on the field thereafter (Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg, 
1973; Sayles, 1964; Stewart, 1967,1976,1982). Hales (1986,1999,2001), in his 
comprehensive reviews of the research within the field, found that managerial work 
exhibits a number of consistent characteristics. Although these appear diverse, and 
to a different extent in the literature, the following findings are considered common: 
- Short, interrupted and fragmented activities 
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- An obligation to react to events, problems and the requirements of others 
-A preoccupation with the urgent, ad hoc and unforeseen, rather than the planned 
- The embedding or nesting of activities within others 
-A high level of verbal interaction, often face to face or by phone, but 
increasingly by email 
-A degree of tension, pressure and conflict in seeking to juggle competing 
demands 
- Considerable choice and negotiation over the nature and boundaries of the job 
and how it is done 
(Hales, 2001: 51) 
The above findings portray managerial activity as fragmented, reactive, and 
preoccupied with the day-to-day and the routine, in contrast with classical 
management theory (Fayol, 1916; Barnard, 1938), which describes management 
through its functions that are much grander in scope. Classical management theory 
was first challenged by Mintzberg's (1973) observational study of American CEOs. 
Mintzberg's study attracted scholarly attention when it presented managers as 
reactive, non-planning, non-methodical beings. While Mintzberg's study has since 
been frequently replicated, with his findings being confirmed and occasionally, 
disconfirmed, there is a general consensus about the apparent gap between the 
theory and practice of managerial work activity. 
3.2.2 Reconciling the theory and practice of managerial work 
Despite the convergence of empirical findings, the field was subject to criticism for 
failing to bridge the gap between theory and practice or what Mintzberg (1975) 
called `a gap between folklore and fact'. The theory of management is represented 
by the classic teachings of early authors such as Fayol (1916) and Barnard (1938), 
who portray management through its functions. Fayol identified five elements of 
management: planning/forecasting, organising, commanding, coordinating and 
controlling. Although management functions as identified by early authors were not 
empirically grounded, they were generally accepted as sufficient descriptors of 
managerial work. The dissonance between theory and practice was illustrated when 
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those conceptions of managerial work were gradually tested by later empirical 
studies, and as they showed, could not explain the body of evidence. 
More recently, that concept seems to have been turned around, with authors arguing 
that previous studies had been hasty to disclaim previous theoretical assumptions. 
The results of empirical studies, showing that managers do not spend much time 
coordinating, planning and controlling, does not mean they do not do so (Hales, 
1986; Whitley, 1989). Various authors (Hales, 1999; Noordegraaf and Stewart, 
2000; Tsoukas, 1994; Willmott, 1984) hold the inability of existing research to 
explain managerial work partially responsible for the gap between theory and 
practice, taking into account the context in question. As Tsoukas (1994: 294) says: 
`if the study of managers is reduced to the study of individual actors on 
stage, the script and the setting which enable actors to perform in the first 
instance are neglected' 
The above, however, does not imply that there are no areas of agreement that span 
both theory and practice. Hales (1986,1999,2001), in his reviews of the field, 
found that in both the evidence and theory of accounts of managerial work: a) the 
nature of managerial work is contingent upon contextual variables; b) the 
managers' activities are not only influenced by their context; they can also choose 
or negotiate their content and style of work; c) managerial activities are not 
performed unproblematically, instead they are compromised and negotiated within 
the organisation, d) the boundaries of managerial work are fluid. An individual 
manager can define the extent to which he or she will get involved in different 
activities and stretch across normal business boundaries. 
3.3 The 'strategicness' of managerial activity 
The question arising is: how can the managers' contribution to strategy be 
conceived if the empirical evidence demonstrates that their actions are anything but 
strategic. This concern has been echoed in Whittington's (1996) early work: 
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`research on managerial work may be more focused on its unromantic 
realities, leading to the marginalisation of strategic activity' p. 734 
As an afterthought, Whittington (2002: 9) commented that the work of practitioners 
may consist of unglamorous material but this is probably the largest part of their 
activities. He further suggested that the practice perspective needs to go deeper into 
the black box and delve into the ordinary work involved in the routines of everyday 
life. However, the lack of an operational account of how managerial activity may 
affect the strategy of the firm has given rise to the presumption, among some 
authors within the S-a-P field (Clark, 2004; Hendry and Seidl, 2003; Whittington, 
2003,2004), that (top-level) managerial activity can be equated to strategic activity. 
Clark (2004: 105), for example, stated: 
`... strategy is a crucial and time-consuming activity' 
The above presumption is apparently made by various authors for simplification 
purposes, but does not help when it comes to giving an operational account of the 
managers' contribution to the strategy of the firm. Thus, S-a-P literature tends to 
assume that all (top-level) managerial activity is strategic, in a similar manner to the 
planning approach to strategy, though distinguished by its micro-analytical 
approach and the focus on the focal managers. 
In this section I will argue that managerial activity should not be labelled as 
`strategic', as strategy is a property of the firm and not of managerial activity. 
Managerial activity should rather be seen as the raw managerial input which, if seen 
in isolation, gives away very little about what is achieved at the level of the firm, or 
in other words, its output. To prove this point, evidence is drawn from empirical 
evidence on the managers' planning activity (Section 3.3.1). 
3.3.1 Evidence from planning 
Early studies on managerial work diminished any perceptions that considered 
managers to be proactive, reflective beings. Mintzberg (1973), in his study of CEOs 
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in the US, provided evidence for that supposition and agreed that managers do not 
plan their work activities; they act whenever an issue occurs. More specifically, he 
found that managers spend very little time planning, are subject to constant 
interruptions, hold short, face to face meetings which flit from topic to topic and 
respond to the initiatives of others far more than they initiate themselves. 
Mintzberg's explanation is that managers prefer the more active elements of their 
work; in particular, activities that are current, specific, well defined and non- 
routine. This picture does not portray a strategist. As Mintzberg (1973: 153) 
explains: 
`The strategy making process appears to be integrated only by the sense that 
the manager, by virtue of his great store of information and the loose plans 
he develops in his head, can interrelate the decisions he makes. Thus, 
current strategy-making practice cannot be characterised as grand planning' 
Kurke and Aldrich (1983), who replicated Mintzberg's study, give a similar 
account. Their findings supported Mintzberg's theory, as the authors claim, in all 
important respects. Kurke and Aldrich (1983: 12) conclude their analysis by asking: 
`How can organisations tolerate the non-planning manager pictured in 
Mintzberg's and our results? ' 
They provide three possible answers. Firstly, the manager can afford the luxury of 
not planning because organisational subunits respond effectively to their 
environments. Secondly, no organisation has a disadvantage because its managers 
do not plan. Finally, a non-planning stance can be sustained because it allows 
organisations to respond to unexpected changes and maintain a good fit with their 
environments. The authors therefore portray managers as constantly reacting to 
environmental pressures with no plan or strategy to serve as a guide. 
We can identify two issues in the existing empirical findings. The first is the 
observation that managers do not engage significantly in planning activity, which, if 
considered as the observable manifestation of strategic activity, should be discarded 
as such. Second is the subsequent observation that managerial activity itself is 
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fragmented and remedial in character, illustrating a very reactive stance on behalf 
of the managers. According to some authors (Kurke and Aldrich, 1983; Kotter, 
1982), though, such a stance retains efficiency; formal planning may not be used as 
such, as the nature of managerial work dictates a reactive and opportunistic way 
which is more efficient than formal planning. Kotter (1982: 60-94), for instance, 
explained that the fragmented and remedial nature of managerial activity, in the 
context of agendas and networks, means that a reactive, informal and piecemeal 
distribution of time and effort is both efficient and effective. Agendas are uncertain 
and dynamic, as they refer to the implicit goals and priorities the managers have, 
which are loosely coupled with specific strategies and plans, and are likely to be 
changed or revised according to the managers' interpretation of the organisation's 
situation. The managers, as Kotter observed, use their network, which can often 
include hundreds or thousands of individuals, to achieve their agendas. In light of 
the complexity and uncertainty of agendas, formal planning may be difficult to use, 
whereas reactive and opportunistic behaviour allows managers to achieve much in a 
short time and rapidly deal with a range of problems. 
The presentation of the empirical findings on the managers' planning activity shows 
not only the misconception that (top-level) managers engage in strategic activity 
which is exemplified through planning, but also that, for the managers to get things 
`done' and produce the desired outcome, it is necessary to engage in an array of 
interrelated activities. So it is not the activity itself that is strategic but the overall 
output of interrelated activities. Even authors (see for instance Snyder and Glueck, 
1980) who replicated Mintzberg's (1973) work and challenged the validity of his 
findings have concurred that the key is to understand the context of the managers' 
work and the way their activities are interrelated. Planning may not be a significant 
part of managerial activity, but in the context of the managers' work, the 
fragmented and reactive nature of their activity enables managers to produce more 
than they would do through planning. However, planning is not the only example of 
the futility of expecting an isolated managerial activity to account for the managers' 
output. Brunsson (1982), reflecting on decision science, suggested that some 
seemingly irrational decision making serves to get things `done' within the 
organisation by developing motivation and commitment to action amongst 
organisation members. Hence, within context, such decision making becomes 
35 
rational. A similar argument can hold here: managerial work activity serves to get 
things `done' and produce the desired outcome, though in a seemingly fragmented, 
remedial, and reactive manner. It is therefore sensible to separate managerial 
activity (input) from results at that level of the firm (seen as managerial output). 
Organisational outcomes may well be of strategic importance and, as such, 
references should be made to strategic outcomes but not to `strategic' activity. 
3.3.2 The problem of indeterminacy: Linking managerial inputs and outputs 
In the previous section it was demonstrated that managerial activity, if seen in 
isolation of the particular context as well as other interrelated activities, represents 
only the managers' inputs and not their output, or what is achieved at the level of 
the firm. Literature on managerial work activity, however, has focused on 
describing and explaining patterns of managerial inputs and not output at the 
organisational level. This is problematic, as without a linkage between managerial 
inputs and outputs, we are unable to connect managerial activity to strategic 
outcomes. 
In the literature on managerial work, the effects of managerial activity at the level 
of the firm remain obscure, although various authors have tried to breakdown the 
problem of the indeterminacy of managerial inputs to outputs or suggest solutions. 
Marples' (1967) had suggested the analysis of problem portfolios of managers as a 
way forward, arguing that the resolution of problems could be seen as the 
managers' output. Many years later, Whitley (1989) argued that managerial 
problems cannot be specified and resolved without considering related issues, 
because it is the overall outcome that is important. According to Whitley (1989: 
214), managerial work can only be evaluated in terms of the collective output of the 
system of which it is part, and competence cannot be determined by direct visible 
results of task performance. In the same vein, Hales (2001: 56) writes: 
`individual managers may not make a difference because no-one does: 
organisational outcomes emerge, without evident authorship, from complex 
negotiated interactions' 
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Whitley (1989) and Hales (2001) refer to issues of collective action within the firm, 
whereby the managers' inputs may not have a significant or at least a discernible 
effect at the level of the firm, given the complex and negotiated input of other 
actors in the organisation. Bearing in mind that the research body on managerial 
work activity necessarily focuses on the focal managers and not on the collective 
action within the organisation, there is an obvious problem in terms of how to grasp 
managerial output without straying from the study of the managers in question. 
This, according to the authors, seems to be the major obstacle in grasping 
managers' output at the level of the firm. 
Hales (1986), however, did suggest a way to understand managerial output through 
the study of managerial activity. In particular, he noted: 
`a dichotomy between doing and achieving is misleading. It is better to 
conceive it as a continuum ranging from simple behaviour stripped from the 
context of intention, and therefore of meaning, through activities endowed 
with context based meaning, to tasks, or the defined goals of activity and 
functions, the intended contribution of managerial tasks to the organisation 
as a whole' (Hales, 1986: 106) 
Hales' suggestion represents an attempt to establish a linkage between managerial 
inputs and outputs at the organisational level in an operational manner. His 
conception of managerial inputs does not stray from that of early authors 
(Mintzberg, 1973, Kotter, 1982; Kurke and Aldrich, 1983; Snyder and Glueck, 
1980), who acknowledged that the incompleteness of isolated managerial activity 
accounts for the managers' contribution at the level of the firm. On the other hand, 
the interpretive approach Hales (1986) advocates adds to the traditional 
ethnographic approach taken by researchers within the field, suggesting a more 
integrative treatment of the problem of indeterminacy. 
Taking into account the discussion above (see also section 3.3.1), we can conclude 
that activity cannot be strategic as such; however, the outcome that is produced by 
the managers' activity can be strategic. The connection between managerial activity 
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and strategic outcomes is problematic, arising from the issue of the indeterminacy 
of managerial inputs to outputs at the level of the firm. Within the literature on the 
subject, managerial work activity does not have a discernible effect on the 
outcomes that are produced at the level of the firm. It is, however, possible to link 
managerial inputs and outputs through a more integrative approach, combining 
ethnography and interpretivism. 
3.4 Examining the contribution potential of role theory 
Role theory has been commonly used in studies on managerial work activity by 
ascribing sets of roles to the managers under examination in order to generalise and 
typify their behaviour. Elements of role theory, however, have also been used 
within S-a-P literature, and the question is whether role theory can be transposed to 
S-a-P research. This section therefo re d wells on role theory and examines the 
feasibility of applying role theory in studying managers' contribution to strategy, as 
well as assessing its potential to become a means for generalising about the 
managers' contribution. 
3.4.1 Overview 
Authors (Merton, 1957a; Katz and Kahn, 1978; Fondas and Stewart, 1994) have 
conceived a role set to be the people with whom the manager has contact with, and 
who hold expectations about the manager's performance. Since the people that 
form the role set depend on the manager's performance to an extent, they develop 
beliefs and attitudes on what the manager should do as part of his/her role. These 
beliefs and attitudes held by members of a role set are described as role 
expectations, which are `sent' to the focal person in the form of a sent role; this 
refers to the interaction episodes between the members of the role set and the 
manager. The manager's perception of the messages sent by the role set is the 
received role. Finally, role behaviour is what the manager does in response a) to the 
received messages and b) his/her perception of the role. 
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In the field of managerial work activity, role theory has been a useful analytical tool 
for examining variations of managerial work across different contexts (Hales, 1987; 
Hales and Tamangani, 1996; Hickson, 1973; Stewart et at, 1994), and thus, 
providing context specific generalisations regarding managerial work. Role theory 
has, however, been criticised as giving an overly deterministic view of managerial 
activity. Empirical studies often describe managerial work as observable behaviour 
driven by other people's expectations. Generalisations are made based on the 
manager's position in the organisation's authority system and across other 
organisations. In such cases, ̀ role' is used to describe a process of conformity and 
consensus over role expectations. 
Theoretically, a degree of disagreement over the focal person's behaviour is 
possible and this disagreement, or role conflict, allows the manager to define the 
expectations to which he or she prefers to be held (Kahn et al, 1964; Miles and 
Perreault, 1976). In cases when people assume different roles than that expected by 
their role set, in Goffman's (1967) terms, they display `role distance'. Fondas and 
Stewart (1994) use the term `expectation enactment' to refer to the impact the focal 
manager has on the expectations of the role set. In other words, the focal manager 
assumes roles divergent from the sent roles purposefully by `intentionally initiating 
opportunities to shape role expectations' (Fondas and Stewart, 1994: 88). 
There have been efforts by various authors (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980; March 
and Simon, 1958; Montgomery, 1998; Simon, 1981) to make use of role theory, not 
just as a means of generalising about managerial behaviour, but as an integrative 
analytical tool that can be useful in organisation theory as well. Simon (1981), for 
instance, argued that a role is not a set of prescribed behaviours, but a set of 
prescribed decision premises. Earlier, March and Simon (1958) saw roles as 
descriptors of logical action as opposed to the rational/calculative choice (a 
characteristic of contingency theorising). Crozier and Friedberg (1980) 
conceptualised roles as descriptors of action that allow actors to play the 
`organisational game'. One of the most recent and integrative attempts to conceive 
a role is made by Montgomery (1998), who builds upon March and Simon's 
distinct explanation of the logic of action, showing how they can be reconciled. 
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Thus, theoretically, role theory seems to be a promising analytical tool with some 
integrative capacity. 
3.4.2 Application of role theory within the S-a-P literature 
Within the S-a-P literature, expectations analysis, similar to that used in role theory, 
is used to understand how individual actors affect outcomes by shaping other 
actors' expectations. Bowman and Ambrosini (2000, see also van't Hof, 2005) note 
that a common approach in corporate change is to introduce a new CEO. Typically 
the CEO is driven by others' expectations to effect change, and the confidence to 
act derives from direct personal experience of the `solution'. Maidis and 
Lawrence's (2003: 120) empirical study of strategising in the British symphony 
orchestra concurs with the previous point: 
`With the arrival of the new Artistic Director in February 1998 came the 
strong expectation within the orchestra that there would soon be an artistic 
strategy' 
At an even more micro level, Denis et al (2004) illustrate how practitioners use 
numbers when strategising in order to shape others' expectations, while Hodginson 
and Wright (2002) describe an event where the arrangement of details by the CEO, 
such as the seating plan, commanded a different set of expectations by the 
participants. 
Role theory however, or indeed, any type of expectations analysis, can only express 
partly managerial inputs to strategic outcomes. As Golsorkhi (2004: 10) shows, in 
his typology of types of practice (based on Weber's typology of action), practice 
driven by expectations represents only one type, which is alongside value-oriented, 
emotion-oriented, and tradition-oriented practice. In this sense, role theory cannot 
be applied in S-a-P research, as it does not fully encompass the managers' inputs. 
Johnson et al (2003) concentrated more on conceptual development, seeing 
expectations analysis as a method by which we can understand how actors construct 
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their institutional environment, thus providing a link between the micro and macro 
context of action. As Barley and Tolbert (1997: 94) argue, we can understand 
institutions in terms of: 
`the history of negotiations that lead to `shared typifications' or generalised 
expectations and interpretations of behaviour' 
As Johnson et al (2003) see it, expectations analysis and, in effect, role theory is not 
a means for generalising about practitioners, but rather a mid-level theory by which 
micro-level interactions are linked to macro-level institutions, nurtured by a shared 
pool of expectations across the reference group of practitioners. 
3.4.3 Contribution potential and limitations 
Role theory has served the field of managerial work activity and has been 
problematic for organisation theorists, who attempted to link managerial and 
organisational action. However, the use of elements of role theory within S-a-P 
literature, unlike the literature on managerial work, is not about typifying 
managerial behaviour, but provides an analytical tool to look at how actors 
influence, and are influenced by, their surrounding environment. Therefore its 
contribution is that it provides a means of analysing the reciprocal communication 
between the micro and the macro context of action. Nonetheless, role theory cannot 
be used as a principal theory in the activity-based view of strategy. It is limited as a 
means of describing managers' inputs (activity) to achieve the desired strategic 
outcomes, as it can only account for expectation-driven managerial inputs. 
3.8 Summary and conclusion 
Empirical evidence from the literature on managerial work activity challenges some 
of the assumptions made by authors within S-a-P literature, in particular that of 
taking strategy as an activity. It was argued that strategy cannot be deduced to be 
any isolated activity because strategy can be the outcome of many interrelated 
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activities, therefore reasserting the importance of linking activities to outcomes at 
the organisational level, which may well be strategic. 
S-a-P literature, however, has failed to provide an integrative conceptual account 
for the connection between managerial activity and strategic outcomes. As shown 
in chapter two, such linkages are established in a rather experiential manner, 
assisted by in-depth, micro-analytical, and often multi-layered studies. On the other 
hand, the sheer complexity of its micro-analytical approach has led to the voluntary 
confinement of its empirical body within strictly organisational boundaries. This 
has created a problem for empirical research, by obstructing the selection of wider 
reference groups, and effectively limiting the extent of generalisation that can be 
achieved. 
Strategic outcomes 
The organisational level 
Outputs 
------------- -------- --------------------------------- 
The managerial level 
----- Inputs 
Other actors 
Figure 1: The problem of indeterminacy 
At this point, we can decompose the problem to its constituent parts: firstly, the 
difficulty of moving from managerial inputs to outputs at the organisational level 
(Figure 1). As shown by the review of literature on managerial work activity, the 
link between what the managers do (their inputs) and what they achieve (their 
outputs) at the organisational level cannot be readily determined. Not only are the 
managers' inputs complex and interrelated, but also negotiated with other actors 
within the firm, making their output at the level of the firm difficult to discern. 
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Hales (1986), however, attempted to provide a solution by viewing the managers' 
output as the intended contribution of managerial tasks to the organisation as a 
whole, giving way to interpretive rather than ethnographic approaches to 
identifying the managers' output. Secondly, there is the problem of identifying the 
outputs that lead to strategic outcomes. Just as we cannot assume that managerial 
activity is strategic, we cannot assume the strategicness of its output. 
Going back to our conclusion in chapter two, an attempt to generalise the 
contribution of practitioners within context requires a conceptual resolution of the 
problem of the incommensurability between managerial activity and organisational 
strategy. Knowing the constituent elements of the problem, we are left with two 
tasks: a) to grasp the managers' output at the organisational level and b) to identify 
those outputs that lead to strategic outcomes. In doing so, it would be possible to 
avoid a focus on in-depth, micro-analytic studies on single organisations, allowing 
the selection of reference group practitioners within wider contexts. 
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CHAPTER 4 
UNIFYING THE FIELDS 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 concluded by suggesting that it is possible to operationalise the 
managers' contribution to the strategy of the firm by identifying the managerial 
outputs that lead to strategic outcomes. By doing that, it addresses the problem of 
the incommensurability between managerial activity and organisational strategy, 
the resolution of which will allow context specific abstractions about the managers' 
contribution. Consequently, this chapter is concerned with devising such an 
operationalisation. Firstly, it deals with the basic problem of the indeterminacy of 
managerial inputs to outputs at the organisational level; for that purpose, section 4.2 
suggests a unitary view of organisation, which cancels out issues of collective 
action and minimises intraorganisational complexity. Section 4.3 makes the 
proposition that uncertainty is a strategy-generating principle, commo n in both 
managerial and organisational levels of action. Therefore, by examining the 
managers' response to uncertainty, it is possible to identify those outputs that lead 
to strategic outcomes. Finally, section 4.4 describes the conceptual framework that 
is applied for the purpose of the study. 
4.2 Towards a unitary view of organisation 
The connection between managerial and organisational action has been a critical 
issue within the S-a-P field (Hung and Whittington, 1997; Jarzabkowski, 2004; 
Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2002; Johnson et al, 2003; Whittington, 2001). In 
chapter three, I argued that this issue is part of the more fundamental problem of the 
indeterminacy of managerial inputs to outputs at the organisational level. In simple 
terms, the interrelated nature of managerial activities and issues of collective action 
within the firm make the identification of the managers' output obscure. Hales' 
(1986) proposition of eliciting the managers' intended contribution to the 
organisation as a solution to the problem of indeterminacy, although useful, does 
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not resolve the issues of collective action within the firm. In order to overcome the 
problem of indeterminacy and link the managerial and organisational levels of 
action, I suggest the adoption of a unitary view of organisation, a simplifying 
assumption that minimises issues of collective action, and thus, permits the 
communication between managerial inputs and outputs at the organisational level. 
A unitary view of organisation suggests that power is concentrated on one, or a few 
people, within a firm (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). In Burrell and Morgan's (1979: 
204) analysis, the unitary view of organisation assumes confluence, not conflict, 
between individual, group and organisational goals. Similarly, Grandori (1995) 
refers to unitarist organisations as those that do not have intraorganisational interest 
groups, and where administrative effectiveness does not rely on the outcome of 
their negotiation or collaboration. Unitarism also appears frequently in 
organisational behaviour literature (see Abbott, 2006; Corby, 1992; Fox, 1974; 
Geare et al, 2006; Lewis, 1989), especially in the employment relations stream, 
denoting one set of interests and values binding all parties towards a common goal. 
Provis (1996), in his critical reassessment of the unitary view, however, suggests 
that `interests' are substantially different from `values', and emphasises the role of 
organisational culture in shaping what can be either a unitary or pluralist 
organisational environment. 
In the strategic management literature (Child, 1972; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 
1988; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Miller et al, 1984; Koza and Thoenig, 2003), the 
unitary view of organisation is used more as an assumption rather than an 
observable fact, assuming that managers have complete authority within the 
organisation, which allows for focus on the top echelons of the firm. Child (1972), 
for instance, applied it in his concept of strategic choice. 
`We need to direct our attention towards those who possess the power to 
decide upon the organisation's structural rationale, towards the limits upon 
that power imposed by the operational context, and the process of assessing 
constraints and opportunities against values in deciding organisational 
strategies' (Child, 1972: 13) 
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In Child's view, the management's activity outside the organisation is highly 
political, being engaged in boundary spanning activities (power relationships 
outside the organisation); within the organisation, he assumes that power is 
centralised around a few key holders of power, the top echelons of the firm. Power- 
holders are assumed to have complete authority and therefore their actions are free 
from internal conflict. 
What Child achieved with this assumption is to conflate managerial and 
organisational action, permitting the study of the environment-firm interaction, 
whilst assuming that the power-holders' political behaviour is oriented outside the 
organisation and not within. Even though these individuals, the power-holders, are 
endowed with authority within the organisation, their power is constantly 
negotiated outside the organisation. Hence, instead of recognising the conflicts and 
diverse interests at the intraorganisational level, strategic choice acknowledges 
conflicts and diverse interests at the interorganisational level as well as the capacity 
of organisational agents to exercise power over the environment. 
In the context of this study, the adoption of a unitary view of organisation has 
implications for the activity-based view of strategy. Firstly, it deals with the 
problem of indeterminacy, assuming that the output of managerial activity is not 
negotiated with other actors within the firm. In turn, this opens the path for a 
conceptual development of how managerial activity contributes to strategic 
outcomes. Lastly, by denoting a focus on the power-holders rather than 
intraorganisational groups, it allows generalisations about practitioners at a cross- 
organisational level. In other words, it allows context-specific generalisations about 
the managers' contribution to strategy. 
4.3 Uncertainty as a strategy-generating principle 
The unitary view of organisation allows us to eliminate issues of collective action in 
strategy formation, place the managers' role at centre stage, and make the 
managers' outputs at the organisational level easier to discern. Yet, as argued in 
section 3.3, we cannot readily equate managerial outputs to strategic outcomes, just 
as we cannot assume that managerial activity is `strategic'. Here, it is possible to 
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develop an integrative link between managerial activity and organisational strategy 
by conceiving the outputs that lead to strategic outcomes as those that result from 
the managers' response to uncertainty. In particular, in the following discussion it is 
argued that if uncertainty is a predictor of organisational action, which can be 
referred to as strategic, and a generative mechanism of managerial action; then the 
managers' contribution to achieving strategic outcomes, and in effect to the strategy 
of the firm, is defined through their response to uncertainty. In this sense, 
uncertainty is taken as a strategy-generating principle that allows the 
operationalisation of the managers' contribution to strategy. 
4.3.1 Uncertainty and strategy 
The strategy field has long treated uncertainty as the driving force of organisational 
strategy (Fredrickson, 1983; Hampden-Turner, 1993; Jauch and Kraft, 1986; 
Mintzberg, 1978; Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991; Quinn, 1988; Spender, 1980,1989), 
based on the commonplace assumption among early organisation theorists (March 
and Simon, 1958; Scott, 1987; Thompson, 1967; Williamson, 1975,1985), as well 
as in early seminal empirical studies (Bums and Stalker, 1961; Chandler, 1962; 
Emery and Trist, 1965), that uncertainty is a predictor of organisational action. 
Following this line of thought, the predominant view was that organisational 
performance is dependent on the management's ability to reduce uncertainty. In his 
seminal work, Thompson specifically argued that most organisational action can be 
explained by the need to reduce uncertainty. Thompson's formal theory of 
organisations suggested that uncertainty is handled within the organisational 
domain through `buffering', as a response to environmental fluctuations, and 
through `anticipating and adapting', as a response to environmental constraints. 
With regard to the former, organisations will tend to `smooth' their effects, by 
attempting to reduce the fluctuations in their controlled environment. Thompson's 
theory encapsulates what following studies within the strategy field saw as the 
process of adaptation in response to changes in the external environment. 
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4.3.2 The management's response to uncertainty 
Assuming that management has a mediating role (Child, 1972; Mintzberg, 1978; 
Penrose, 1959; Pfeffer, 1975) in the environment-firm interaction, thus driving 
organisational action when dealing with uncertainty, we can understand the 
management's response to uncertainty as their contribution to the strategy of the 
firm (Spender, 1980,1989). As shown earlier, strategy literature views changes in 
the state of the external environment, to which organisations need to adapt, as the 
major source of uncertainty. The management's understanding of their firm's 
environment then becomes of central importance. Penrose (1959) developed the 
notion that managers create a view of their organisation's environment. Early 
studies (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Downey et al, 1977; Duncan, 1972; Tung, 
1979) concur that the objective measurement of the environment is fraught with 
difficulties, being influenced by the decision maker's perceptions and 
interpretations. Managers may even filter the signals from the external environment 
in order to align them with what they consider more relevant to their organisation's 
situation. As Penrose (1959: 215) says: 
`The environment is treated as an image in the mind of the manager because 
this is the environment which is relevant to the managers' decisions' 
Consequently, the managers' response is contingent upon their interpretive 
understanding of their situation. This notion has been particularly reflected in the 
literature on strategic groups (Daniels et al, 1994; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1993; 
Porac et al, 1989; Reger, 1990; Reger and Huff, 1993), which looks at business 
competition from an individual perspective, having established the cognitive 
schema of the environment held by the key decision makers as the link between 
community/ group level and firm level competitive phenomena. 
Nonetheless, the management's response is not only contingent on their interpretive 
understanding but also embedded in what Schutz (1967) calls `stocks of 
knowledge'. Stocks of knowledge are characteristic of communities, being 
developed through a history of interactions within a given social context (Berger 
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and Luckman 1971; Schutz and Luckmann, 1973). As Reger and Huff (1993: 106) 
would explain: 
`managers interact with each other at industry associations and other 
gatherings; they share similar sources of information such as trade 
publications; they hire from the same professional labor pool and frequently 
employ the same consultants' 
Similarly, Berger and Luckmann (1971: 76) had argued that social interaction 
among individuals builds up a set of mutual expectations which, when confirmed, 
are treated as understanding. Part of this understanding is how individuals make 
choices, leading to a transfer of judgment and the beginnings of a shared rationality. 
Spender argued (1980: 95) that this socialisation process eventually generates a 
body of shared understanding or common rationalities. At the industry level, what 
Spender (1989) refers to as the `industry recipe' represents the group's shared 
rationality. 
In Spender's view, the management's response to uncertainty does not only define 
their contribution to the strategy of the firm, but also demonstrates the context- 
specific nature of their contribution. Drawing upon Schutz's (1967) work, Spender 
argued that managers within the same industry, in the face of uncertainty, draw 
from a shared pool of knowledge from which they make judgments. These 
judgments denote a shared understanding amongst communities of practitioners as 
to how they can deal with uncertainty. 
4.3.3 Uncertainty and managerial activity 
The previous discussion showed that communities of managers within specific 
contexts have a shared knowledge of how to deal with uncertainty, or as Spender 
(1980,1989) saw it, a shared manner of making strategy. Spender saw the 
management's response to uncertainty as the judgmental bridge between 
organisational strategy and managerial activity. In his empirical work, however, he 
focused on the judgmental and not on the `activity' part of his conception. Penrose 
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(1959) provided further insights in her work, although Spender did not explicitly 
build upon it at that time. Penrose referred to the `judgmental' part as the managers' 
experiential knowledge, whereby the managers use to choose actions which enable 
the firm to sustain itself and grow. She also added that this knowledge is reflected 
in the managers' activity; in particular, in the activity patterns for handling the 
operating cycle of the firm, thus giving a more operational account of how 
uncertainty is linked to both the managerial and organisational levels of action. 
Bowman and Ambrosini (2000) provide further empirical evidence on this matter. 
Building on the assumption that an individual's actions stem from applying their 
unique interpretation to the situations confronting them, they provided an 
experiential account of how these actions are mainly based on experience and 
learned routines. They noted: 
`the CEO may perceive that the organisation is performing satisfactorily and 
may play down or overtly dismiss signals from the environment that would 
suggest that changes are necessary' (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000: 208) 
The authors suggest that the managers' routine actions are dynamic, being 
contingent to their ongoing interpretation of their organisation's situation which, in 
turn, informs their judgment about the credibility and viability of their actions; 
furthermore, in the case of uncertainty, the managers would engage in non-routine 
activities. Their account is not far from Penrose's conception. Penrose (1959) saw 
routine activity as exhibiting a degree of what has since been described as `path 
dependence (Lei et al, 1996; Winter, 1987), influenced by the firm's resource base, 
as perceived by its management team. She also recognised that non-routine activity 
(i. e. the creative recombination of the firm's resources) was required in order to 
create value for the firm: 
`The resources with which a particular firm is accustomed to working will 
shape the productive services its management is capable of rendering' 
(Penrose, 1959: 5) 
`The services that resources will yield depend on the capacities of the men 
using them, but the development of the capacities of men is partly shaped by 
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the resources men deal with. The two together create the special productive 
opportunity of a particular firm' (Penrose, 1959: 78-9) 
The managers' ability to create value depends on their capacity to perceive and 
pursue what Penrose calls `productive opportunities' in the external environment. 
This can be explained as their capacity to detect the demand for resources in the 
external environment, which they can satisfy through their `productive services'. 
Penrose, however, took a quasi-unitary view, rather than the unitary view adopted 
by previous authors focusing on the top management teams. Unity of action in 
Penrose's (1959: 46) work is achieved by the shared experience of the top 
management team in a firm-specific capacity, without which managers cannot 
function properly and seize productive opportunities. 
Reflecting back to the empirical evidence from the literature on managerial work 
activity, it is apparent that it concurs that uncertainty is a generative mechanism of 
managerial action. In particular, the effects of uncertainty lead to the selection of 
active and non-routine elements of work (Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 1982). While 
empirical studies (see for example Stewart, 1967; Mintzberg, 1973; Noordegraaf 
and Stewart, 2000) present managerial activity as preoccupied with day-to-day 
issues and problems, resulting in the portrayal of a fragmented and remedial 
pattern, it is apprehension over the uncertain and the problematic which forces 
managers to reestablish balance and continuity. 
The above discussion illustrates that uncertainty is not only a strategy-generating 
principle at the organisational level but also a generative mechanism of managerial 
action. Authors within the S-a-P community (Chia, 2004; Jarzabkowski, 2003; 
Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2002; Salvato, 2004; Samra-Fredericks, 2003; 
Whittington, 2002) have also stressed the link between managerial activity and 
strategy, although they have given mostly experiential accounts of how detailed 
managerial activities contribute to strategic outcomes. Conceiving the managers' 
response to uncertainty as their contribution to the strategy of the firm plays a dual 
role: it helps in the identification of the managerial outputs that lead to strategic 
outcomes as well as the related inputs. 
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4.4 The conceptual framework 
The managers' contribution to strategy is operationalised as their response to 
uncertainty, which is evident at both the domain of knowledge (section 4.3.2) and 
the domain of practice (section 4.3.3). Having made the simplifying assumption 
that power is concentrated within one, or a few individuals within the firm (section 
4.2), we can view the managers as the mediators within the environment and the 
business (in line with similar conceptions developed by Pfeffer, 1975 and 
Mintzberg, 1987). Thus, three levels of analysis can be employed in this conceptual 
framework, similar to those suggested by Johnson et al (2003): the environment 
within which the firm operates; the firm itself; and the focal managers (Figure 2). 
The external environment 
Managers 
The organisation 
Source of uncertainty. The main driver of 
organisational strategy 
Management has a mediating role in the interaction 
between the environment and the firm. The managers' 
contribution to the strategy of their firm is generated 
from their response to uncertainty 
Intraorganisational processes influence organisational 
action 
Figure 2: The conceptual framework 
The external environment is seen as the main source of uncertainty, which affects 
the context in question. Consequently, the environment, as a source of uncertainty, 
has to be understood as being socially constructed by the group of practitioners 
(section 4.3.2). Over time, the groups develop a shared understanding of the issues 
pertaining to their firms' situation and of how to deal with them. 
The organisation, on the other hand, is seen asa unitarist environment where 
uncertainty is limited, as power is concentrated on a few actors within the firm, thus 
making it free of internal conflict (section 4.2). The resulting uncertainties may 
vary, however, according to the structural characteristics of the firm (section 2.2). 
52 
Whether these uncertainties originate from the external environment or from within 
the firm, they may have a different effect contingent on the firm's specificities. 
The focal managers have a mediating role between the environment and the firm 
and, within the context of their occupational group, they share a common 
knowledge of the uncertainties that pertain to their firm's situation. That common 
knowledge should also be reflected in their practice (section 4.3.3). Previous 
research within S-a-P literature (section 2.4) has empirically shown how managerial 
activities and practices contribute to strategic outcomes; however, as this empirical 
evidence is mostly experiential, generalisations about practitioners are limited, with 
existing S-a-P research focusing primarily on the various forms the managers' 
contribution to strategy can take (se ction 2.4.3). In addition, the absence of a 
conceptual framework led many authors to arbitrarily conflate organisational 
strategy with managerial activity (section 3.3). 
Within this framework, managerial activity is free of any connotations of 
`strategicness'; it is simply taken as the managers' observable raw input, such as 
their interaction with others, deskwork activity, observational tours and so on. The 
'strategic' label, however, can be ascribed to the managers' output (section 3.3.2), 
or what is achieved at the level of the firm, which in turn is the result of interrelated 
activities. Unlike the managers' raw input, their output is not observable but can be 
seen as their intended contribution to the organisation. In turn, managerial outputs 
that relate to strategic outcomes are identified as those that deal with uncertainty 
(section 4.3.3). 
What this conceptual framework achieves is to locate the managers' contribution to 
strategy through their mediating role between the environment and the firm, 
something which is possible only in unitarist organisational environments. By doing 
so, it becomes possible to move from managerial activity to organisational strategy 
through the managers' response to uncertainty. This conception advances the study 
of the managers' contribution to strategy, which has only previously been inferred 
on an experiential basis (section 2.4). 
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4.5 Conclusion 
My conceptualisation of the managers' contribution to the strategy of the firm 
draws from both strategy literature and literature on managerial work activity, in an 
effort to address a subject previously poorly examined within the literature: the 
distinct nature of managerial activity and organisational strategy. In the field of 
managerial work activity, their distinct nature is reflected in the more fundamental 
problem of the indeterminacy of managerial inputs to outputs at the organisational 
level. Issues of collective action and the interrelated nature of managerial activities 
do not allow such an assumption to be made; however, a unitary view of 
organisation can be used as a way of eliminating issues of collective action, thus 
establishing the focal managers as the central figures within their firm. Finally, the 
managers' contribution to strategy can be identified through their response to 
uncertainty, which serves as an integrative link between managerial and 
organisational levels of action. 
The managers' contribution to strategy is also context-specific, requiring a local 
understanding of strategy making. Institutional norms, occupational practices and a 
shared geopolitical environment often dictate the actions of the practitioners within 
the local context. The firm itself is a context that sets boundaries for managerial 
action; its specificities, such as culture or capabilities, require adaptation on behalf 
of the managers. Generalising about practitioners is therefore a multi-level exercise: 
an investigation into the practitioners' detailed activity, the organisation, and the 
organisation's context. Thus, the research inquiry requires breadth to account for 
the reciprocal influence among the levels of analysis and the bounded nature of the 





This chapter explains how the fieldwork was conducted. It starts with the 
epistemological presuppositions that are made in this study, setting the scene for the 
case study approach which is adopted; it also elaborates on how each data 
collection method was used, and gives a reflective account on how the research was 
conducted and how the data was analysed. Lastly, it discusses issues of validity and 
reliability related to the study, and presents the sample taken in the study. 
5.2 Epistemological presuppositions 
Epistemology describes what counts for knowledge and under what conditions it is 
possible to have it (Eflin, 2003). Every epistemological account begins with a set of 
assumptions. The preliminary assumption in this study is that strategy is context- 
specific, and, as such, it is possible to generalise about the practitioners' 
contribution to strategy within a given context. The practitioners' contribution to 
strategy, however, is obscure because ̀strategy' is treated in this study as something 
intangible, following the view that strategy is an artefact, a label given by the 
researcher (see Knights and Morgan, 1990). By conceptualising strategy as the 
resulting pattern of a response to the external environment, however, it is possible 
to understand the managers' contribution to strategy as their response to 
uncertainty. 
In generalising about a reference group of practitioners within a particular context 
(national/industry/sector), I assume that the practitioners develop a commonsense 
understanding of how to deal with uncertainty; in other words they develop a 
common way of strategy-making. This is the result of the homogenisation effect of 
the context. While it is assumed that there are local realities within a particular 
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context, it is also expected that the practitioners will have a shared understanding, 
experience and meaning of those realities. 
The aforementioned assumptions are not totally new, as similar suppositions have 
been made by Spender (1980,1989), and to some extent by authors within the 
strategic groups literature. In this study, however, I further assert that the managers' 
contribution to strategy should also be reflected at a more micro level, in the 
managers' activity. This adds to the previous assumption that we can elicit context- 
specific accounts of strategy making, the difference being that it refers to the 
practitioners' domain of practice as opposed to the domain of knowledge which is 
mentioned above. 
The last assumption, however, is valid only within unitarist organisational 
environments. This is a necessary precondition, as in other, pluralist organisational 
environments it would be difficult to extrapolate the practitioners' work activity 
from their contribution to strategy. As shown in the literature review (see section 
3.3.2), the impact of the managers' work activity on the organisation is 
indeterminate, making it difficult to link what they do (their activity/input) to what 
they produce at the level of the firm (their output). In unitarist organisational 
environments, the managers' output is easier to discern, as there is no intervention 
from other actors, given that power is concentrated on the managers. This is 
reflected in the methodological choices of the study, where the case studies chosen 
qualify as unitarist organisations. 
5.3 The case study approach 
A case study approach is used in this study in order to deal with the complexity of 
the study and the subsequent need for depth in the research inquiry. At a primary 
level, the complexity originates from the two units of analysis of the study: the 
managers' activity, which is observable, and the organisational strategy, which is 
intangible and can be understood ex post factoYas a response to a changing 
environment. By linking the two embedded units of analysis through the lens of 
uncertainty, a set of assumptions are formed (see section 5.2) which necessitate a 
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multi-level research inquiry able to accommodate: a) the interpretive approach 
required for understanding the managers' common response to uncertainty, b) the 
ethnographic inquiry of the managers' work activity, and c) a broad understanding 
of the organisation and the wider context through a more normative approach, in 
order to examine the impact of the managers activity on the strategy of the firm. 
As a result, the study relies on multiple sources of evidence; these sources allow a 
relative triangulation of the data, but the development of convergent lines of inquiry 
is not pursued in this study. Just as authors within the S-a-P stream have contended 
(Denis et al, 2004), we might well find divergence, which may provide answers and 
form a different level of analysis. Such divergence is expected, as this study has 
embedded units of analysis, namely the managers and their firms. 
Multiple cases are selected for the purpose of this study, in order to provide enough 
breadth for making generalisations regarding the selected occupational group of 
managers and their contribution to the strategy of their firms. The selection of these 
cases (see section 5.8 for more details) follows a `replication' (as opposed to a 
sampling logic), where generalisations are made, not through the size of the 
population, but through their uniqueness and the extent to which they can display 
predictable results (Yin, 1994: 45). 
5.4 Research methods 
The two main methods of data collection used in this study were direct observation 
and systematic interviewing; the interviewing consisted of multiple questioning 
sessions (Appendix 3). Having operationalised the managers' contribution to the 
strategy of the firm as the actions taken as a response to organisational uncertainty, 
the main body of the interview was devoted to eliciting the managers' interpretive 
accounts on how they deal with uncertainty. The observation, on the other hand, 
elicited patterns of the hotel managers' detailed activity, seen in this study as their 
raw inputs. Nonetheless, the hotel managers' inputs have a bias towards portraying 
standalone managerial behaviour, overlooking what is being achieved at the 
organisational level. Furthermore, the time-consuming nature of the observation 
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necessitated a short observation period during the operating season of the hotels, 
not accounting for the managers' inputs outside the operating season. These 
inherent limitations of observation were mediated through a process of triangulation 
via the interview. In particular, the main part of the interview required the 
managers' own account of how their responses to uncertainty reflect on their work 
activity, which is juxtaposed later with the observational method. Therefore, the 
interview complemented the observation by gaining the managers' own 
interpretation of their activity and eliciting their intended contribution to the 
organisation; in other words, their output. In addition, a supplementary questioning 
session was dedicated to defining the hotel managers' annual work pattern, in an 
effort to compensate for the time-limited, non-longitudinal nature of the 
observation. This gave a more rounded view of their activity, not just a snapshot 
based on their observable activity, and also compensated for the relatively short 
observation period in each case. 
The case study approach also allowed for the use of a wide range of techniques in 
the data collection, which were incorporated into the interviews; the interviews 
included three supplementary questioning sessions. One, as mentioned earlier, 
required the managers to describe their work activity throughout the calendar year 
(based on the assumption that their pattern of work is cyclical). In addition, two 
more questioning sessions were incorporated in the interview, aiming to produce 
data that is more longitudinal in nature and simulates the hotel firms' responses to a 
changing environment over an extended period of time through the hotel managers' 
reflections. This required a different line of questioning compared to the main part 
of the interview. While the main part of the interview was largely unstructured, 
allowing the respondents to develop their own constructs, the second part of the 
interview required the respondents to explore how they had dealt with certain pre- 
specified issues; here, these pre-specified issues were operationalised as trends and 
developments in the industry. In order to elicit those trends and developments in the 
local hotel sector, issues of the specialist magazine, Tourism & Economy, for the 
years 1999-2003 were reviewed, eliciting six major trends and developments (Table 
1). This questioning session was further aided by a document which was presented 
to the respondents (Appendix 5), which reflected a timeline of trends and 
developments upon which they could add issues that had influenced their firm. 
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Table 1: Trends and developments in the hospitality industry 
Developments 
Introduction of the single currency 
September l lth events 
Consolidation in the travel and tourism industry 
Trends 
Shortening of booking times 
Decrease of the travellers' average stay 
Seasonality 
This additional questioning session is intended to provide a means of comparison 
among the cases with pre-specified sources of uncertainty. Lastly, a third line of 
questioning was used to obtain information on how certain pre-specified 
organisational outcomes were shaped over time; again providing a more structured 
approach for comparison purposes. This inquiry was assisted by a template 
presented to the respondents that spanned the organisation's life cycle (Appendix 
7). The organisational outcomes used were a) the composition of markets, b) 
portfolio of partners, c) allocation of hotel rooms and d) their revenue sources. 
These were selected after taking the preliminary research data into consideration, to 
ensure that all variables are influential to the hotel firms' performance and upon 
which the managers have an exclusive or significant degree of choice. 
Documentary data was also collected from each case in order to enrich the 
researcher's knowledge of the organisational environment. Documentary data have 
the advantage of covering long spans of time which illustrate the events and/or the 
communications that took place in the past. As Yin (1994: 82) notes, however, it is 
important to remember that documents were written for a specific purpose and to 
address people other than the researcher and the objectives of the study. Taking that 
into account, we accept that documentary evidence reflects a communication 
between groups of people in order to achieve other objectives. Hence, greater 
emphasis was given to observation and interviews, justifiably, as observation and 
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interviews are considered the main research tools of the social science field 
investigator (McGrath, 1964). 
As multiple methods and data sets were employed, it can be said that a degree of 
data triangulation was achieved. In Denzin's (1970) view, however, multiple 
approaches and data sets are assumed to be consistent rather than complementary. 
Brannen (1992) adds that the idea that combining data sets ensures the validity of 
the data is naive and is often encountered by positivists. The problem of integration 
then stands, as long as data generate differing explanations. In this study, though, 
multiple sources and methods should be understood in relation to the purposes they 
are used. The research problem requires multiple data sources which, although they 
may converge, are used to provide complementary answers. 
5.4.1 Interviewing 
Multi-session (based on the type of questions), semi-structured interviews were 
used in order to retain a degree of structure and direction during the interview. At 
the same time, the technique was flexible enough to allow the respondents to make 
their own contributions. At the beginning of each interview, each respondent was 
given a form to fill in related to their demographic. The interview length varied 
from 45 minutes to 3V2 hours depending on the respondent. A total of 33 interviews 
were conducted with a range of respondents (a complete list is provided in 
Appendix 2). While the occupational group of hotel managers remained the focal 
group of the study, additional informants were selected as the research progressed, 
drawn, not necessarily from the hotel units, but from the wider tourism industry. 
This purposive selection of actors (Hemmington, 1999) was adopted in an effort to 
elicit additional facts and triangulate the information given by the hotel managers. 
The interviews were tape-recorded in all but one case; that respondent felt 
uncomfortable having the conversation recorded, so the researcher kept handwritten 
notes. The interview schedule consisted of open-ended questions (Appendix 3). The 
ice-breaking section included questions about the duties and responsibilities of the 
respondent and an enquiry about the history of the organisation; questions that all 
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the respondents could answer with ease, making them feel more comfortable during 
the interview. The positioning of these questions in the ice-breaking session does 
not make them peripheral to the study; they were critical in providing the context of 
the hotel managers' activity and to pave the way for later prompts. Running the 
interview was a much more complex process; the open-ended questions were 
mainly used as initiators of discussion topics. In this sense, the researcher allowed 
considerable freedom to the respondents to initiate new topics of conversation. 
Often the discussion was content-specific; the researcher would then prompt or ask 
questions in order to allow comparisons with other cases. This was an intensive 
process and required a long preparation, in addition to constant updating of field 
notes and content-specific questions. 
The interview process was influenced by the interpretivist tradition (Schutz, 1973; 
Silverman, 1970; Spender, 1980,1989), assuming that the subjects of the study 
create and attach their own meanings to the world around them and to the behaviour 
they manifest in that world. Therefore, having decomposed the managers' 
contribution to strategy as their response to uncertainty, which is observed at 
different levels of analysis, it is accepted that it can be understood through the 
subjects' own accounts. Also, given that the focus of this study is an occupational 
group, it is assumed that its members are collectively shape their reality through 
their social interactions. In other words, the subjects' reality is socially constructed 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1969; Garfinkel, 1967), and in this study it 
is reflected in taken-for-granted, common stocks of knowledge, to which the 
researcher needs to gain access. 
All interviews, however, can be argued as being `reality constructing, meaning 
making' occasions (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). According to Holstein and 
Gubrium (1995), the researcher has to access the narrative resources of the subjects, 
referred to by the authors as `stocks of knowledge'. The authors stress that the 
subject/respondent should not be seen as a vessel of answers, otherwise the 
interview becomes epistemologically passive, not engaged in the production of 
knowledge. The social interactionist approach itself does not operate in a passive 
manner; access to the vessel of answers does. This causes the researcher to act as a 
61 
pupil, rather as a coach leading the interview based on predefined questions. They 
also add: 
`Although the interest in the content of answers persists, it is primarily in 
how and what the subject/respondent, in collaboration with an equally active 
interviewer, produces and conveys about the subject/respondent's 
experience under the interpretive circumstances at hand' p. 9. 
Treating the interview as active allows the interviewer to encourage the respondent 
to shift positions in the interview, so as to explore alternate perspectives and stocks 
of knowledge. The interviewer has to suggest both the topics of interest and 
appropriate ways of addressing the topics. Moreover, it is important that the 
researcher is sensitive to context. One way to achieve that is using background 
knowledge to assist respondents to explore and describe their actions and 
circumstances. Citing shared experience is often a useful way of providing concrete 
referents on which inquiries and answers can focus. Within the S-a-P field, Balogun 
et al (2003: 201) also argue that it is necessary to ensure engagement of the 
participants and, in order to do so, it is important to anchor the majority of 
questions on organisational realities. The researcher achieved that by asking 
content-specific questions that were updated during the fieldwork, providing a 
means of comparison across the cases. 
5.4.2 The observation 
The observation aimed to examine naturally occurring events/actions and provide a 
fine-grained analysis of how the hotel managers contribute to the strategy of their 
firms. The collaborating organisations allowed access to the researcher to shadow 
the hotel managers of the sample and record their everyday activities. The 
observation period was limited to two days, taking into account time constraints and 
to allow an acceptable level of accessibility to the subjects of the study. The length 
of the observation period in previous studies has varied from one day (Mintzberg, 
1994) to one week of continuous observation (Jauncey, 2000) or longitudinal 
sample observation (Samra-Fredericks, 2003). In terms of statistical validity, 
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though, Martinko and Gardner (1990) suggest that an average length of 3 days 
would be sufficient to produce valid results. 
The observation was designed to capture several dimensions of managerial work, 
namely duration of activities, time span, recurrence, initiation of activities, other 
actors involved and the location where the activity takes place; dimensions 
previously explored by exemplars in the field (Mintzberg, 1973; Martinko and 
Gardner, 1990; Hales, 2001; Stewart, 1976). As seen in Appendix 4, the 
observation procedure involved recording discreet behavioural events, which were 
classified according to the times at which they began and concluded, the form of 
initiation, the location where the activity took place and the managerial event code. 
At the same time, field notes were kept during the whole observation period. 
According to Snow and Thomas (1994), direct or participant observation is 
considered to be the most uncontrollable form of enquiry. McCall and Simmons 
(1969: 1) note: 
`observation... refers to a characteristic blend or combination of techniques 
and methods... it involves direct observation of relevant events, some 
amount of social interaction in the field with the subjects of the study, some 
collection of documents... and open-endedness in the directions the study 
can take. Because of this rather omnibus quality... it has not lent itself to the 
standardisation of procedure that social scientists have come to expect of 
their methods, as in testing, survey and laboratory work. Profound questions 
of reliability, validity and generality of the results have thus been raised. ' 
In general, observation demands a very close relationship with the phenomenon 
under study. One problem related to this method is the research subjects' 
`reactivity' (Bryman, 1988); that is the subjects' reaction to the presence of the 
researcher, which can distort the data collection, as the subjects may try to portray a 
different image than they would naturally show. On this issue, the researcher made 
efforts to explain to the research subjects the process of the observation in advance, 
and the fact that interaction with the researcher or disruption of their work activity 
would be minimal. The subjects were also assured that private or confidential issues 
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do not have to be discussed in the presence of the researcher-observer. Emphasising 
the unobtrusiveness of the method, whilst downplaying the researcher's effect on 
the managers' work, gave the subjects perceived `slack' to set the subject- 
researcher rules of interaction themselves. Hence, the managers chosen for the 
sample felt they could continue their activities uninterrupted, and did so. Using this 
method meant that the problem of reactivity was minimised, as the managers did 
what they were accustomed to doing. 
5.4.3 Additional data 
Multiple source secondary data were collected, including industry statistics and 
reports (official and from the related trade press). Although no systematic statistical 
analysis was conducted, it served to substantiate the facts when compared with the 
respondents' interpretive accounts. During the ongoing process of the fieldwork, 
the collection of that secondary data was of considerable value in terms of 
conveying the credibility of the research. While the researcher had experience in 
this industry, the up to date analysis of secondary data permitted reflection on the 
researchers' own experiences, and helped to build rapport with the respondents. 
Documentary data related to the cases of the sample were also collected, giving the 
researcher a broader picture of organisational processes, and included memos, 
forecasts, financial reports and contracts. The relatively homogeneous sample also 
spurred the idea of collecting demographic data from the managers (Appendix 6) 
but, due to their small number, the analysis did not bring about any valuable results. 
5.5 Preparation for the fieldwork and getting access 
Prior to the main fieldwork, a pilot study was conducted in order to test the research 
methods, which included different types of questions and interviewing techniques 
(unstructured interviewing, for instance, was tested in early pilot interviews). The 
sample for the pilot study was not theoretically derived; instead, it was selected on 
the basis of convenience and accessibility, in order to allow the researcher to test 
the data collection methods within an acceptable time frame and elicit a sufficient 
amount of data for preliminary analysis. 
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Sample selection through official catalogues may not be the most advisable option. 
Hotels featured in the tour operators' catalogues may be marketed around the range 
in which the tour operators would like them to be portrayed, not on merit. Official 
lists by the GNTO may also not take into account certain facets of the hotel and 
accredit it with a non-representative category rating. It was common to find 2* 
category hotels marketed as 3* or hotels with a mixed category (where a part of the 
hotel unit is at a higher standard than the rest). During the first contact, a hotel GM 
noted: `we may be listed as a 3* category hotel but actually we are a purebred 4* 
hotel'; this was not recognised officially, because hotels are not only graded on 
facilities offered, but also on other preconditions, such as room size. Therefore an 
initial discussion was necessary in order to resolve such issues from the start. 
Initial contacts were usually made a few days prior to the research, because the 
GMs work schedule is irregular and the short period between the first contact and 
the fieldwork was meant to eliminate this problem. This approach was permitted 
from the wide sample frame in most cases. Exceptions were some unique cases 
where the researcher had to choose from a very small number or only had a single 
option. Contacts with the gatekeepers within the hotel firms (the GM or the owner) 
were made on weekly basis, usually at the beginning of the week so that the 
research could commence from Wednesday-Monday. Tuesdays could not be 
included in the fieldwork, as the GMs (or DGMs) typically visit the travel agents 
(T. As) and/or the tour operators (T. Os) they work with to collect payments and 
request info about the bookings status. Despite the long length of the fieldwork 
(four months), it was necessary to try to conduct most of the fieldwork during the 
mid-low seasons, because it would be too difficult to gain access in the high season 
due to the extra workload. The mid-low seasons were also preferable because the 
researcher was more likely to receive complimentary accommodation-subsidy 
offers. 
Secretaries or receptionists were usually the first point of contact; however, they 
were avoided whenever possible, as they were very protective of their superiors' 
work schedule. it can be said that they act as filter for avoiding unwanted 
communication with certain people. It was necessary to ask for the key people by 
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name, which required previous preparation from the researcher, usually through 
informal sources. The researcher introduced himself by stressing his relationship 
with an academic institution and the confidential and non-commercial nature of the 
study. The next step was to make the research sound unthreatening and simple. The 
words: `I am investigating the work of hotel managers and how they make 
decisions' were simple enough and understandable by the respondents. The 
researcher then went on to explain the methods used in the investigation, without 
attempting to buffer the real scope of the research. This was necessary, as it was 
better to identify unwilling research subjects during the initial contact and not after 
the fieldwork had commenced. Some managers seemed to exaggerate the extent of 
the secrecy of their work and were particularly suspicious about the method of 
observation, stating that they did not want to reveal their professional secrets and 
that their professional or personal life is not anybody else's business. It was also 
essential to be able to approach both managers and business owners and gain their 
consent. Business owners may have thought that the researcher was going to 
infiltrate their business affairs, whereas managers (and it was evident with some) 
might be secretive concerning their work activities. 
5.6 Data analysis 
Open coding is used for the analysis of the interview material, in order to identify 
emergent themes by pulling together real examples from the text. The analytical 
procedure entailed several steps: the identification of themes and categories in each 
interview transcript and their labelling; the integration of those themes and 
categories; changing the arrangement of the data by case to arrangement by labels; 
eliciting constructs and identifying the themes that emerge from the analysis. 
The constructs mentioned above are derived from the common understanding or 
stock of knowledge of the respondents. According to Schutz (1967), a construct 
describes the process of understanding the conduct of others and can be seen as a 
process of typifications, whereby the actor applies interpretive constructs similar to 
`ideal types' to apprehend the meaning of what people do. Meaning is dependent 
upon reflexivity, is attached to actions retrospectively and, according to Schutz, 
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only the already experienced is meaningful. Schutz acknowledged that the stock of 
knowledge used by people to typify the actions of others and understand the world 
around them varies from context to context. In this respect, the validity of the 
constructs is assured only if seen within their local context. 
Another analysis involved the drawing of role expectations out of the interview 
material. This was based on Dahrendorf s (1968) typology of role expectations, but 
language limitations that stem from the translation from Greek to English made the 
author's suggestions largely unusable. As an alternative, a second analysis of the 
transcripts (analysis of the interviews directly from the tapes) was conducted. 
Although the second analysis gave better results, it was deemed insufficient to give 
an exploratory account of the managers' contribution to strategy (Section 3.4). 
The observation material was codified into managerial activities, time spent on 
activities, form of initiation and purpose of contact. The study places an emphasis 
on time spent and the frequency of the variables above in a manner typical to other 
ethnographic studies. For comparative reasons, the analysis did not go to great 
lengths, as this was not necessary to reflect the findings of previous studies in the 
field. 
The statistical data collected primarily included tourist arrivals, occupancy rates and 
population of hotel units distinguished in four regional segments. These can be 
related respectively to access-demand, organisational performance and growth- 
development of the sector. The researcher hoped to use a multivariate analysis and 
examine the magnitude of the variables over time. In the process of collecting data, 
I realised that information from certain years was lost and non-retrievable and that 
the further back in time the data was referring to, the less detailed it became. 
Therefore, a systematic statistical analysis was not possible; however, it does serve 
as descriptive facts that substantiate the respondents' interpretive accounts. 
67 
5.7 Issues of validity and reliability 
Issues of validity and reliability pertaining to this study are as follows: the lack of 
standardisation in interviews may raise concerns about reliability; however, it was 
not a key concern because the interviews were organic, developing new themes, 
allowing cross-case comparisons through the course of the fieldwork, and were 
centred around some loosely set questions, thus giving the opportunity to the 
respondents to raise themes of their own. While similarity of responses was not 
actively pursued in the main section of interview, it was a different matter for the 
following, more structured types of questions that aimed to elicit additional data 
sets. 
The collection of observational data, on the other hand, has the inherent problem of 
generalisability (external validity). It typically entails rich, in-depth accounts of 
managerial work but the sheer size of the data collection burden restricts this 
method to small samples. Noordegraaf and Stewart (2000: 432) contend that: 
`reliability is increased by reliability checks, coding methodology and large 
samples; validity is increased by empirically based, in-depth understanding 
of real world phenomena. One of the continuing strengths of managerial 
behaviour research has been its concern with qualitative research, because 
of its empirical, inductive focus and its attempt to avoid mainstream 
management conceptualisations. An explicit attempt to bring managerial 
behaviour research back in line with mainstream management research 
would counteract with its original intent. Qualitative, inductive, 
observational and thus less reliable research is not an inferior kind of 
research, it is a different kind. ' 
Certainly the pursuit of (internal) validity has to compromise generalisability 
(external validity). Internal validity requires in-depth observation, which can be 
ideally attained through small samples, which limit the possibilities for statistical 
generalisation. The same applies to interviews; however, they do allow analytical 
generalisation. According to Yin (1994: 30-31): 
68 
`statistical generalisation simply cannot be used as a method for 
generalising the results of the case. This is because cases are not sampling 
units and should not be chosen as such... In this respect, multiple cases 
should be regarded as multiple experiments. The method of generalisation 
then is analytic generalisation in which already developed theory is used as 
a template to compare the results of the case study' 
The use of multiple sources of evidence in the study is one way to tackle issues of 
validity. As noted earlier, though, their use was not intended for triangulation. The 
data are, of course, dependent on the researcher's interpretation compromising the 
validity of the results. On this issue, the 3-phase data collection helped the 
researcher to confirm his observations with the respondents. Similar benefits were 
gained by allowing the respondents to review the executive summary. Language 
issues can also affect the translation from transcripts kept in Greek and records and 
analysis kept in English. For this purpose, the consistency of translating was tested 
with cross-checking. A second transcriber was given a sample, which was later 
compared with the researcher's original. The consistency was deemed satisfactory, 
as translation inconsistencies were minimal. 
In the analysis of the data, a pattern-matching logic was followed (the comparison 
of an empirically based pattern with a predicted pattern), something that is 
considered a common practice that strengthens internal validity (Trochim, 1989). 
The pursuit of theory triangulation in the discussion chapter can also be seen as 
enhancing internal validity. The degree of external validity (generalisation) on the 
other hand is limited. As was argued early in the thesis, strategy formation is 
context-specific and one cannot expect to generalise unproblematically across 
contexts. The results apply mainly to the occupational group of hotel managers 
within the local hotel sector in Crete. The remedy for this issue, the replication 
logic in Yin's (1994) terminology, was employed in terms of selecting a diverse 
sample of hotel firms (theoretical sampling). 
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5.8 Sampling 
The sample consisted of nine independent hotels from the island of Crete. Crete 
represents a typical Greek tourist destination, being one of the most touristically 
developed areas in the country. In the 1996 audit by the Greek Chamber of Hotels 
(GCH), Crete was shown to have 1,300 hotel units, 20% of total hotel units in 
Greece; consequently, the island is heavily dependent on tourism. Even other 
significant regional sectors such as agriculture, commerce, transportation, 
construction and services are strongly related to tourism (Andriotis, 2000; 
Tzouvelekas and Mattas, 1995). In this study, the selection of the cases from a 
single island is an attempt to frame the analysis within specific institutional settings 
and make the relationship among managerial practice, the organisation and the 
wider context more evident. 
All nine hotels had to be independent, to ensure that there is no corporate structure 
and they are not publicly owned. Although they can be part of a hotel chain, it is 
important that they are privately owned. This choice is deliberate; as independent 
hotels, the sample did not have the complex structures of larger corporations. 
Independent hotels, due to their smaller size, are characterised by simple organic 
structures and a management style anchored in the behaviour of the leader 
(Dandridge, 1979; Mintzberg, 1983). Because of these characteristics, person- 
centred governance structures based on high-trust may be more important in small 
firms than in larger corporations (Dubini and Aldrich, 1991; Perrow, 1993). Larger 
organisations (i. e. large hotel chains) have more complex dynamics, with multiple 
actors and various degrees of centralisation around the corporate structure. In that 
instance, the role and involvement of the managers of the hotel units would be too 
difficult to identify. In the selected sample, the focus was on the more simple 
relationship between hotel managers and the business owners and other 
organisational actors. 
The choice of independent hotels is also based on previous discussion in the 
literature review (Section 4.2). Unitary organisations are characterised by the 
centralisation of power on one, or a few organisational actors. Such organisational 
environments allow the managers' output at the organisational level to surface, 
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simplifying the identification of links between managerial activity and strategic 
outcomes. Independent hotels are considered to be unitarist organisations; firstly 
because of their nature as SMEs, and secondly because Greek firms display 
characteristics of unitarist environments (Bourantas et al, 1990; Cummings and 
Schmidt, 1972). Thus, they permit the assumption that power is centralised on one 
or a few individuals within the firm. 
Given the time constraints and the fact that the study is exploratory in nature, it was 
deemed appropriate to conduct theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Strauss, 1987) rather than use a sample offering statistical representativeness. 
Therefore, some important variables are taken into account in order to determine 
the sample frame. The cases are selected in a way that allows contrasting results 
but, at the same time, permit predictions of the reasons or causes of this variance (a 
theoretical replication). This helped the extraction of common themes that reflect 
strategy making in this hotel sector. 
The selected cases fall into the categories of 3* and 4*, hotels according to 
international standards. The accommodation capacity of these types of hotel 
represents a large proportion of the total accommodation offered on the island, 
having a 27% and 20% share respectively. This criterion also has a practical 
purpose. By law, 2* hotels and above must have a manager accredited with a 
degree in hospitality. Therefore, the sample retains homogeneity on the 
characteristics of the hotel managers, who are seen as members of an occupational 
group. On the other hand, the classification of the hotels in these two categories 
implies certain differences in the hotels' infrastructure, facilities and amenities; 
therefore, the hotel product and its pricing would be variable, as would the target 
market of the hotel businesses. 
Since it is possible to encounter owner-managed hotels in the sector, the sample 
incorporated cases with this type of management. In the management literature, 
owners are usually seen as entrepreneurs and not as professional managers. That is 
because owners have access to resources and legitimations, which enable them to 
take decisions unavailable to professional managers. In addition, owners do not face 
the same entry and exit barriers in the industry as professional managers; however, 
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our criteria for the selected cases suggest that there should be a professional 
manager in each hotel. Owners-managers should belong to the particular 
occupational group and share, to a degree, the same norms as professional 
managers do, although their purpose and interests may not be the same. 
The study also looked at two types of hotels: resort and city hotels. Resort hotels 
represent the vast majority on the island, whereas city hotels are a minority of the 
total population. These two types of hotels have distinct modes of operation. Their 
differences lie in the location (urban vs coastal areas) and the seasonality of their 
operation. City hotels are affected by the local calendar and events as well as the 
business activity in the area. On the other hand, resort hotels work during the 
summer season, which is extended by the tourist demand and usually runs from 
March till October. For t he rest of the year, t he industry goes into a state of 
hibernation, making tourism infrastructure redundant for that period. The 
phenomenon of seasonality itself is the result of the attachment of business activity 
to the model of mass tourism. 
The attachment to the model of mass tourism has a number of other implications, 
such as the continuing decrease in the average tourist expenditure and the increased 
dependence from tour operators. Also, the overdevelopment of some regions does 
not help them differentiate. The state attempted to mediate this phenomenon and 
expand the tourist season by promoting the dispersal of the tourist activity in other, 
less developed areas; however, tourist activity remains largely concentrated in 
several rather overdeveloped areas in the country (Papanikos, 2001). Papanikos also 
notes that differences can be seen within the same region. This led to another 
distinction in the sample. In Crete, tourist activity is concentrated on the north part 
of the island mainly because the north coast is the only access route for tourists, as 
the airport and the main harbours are located there. For these reasons, the south 
coast has not attracted much investment, both in terms of infrastructure and 
hospitality services. 
One last case is chosen as a polar example of a resort hotel, which operates within 
the same institutional settings but does not share the same links with the 
competition in the industry. This case is represented by a hotel which specialises in 
72 
a niche market and is not bound to the same power relationships as a typical resort 
hotel. 
Therefore the composition of the sample is as follows: a total of nine hotels divided 
into four sets of 3* and 4* hotels, plus one polar example. The composition of the 
sample is illustrated in the table below: 












Resort Resort hotels City hotels Owner - Hotel hotels from from south with ongoing managed operating in a 
north Crete Crete operation hotels niche market 
Hotel 
category 
3* Case A Case C Case E Case G 
4* Case B Case D Case F Case H Case I 
The first set is a base example of resort hotels on the north coast, while the next is 
two hotels from the south coast. Their main difference is that they operate in areas 
with major gaps in terms of tourism infrastructure. Another set of city hotels is 
added, which are distinguished by their ongoing operation throughout the year and 
their location in prime cities. Two more resorts are chosen that are being managed 
by their owners and not by salaried managers. One last polar example is taken, 
which is subject to different rules of operation due to its detachment from the 
mainstream tourist markets. These cases are deemed to be representative of the 
independent hotel sector and the selection of additional cases would have been 
excessive; or as Eisenhardt (1989) had noted, a researcher can stop adding cases 
until incremental learning becomes marginal. 
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5.9 The cases of the study 
Case A: The 3* resort hotel 
A typical resort hotel built in the early 1980s, in the 2°d era of the Greek tourism 
industry. As such, it faced financial difficulties because of high inflation and 
interest rates during that period. It has, however, increased its capacity from 50 
rooms when it was first built to 160 rooms in the present day. In the 3`d era of Greek 
tourism, the 1990s, it gradually became marginalised; a result of the stagnant 
demand and the ever increasing accommodation offer. In this situation, the 
management does not intend to increase the hotel's capacity any further. 
One advantage the hotel possesses is its location. While not located within a major 
tourist centre, it is within very close proximity to the airport. Its market has 
remained largely unchanged over the years. Since its inception, it has concentrated 
on the German market. This persistence in identifying its market helped it build a 
reputation in the market, as well as maintain a long-running relationship with its 
partners (the suppliers). In 2003, however, the hotel underwent a significant change, 
shifting its operation to all-inclusive, which entails not only changes in its operation 
but also affects its positioning in the market. While this was previously seen as a 
`risky move', it received support from the suppliers of the hotel, which prompted it 
to change. 
Case B: The 4* resort hotel 
This 4* resort hotel has a central market position. Like all 4* hotels, it has an 
advantage over the similarly priced, but significantly less rich, 3* hotel products. 
As a typical 4* hotel, it has a higher capacity, which is necessitated by its need to 
sustain the revenue sources from its departments; however, its size and complexity 
of operation do not necessarily entail equally higher staffing levels, as they benefit 
from economies of scale. As a result, it can even match the prices of 3* hotels when 
it comes to competing for sales. This hotel, however, enjoys particularly high 
demand because of its location within a major tourist centre and its award winning 
level of service. The management describes it as ̀ one of the healthiest businesses in 
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the city', displaying profit growth every year, as well as a very low labour turnover 
rate. 
It first opened in 1991 with 100 rooms and 200 beds, but gradually expanded, and 
reached 154 rooms and 300 beds in the present day. Unlike other hotels in the 
region, it targets multiple markets, although the majority of the sales are made in 
the German market. The management wishes to keep it this way and plans to 
expand the hotel in the near future. 
Case C: The 3* South resort hotel 
The 3* resort hotel in the south axis of the island was built in the early 1980s in a 
region which was undeveloped at that time. As the owners contended, it was the 
first hotel in the region, and also the first to bring organised tourism to the region by 
working with the major suppliers. Today the region, while not a tourist centre, has 
become a popular resort which enjoys a much higher demand than in the past. 
This 3* resort hotel has become marginalised over the years, however, not only 
because of its size and category standard but primarily because of its location. 
Being located far from the main access points of the island, it does not enjoy high 
demand from the suppliers or the consumers. The issue here is the time/distance 
from the main access points, which entails a greater logistical burden for the 
suppliers and an unwelcome feature for the consumers. As a result, it has become 
difficult for the hotel to maintain long-term partnerships with its suppliers, who 
tend to seek more desireable hotel products. 
Case D: The 4* South resort hotel 
This 4* hotel is a high capacity hotel (700 beds) located in the south axis of the 
island. Built in 1980, it has become a trademark within its region, which itself is 
characterised by a low concentration of hotel units. Like the 3* south resort, this 
hotel has a disadvantage compared to hotels in the north axis of the island because 
of its time/distance from the main access points. 
75 
The hotel approaches a wide range of markets, although the German and the 
English market have the highest share. In 1991, it underwent a gradual renovation 
which changed its positioning in the market. Now it primarily targets families, a 
choice supported by the renewal of the hotel and its new facilities. This 
differentiation is necessary, according to the management, in order to avoid 
competing for the same share of the market in the region, which is unavoidably 
smaller than the market of a resort in the north axis of the island. 
Case E: The 3* City hotel 
One of the first hotels to be created in the metropolitan city of Heraklion; in a 
typical manner, the hotel gradually increased its capacity and, since 1971, it 
operates at full capacity (73 rooms with 135 beds). In 2001, it underwent a radical 
renovation, which allowed the targeting of a more upmarket clientele. 
The positioning of the hotel in the market has changed dramatically over the years. 
In its early years, and until the late 1980s, it operated as a resort hotel, receiving 
customers who visit the destination for leisure purposes. The time period the 
average customer stayed varied from 1-2 weeks. As the population of the resort 
hotels gradually grew, the 3* city hotel stopped being competitive in this market. 
Now it concentrates on business clients, as well as on fly&drive and roundtrip 
packages. 
Case F: The 4* City hotel 
A medium capacity (134 rooms with 365 beds) city hotel located in the 
metropolitan city of Heraklion; its development is similar to the 3* city hotel. In the 
early years of its operation, it worked as a resort hotel, as there were only a few 
players who dominated the market at that time. After the resort market opened, and 
its typical clientele moved to the more leisure-focused beach hotels, the nature of 
the 4* city hotel changed. Now it operates more like a `travel station', catering 
mostly fly&drive packages, that is individuals or groups that stay in the city for a 
couple of nights, then go somewhere else. Whilst this change was taking place, the 
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4* city hotel developed another kind of clientele; a corporate clientele which has 
accounted for 30% of its sales since 1985. 
Case G: The 3* Owner-managed hotel 
A small, owner-managed hotel located within a tourist centre; it commenced its 
operation in 1985 and expanded in 1996 by acquiring a neighbouring hotel, which 
operates as an additional section to the existing building. Being located within a 
tourist centre, it maintains the advantages of an increased consumer demand for the 
particular region, although its low category rating has marginalised it in the market. 
Furthermore, in 2001 the region experienced the withdrawal of a major tour 
operator (T. O. ), and in effect, the withdrawal of a major market, the German 
market. To compensate for this loss of demand, the hotel now primarily targets the 
Greek market, taking advantage of its privileged location, which allows it to operate 
as ̀ travel station'. 
Case H: The 4* Owner-managed hotel 
A medium sized 4* hotel (145 rooms) located in a major tourist centre; it was built 
in 2001 as a spin-off venture from a previous business of its owners. It is last of the 
three hotel developments owned by the family. Its development, however, is not an 
expansion, but rather a spin-off venture of that family, who had other co-owners in 
the previous hotel developments. 
This hotel is a more mature business development than the previous two hotels, 
which initially started operating with a low number of rooms and gradually 
expanded. This third hotel development, on the other hand, was built to its 
maximum capacity and specification. It targets a younger clientele from a wide 
range of markets, even though the majority of its sales come from the German 
market 
Case l: The Specialist hotel 
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This polar case is unlike a typical hotel. It was built in the late 1980s, in the image 
of a traditional Cretan village, using materials from demolished village houses. The 
idea behind it was to create a laographic place to collect, maintain, and present 
elements of the Cretan tradition. It hosts workshops with local artists and a 
museum. These elements of its product offering cannot be found in other hotels, 
regardless their category rating and size. 
The differences continue with its year-round operation, even though it is not a city 
hotel as such. It does target similar market segments as city hotels, though, offering 
primarily fly&drive and roundtrip packages. These target markets are the result of 
necessity rather than choice. According to the management, they would prefer to 
offer tailor-made laographic programmes, but they are constrained by the low 
average stay of their customers. Its major revenue source is not the hotel operation, 




THE INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
6.1 The history and development of the Greek tourism industry 
The Greek tourism industry has developed rapidly in the last 40 years and has become 
an inseparable part of the Greek economy. This is clearly illustrated by the fact it 
contributes 8% to the GDP, whilst at the same time generating employment for 10% of 
the total workforce. Its subsidiary hotel sector in Greece has a clear national character 
and it is therefore important that it is placed in context. 
Post-war Greece experienced an increasing tourist demand, supported by state 
promotion and a co-evolving accommodation offer. The dramatic growth of the tourist 
demand in Greece after the post-war era is not surprising. Greece, including all its 
islands, has the longest coastline in the Mediterranean, while its history and natural 
attractions are an invaluable asset when marketing its tourist product; however, Greece 
is outperformed by competitive countries such as Spain, Italy and Turkey. Its low 
population density relative to its coastline may provide a reason for that. The Economic 
Intelligence Unit's (EIU, 2003) tourism report suggests that Greece's population 
cannot support the scale of infrastructure that major international tourism demands. 
Before the Second World War, tourist arrivals in the country accounted for only a few 
thousand, high spending visitors. In the 1960s, the country was becoming more and 
more popular, being discovered by upmarket tourists. Greece was then a strong 
attraction for travellers who wanted to have `a real experience' (EIU, 2003). In later 
years, though, one can also notice the inclusion of other socio-economic groups 
(Papadopoulos and Mirza, 1985). Although tourist demand continued to grow in the 
following decades, exapansion was spasmodic rather than smooth. The growth of 
tourist demand slowed down in 1964 and was probably related to the political 
instability and the threatened invasion of Cyprus by the Turks, which could also have 
involved Greece. Furthermore, the political changes of 1967 (when the era of military 
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dictatorship began) certainly affected tourist numbers, which experienced a decline of 
12% in 1967. This internal political instability, coupled with the international economic 
recession and the 1974 Cyprus crisis, resulted in a reduction in visitor numbers of 
32.3% in 1974 (Papadopoulos and Buckley, 1986); however, the number of tourist 
arrivals continued to increase for the rest of the decade. In 1975, for example, the 
tourism industry made up everything it had lost the previous year and had expanded by 
34% by 1976. In the late 1970s, it can be noted that Greece shifted from being 
exclusive to become a mass tourist destination; more specifically, the GNTO survey of 
foreign tourists visiting Greece for the years 1977-78 shows that Greece became a mass 
market for low income tourists at this time. At the time when Greece joined the 
European Union (EU) in 1981, mass tourism was becoming dominant. 
Fluctuations of tourist demand are partly cyclical. The demand for Greece depends on 
the demand pattern of its immediate competitors such as Spain or Turkey. If these 
competitors are doing well, it can only be at Greek expense (EIU, 2003). For example, 
when tour operators began to have disagreements with Spain over price and, to some 
extent, over standards, Greece was one of the natural beneficiaries (Smith and Jenner, 
1995). Historically, changes in tourist demand can be partly explained through the 
changes undergone in the world airline industry. In the past, when air travel was a 
commodity for the rich, tourism in Greece was inevitably marketed as an upmarket 
product. The change of the socio-economic background of the incoming tourists (in the 
late 1970s, as stated earlier) coincided with a big boom in air travel, accompanied by 
significantly lower costs. Air travel, being more accessible for lower income masses, 
generated a flow of tourists which the Greek tourism industry had to cope with. Given 
Greece's remote location from its main tourist markets, air travel has triggered demand, 
accounting for approximately 80% of total tourist arrivals. Charter flights are usually 
the only way for international tourists to fly directly to the islands, where there is 
limited availability of direct scheduled flights. 
Greece, as a tourist destination, has some of the worst seasonal figures in the 
Mediterranean. In 1994, the four months from June to September accounted for 65.4 of 
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arrivals. The first four months of 1994 accounted for only 10.5%. According to 
Drakatos (1987), Greek tourism has a clear seasonal profile, in which tourist arrivals 
tend to concentrate in the period from May-October, reaching a peak in July. The 
author observed considerable differences among the seasonal patterns of particular 
nationalities of tourists arriving in Greece. The extension of seasonal demand has been 
one of the priorities of the state, which promoted alternative forms of tourism, less 
saturated regions and gave incentives to the various stakeholders; however, the 
situation does not seem to be improving. The seasonal figures for 1994 were worse 
than those of 1990. Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that many professionals 
in the industry are content with a seasonal pattern of work that ends before Christmas 
and does not restart before Easter (EIU, 2003). Mourdoukoutas' (1988) findings from 
his study of the Greek islands show that unemployment, following a period of seasonal 
employment, is often voluntary. Employees may prefer seasonal occupations because 
they pay more or because it fits with their other activities during the off-season. 
6.2 The role of the state in the development of the tourism industry 
During the early post-war years (late 1940s to early 1950s), tourism in Greece was in 
an embryonic state, with limited tourism activity concentrating in tourist centres 
familiar before the war (Athens, Delphi, Rhodes, Corfu). During this period, the Greek 
state is seen to take a clear intervening role in an effort to create infrastructure facilities 
in these tourist centres. This was accompanied by the introduction of a short-term 
credit policy aimed at the renewal and modernisation of hotel units, which had suffered 
extensive damage during the war (Konsolas and Zacharatos, 1992). 
In 1951, the Greek National Tourism Organisation (GNTO) was established as the 
main agency of tourism policy. From that period until 1966, the newly founded GNTO 
began an extensive programme of public investment on tourist facilities (hotels, motels 
and organised beaches) in various regions of the country. This move had two aims: 
firstly, the state wanted to create model tourist facilities through the GNTO in various 
parts of the country and become the benchmark for future private tourist development 
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efforts. Secondly, this investment activity was an attempt to overcome the reluctance of 
private investors to invest in these areas, by undertaking the cost of `setting up' these 
areas. In the beginning of this period, public investment in commercial facilities 
covered 100% of the total public funds available for tourism. In 1966, this percentage 
had dropped to 27%. Despite this decrease, public investment had created a large 
number of tourist enterprises in various areas in the country (Konsolas and Zacharatos, 
1992); however, the newly created hotel facilities were largely concentrated in three 
areas: Athens (52%), Corfu (12%) and Rhodes (16%). 
In 1972, the state introduced the first of a series of 5-year development plans (also in 
1976,1978,1981 and 1982). These development plans were introduced at a time when 
tourism was considered the solution for the development of the less developed island 
complexes in the country. In the past, the government promoted the development of 
small and medium hotel units. Now, the tourism policy was used as a means for the 
regional development of the country, tourist zones were introduced for the first time. 
The delineation and definition of these zones ̀ should be made in accordance with the 
aims of regional development of the country' as stated in the aims of the plans. The 
introduction of the `tourist zones', however, was also an attempt by the state to amass 
stocks of publicly owned land, in which the proposed `tourist zones' would be 
established. This served a dual purpose: the control of private investment activity, as 
well as the environmentally sound distribution of new hotels. Due to social reaction 
and pressures, this attempt did not succeed. Instead, a large number of small pieces of 
land throughout the country were passed to public ownership. For these reasons, as 
argued by Konsolas and Zacharatos (1992: 60), the term `tourist zone' has no specific 
planning meaning. During this period, a new borrowing practice was introduced, which 
was abused and resulted in a large increase in investments. Normative banking criteria 
were abolished and were replaced under the direct and definitive authority of the 
GNTO. This allowed more rapid investment of capital in large tourism developments; 
however, as Konsolas and Zacharatos (1992) note, from the viewpoint of returns to 
capital, they are still problematic today. 
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The u-turn in the nature of state intervention is evident between these periods. In the 
years from 1953-1966, the state made direct investment in commercial facilities, but in 
the 1980s all investment activity ceased in this direction. The aim now was the creation 
of new tourist areas. The 1976-80 five-year plan attempted to support local ventures by 
giving incentives to local investors for the construction of small units. In addition, it 
recognised `the need to obstruct the action of intermediaries and the tourist black 
economy' (Leontidou, 1991, p. 100). This period also saw the rise of new tourist poles, 
such as Crete and Chalkidiki, which displayed rapid growth in their tourist activity. 
This sudden growth was problematic in these areas, as it strained the ability of their 
infrastructure to support the increasing levels of tourist flow. Konsolas and Zacharatos 
(1992) describe it as singular dualism, where the increase of tourism facilities was not 
coupled with an equal increase in the available infrastructure. In 1981, the aim of the 
development law was to suspend further development of overcrowded and saturated 
tourist meccas such as Athens, Rhodes, Corfu, Crete and Chalkidiki. The year 1983 in 
Greece was dedicated to small businesses, ̀the backbone and the organisation for 
economic development' (Maggina, 1992: 87). The 1983-1987 plan stressed again the 
problems arising from overdevelopment in some regions and aimed to both promote 
the small businesses in the sector and relieve already saturated regions. 
However, the tourism policy adopted by the state has not helped in dispersing tourist 
demand, which remains concentrated in specific regions. According to Konsolas and 
Zacharatos (1992), state intervention has contributed to the overdevelopment and 
concentration of tourist activity in these areas. The particular areas typically consist of 
both large and small-scale tourism centres, all of them characterised by insufficient 
social and environmental infrastructure. Apart from the policy problems, there are also 
substantial structural problems. The overdevelopment of some regions does not help 
them differentiate; therefore, they can no longer be seen as irreplaceable unique 
products and their overdevelopment makes feasible only `high volume, low profit 
margin' strategies (Josephides, 1994). 
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In the 1990s, there was a significant shift in national tourism policy. State incentives 
were now used to encourage large-scale tourist investments, which were considered to 
offer considerable benefits: firstly, for being more labour intensive and raising job 
creation rates; secondly, because larger scale investments allow better control over 
licensed accommodation, quality standards and tax revenues, which is often difficult 
with small and fragmented tourism developments. New legislation was introduced in 
1993 to licence all accommodation. This move aimed to hit the large black market 
sector, or `parahoteleria' as it is called in Greece, and crack down on tax evasion. Even 
now, the new tourism policy triggers arguments among the influential stakeholders of 
the industry. The Association of Greek Tourist Enterprises (AGTE, 2002), for instance, 
expressed its concern about the difficulties encountered by the individual enterprises 
under the current development law. In the 1990s, the industry also benefited from the 
EU funded Mediterranean Integrated Programmes (MIP) and the Union Support 
Framework (CFS). During 1994-98, EU funding substantially increased. The Greek 
government offered packages of investment grants, interest rate subsidies and tax 
concessions. For purposes of tourist investment, Greece has been divided into four 
regions, named A, B, C, and D, with the level of incentives rising in alphabetical order. 
6.3 The role of intermediaries 
In the tourism industry, intermediation comes in the form of tour operators (henceforth 
referred to as T. Os) and travel agents (henceforth referred to as T. As). The first act as 
wholesalers assembling the various components into a travel package; the latter act as 
retailers of the tourist product, selling tours, tickets and various travel services. The 
need for intermediaries stems from the difficulties customers face in buying the 
components of the tourist product, such as accommodation, transport and 
entertainment. The role of intermediaries then becomes indispensable. By nature, tour 
operators assist producers (i. e. hotels) by removing the burden of promotion from 
them, provide specialist knowledge of the tourist markets and achieve economies of 
scale. On the other hand, the travel agent's task is to offer travel services to the 
consumer. The agent receives a commission from each transaction, which can range 
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from 2% for sales of traveller's cheques, to around 8-10% for sales of airline tickets 
and hotel bookings and 30% for insurance. These commissions can increase by up to 
2.5%, called `overrides', if the travel agent exceeds the sales targets (Cooper et al, 
1993). Figures quoted are for travel agents who deal with outgoing tourism. In the 
context of the Greek tourism industry, travel agents deal primarily with incoming 
tourism. They act as the local correspondents for the foreign tour operators who cannot 
operate their own branch at the tourist destination. Again, the travel agents receive a 
commission, which is a negotiable fixed fee for each traveller. Since commissions 
generate most of the income for the travel agent, achieving a high turnover is crucial. 
Travel agents can generate additional revenues by taking over the organising of tours 
during the travellers' stay. In a snapshot, the structure of the main distribution channels 
in the tourism industry is presented in the following figure: 
Source: Cooper, C., Fletcher, J., Gilbert, D. and Wanhill, S. (1993) Tourism: Principles and Practice, 
London: Pitman publishing, p. 190 
Figure 3: The structure of distribution channels 
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The above figure illustrates the main distribution channels in the tourism industry. 
Independent travellers can choose and draw their own itinerary. In order to do this, they 
have to purchase the key components of accommodation and transport directly from 
suppliers, via their own retail outlets, or through the travel agent. Direct purchase of 
travel components is more common with domestic consumers, whereas more remote 
consumers tend to purchase through intermediaries. As mentioned earlier, the majority 
of travellers who visit Greece fall into the last category. 
6.4 The local hotel sector 
Always dependent on travel intermediaries, Crete emerged as a traditional tourist 
destination within the state-controlled tourism industry of Greece. Tourism started 
developing there during the 1980s, and now accounts for 24.7% of total overnight stays 
in the country. Today, tourism is the most important financial activity in the island and 
its larger contributor of foreign exchange. It is estimated that approximately 40 per cent 
of the total population are directly or indirectly involved in tourism activities (Region 
of Crete, 1995). 
The island predominantly offers hotel accommodation, as hotel complexes of all 
categories account for 78.22% of total tourist accommodation on the island, whereas 
furnished apartments represent a share of 21.28%. The latter does not include the 
category `rooms-to-let', which is very significant, as in 2003 it represented an 
additional 70,000 beds or 62% of total hotel beds offered in Crete. Most of these 
establishments are 4* (85%) and are located mainly in the regions of Heraklion (45%) 
and Chania (29%). Rethymno and Lassithi have equal shares (19% each) with regard to 
this type of tourist accommodation (Table 3; see also figure 4 for the location of the 
regions in the island). 
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Table 3: Allocation of accommodation units (excluding rooms to let and campsites) per 
prefecture (2003) 
Units (%) Beds (%) Rooms (%) 
Chania 26 17 17 
Rethymno 18 19 19 
Heraklion 36 45 46 
Lassithi 20 19 18 
Source: Greek Chamber of Hotels (2004) 
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Figure 4: Map of Crete 
The Greek government saw tourism as one of the most dynamic sectors of economic 
development in the island (Kousis, 1989). During the period 1982 to 1995, the Cretan 
hotel industry attracted 20% of national investments subsidised through development 
laws (Greek Chamber of Hotels, 1996). The growth of tourist accommodation supply 
in Crete in 1996 compared to 1995 was 2.2%, while the respective rate for Greece was 
2.6%. However, during the period 1992-96, there was a dramatic increase of 29% in 
the number of beds offered in all types of accommodation establishments in Crete, 
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compared with an average 20% increase for Greece as a whole. This increase was 
particularly experienced in 1995 and was mainly due to measures taken by the Greek 
government through Development Law 2160, which granted the `legitimate operation 
label' to all tourist accommodation establishments in the country. This was an effort to 
encourage owners of illegally constructed establishments, particularly self-catering 
accommodation, to legalise them. 
According to Donatos and Zairis (1990), Crete shows a lower seasonal concentration 
than the rest of the Greek islands, while its seasonal pattern is quite stable. The tourist 
season in Crete runs from May to October, but for the main markets of Germany and 
Scandinavia it lasts from April to October. In low season, there is a higher 
concentration of luxury, rather than economy, accommodation, whereas in the high 
season the situation is reversed. Because of its size, the island can be seen as a 
`microstate', a term used to signify isolated regions with a unique social and economic 
environment, whilst retaining close links to the mainland state (Wilkinson, 1989). 
Tourism in the island has similar features to those of the mainland state. There is a 
regional imbalance in the concentration of tourism activity, with more than 70 per cent 
of hotel units concentrated on the northern coast and approximately 45 per cent of the 
total hotel beds and rooms in the prefecture of Heraklion (Table 2). 
6.5 Structural changes: Summary and implications 
The growth of the hotel sector should be seen as occurring after the 1970s, when the 
state ceased any further direct investment and the private sector took over. The 1970s 
represented an era of radical change in the source of capital investment and in the 
nature of incoming tourism, which gradually turned from the limited and exclusive to 
the model of mass tourism. The 1980s demarcated an era of corrective intervention 
from the state, coupled with a harsh monetary environment, but still remained a period 
of continuous growth. In the most recent era, from the early 1990s to present, the focus 
has been on control and improvement of the existing infrastructure rather than the 
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development of new one. It is the period when the saturation of the accommodation 
supply became apparent. 
The hotel sector in Crete developed primarily during the 2nd tourism era. Even though 
it was not designated as a major tourist centre by the state from the very beginning, it 
has become the no. I destination in Greece. Yet, it retains elements that make it unique, 
just as Wilkinson (1989) described, a `microstate'. The type of market it attracts is 
distinct as is its pattern of seasonality. The fact that the hotel sector developed during 
the 2"d era might indicate financial problems that businesses may have carried since 
then. The local hotel sector is expected to be susceptible to trends and developments, as 
is the tourism industry. It is also expected to be even more sensitive to issues pertaining 
to tour operators. As an island, it is primarily accessible to tourists through air travel, 
making it dependent on the tour operators. 
6.6 Key actors 
In this chapter, three key actors beyond the individual hotels and their managers have 
been identified: tour operators, which are integral to the structure of the industry; the 
Greek state, which has exerted significant influence on the development of the hotel 
sector through direct and indirect intervention; and the GNTO, which has a significant 
role in promoting the national tourism industry and creating demand for hotel units. A 
summary of these actors is provided below: 
" Tour operators 
Tour operators exert considerable control over the country's tourism industry because 
their objectives will often differ from that of individual destinations. Tour operators 
will be primarily concerned with their own survival and personal growth. Ashworth 
and Goodall (1988) point out that the tour operators' strategies have contributed to the 
development of `identikit destinations' in most of the Mediterranean countries. As 
destinations move closer to the model of mass tourism, the more likely the influence 
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from tour operators will be, as well as the dependence of destinations on them. The 
wide choice that international travellers have nowadays makes them less dependent on 
or loyal to particular destinations because they offer almost identical sea, sun and sand 
commodities. This situation is fostered by the tour operators, as they try to develop 
customer loyalty to themselves rather than any of the products they are selling; 
however, hotel units do have a certain degree of choice, as they are not obliged to 
commit to only one tour operator. Their choice is limited, though, as they have to 
choose from an oligopolic market. Such situations are not easily reversible. Carey and 
Gountas (1997) suggest that mature tourist destinations cannot afford to reject mass 
tour operators because of the massive economic dislocation it would cause to the local 
and national economy. 
0 The state 
The state is unable to deal with the key issues and problems of the Greek tourism 
industry (AGTE, 2002). The Association of Greek Tourist Enterprises (AGTE) holds 
the Greek state responsible for the current situation. The AGTE has maintained that, 
since 1991, the Greek state had neglected the tourism industry and had no responsible, 
modern or long-term policy for the future of the sector. Tourism planners in Greece 
often underestimate the power exercised by multinationals, such as the tour operators, 
over the local enterprises and authorities (Buhalis, 1995; Josephides, 1993). The result 
is the inability of the Greek tourist product to attract the desired `high quality, high 
expenditure' tourists, because it is more difficult to satisfy their requirements (Conway, 
1996: 41). Zacharatos (1989: 279) points out that long-term policy targets in any form 
are not usually quantified and the inevitable result is an implementation that is subject 
to irrationalities and personal judgments. The inconsistent and undifferentiated 
promotional campaign which is implemented annually does not aid the situation. The 
campaign aims to achieve the aforementioned specified targets, while it is often a `last 
minute' reaction measure to a forecasted decline of bookings for the current season, 
rather than a coordinated, well timed, long-term marketing policy (Touloupas, 1996: 
130; Papadopoulos, 1989: 304). Komilis (1993: 225) suggests that tourism planning in 
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Greece is characterised by the limited political support, lack of social awareness and 
acceptability of planning actions, inadequacy of scientific and technical foundations to 
support planning intervention and a centralised administrative-institutional system 
performing a number of functions, but failing to exercise its coordinative and enforcing 
role. 
" The Greek National Tourism Organisation (GNTO) 
GNTO, a state owned organisation, being simultaneously entrepreneur, coordinator, 
marketer, planner and researcher, is fully responsible for the Greek tourism policy. 
Various sources (see for example Rodakis, 2004; AGTE, 2002), however, have 
criticised the GNTO over the years for performing none of the aforementioned roles 
satisfactorily. In particular, the GNTO is criticised for being a mismanaged and 
bureaucratic organisation. In the past 15 years, 18 executives have been appointed, 
which means that no serious and stable tourism policy can be implemented. The 
executives are usually inexperienced and the division of personnel is unequal. For 
instance, from a total of 3,000 people employed by the GNTO, only 128 of them work 
at branches abroad or 4.3%. Comparatively, the Spanish NTO employs 595 of its 
people abroad or 33.6%; the same is true for 200 from the French NTO or 74% (H 
Kathimerini, 2003). The Greek National Tourism Organisation (GNTO) found itself 
downgraded in status because of its inability to play its role in shaping the future of 
Greek tourism. In the maze of the state's bureaucracy, AGTE points to the blurring of 
responsibilities between the GNTO and various ministries that are detrimental for the 
tourism sector (AGTE, 2002). 
6.6.1 Implications 
The above summary can be seen as a preface to the institutional context within which 
the hotel firms and their managers operate. The aforementioned key actors are expected 
to: 
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a) Interact with the hotel firms and their management. Tour operators in particular, 
given their status as indispensable mediating organisations for the hotel firms, are 
the actors with whom the management would like to keep close contact with. It is 
also likely that the management would develop strategies allowing their hotel firm 
to draw from the tour operators' resources. 
b) Shape the hotel firms' context. The number and composition of the tour operators 
that are active on the island certainly defines the range of markets a hotel firm can 
approach. The Greek state has variously taken measures intervening with the 
development of the tourism industry in the country, and subsequently, with the 
local hotel sector too. The GNTO, on the other hand, has a large share of the 
responsibility for creating demand for the hotel units by promoting the national 
tourist product. 
The above may be trivial common knowledge for the subjects used in this study, which 
might as well be considered factual. The subjects' common knowledge, as presented 
thematically in the findings, would build upon those `facts' or basic knowledge, but 
they are likely not to be elaborated upon. The reasons behind the current situation are, 
however, an important building block for the reader's understanding of the context, 





In the literature review, it was argued that the managers' contribution to strategy 
can be seen through their response to uncertainty. Uncertainty drives organisational 
action, in addition to managerial activity, and works as a strategy-generating 
principle that defines the outputs of the managers' activity, leading to strategic 
outcomes. As this operationalisation of the managers' contribution includes 
multiple components, the extraction of relevant data requires multiple levels of 
inquiry, which are presented thematically in this chapter. 
The findings are presented in three parts. The first part (Section 7.2) provides the 
first building block for understanding the managers' contribution to strategy. It 
looks at the managers' response to uncertainty, as constructed at the community 
level. The focal managers, being members of the same occupational group and 
situated within the same context, develop a common understanding of the issues 
pertaining to their firms' situation and of how they deal with them. This common 
knowledge is extracted from the unstructured part of the interview and is presented 
in 14 constructs, which refer to the managers' subjective, taken for granted 
knowledge, which is shared within their occupational group. The constructs are 
further categorised under three themes (Table 4): the nature of the environment 
(Section 7.2.1), management tools (Section 7.2.2), and management mechanisms 
(Section 7.2.3). Relating the first part of the findings to the conceptual framework 
previously developed (Section 4.4), it summarises the mediating role of the 
managers between their firm and the external environment in a way which is 
understood by the group of practitioners. In this first part, however, it tends to 
portray a primarily outward focus, describing the interaction of the actors and their 
firms with elements of the external environment, given that it does not concentrate 
on the managers' activity as such. 
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Table 4: Categorisation of constructs 
Categorisation Provide answers to: 
of constructs 
Theme 1 What is the nature of the hotel firms' environment? What are the 
boundaries of their immediate environment within which the managers 
can act? 
Theme 2 What are the tools the managers have access to and which they use to 
deal with uncertainty? 
Theme 3 What are the mechanisms/processes that guide the managers' 
judgement? 
The second part (Section 7.3) dwells on the managers' activity, showing how their 
common knowledge about dealing with uncertainty in this context becomes 
empirical and is reflected in their work activity patterns. It represents the 
ethnographic lens of this study, providing a fine-grained analysis of the managers' 
inputs and gives a micro-analytic account of their contribution to strategy by 
juxtaposing their inputs with their intended output at the organisational level. The 
data are presented in sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 in a manner consistent with previous 
studies on managerial work, which is complemented by further analyses aiming to 
establish the reciprocal causal links between what the managers do (their inputs) 
and what they achieve (their output). These analyses include a) the contrasting of 
the hotel managers' observable activity with their intended contribution to the 
organisation (Section 7.3.3), drawing from the managers' constructs on dealing 
with uncertainties in this context, and b) the analysis of the managers' annual work 
cycle (Section 7.3.4), in order to provide a more rounded view of the managers' 
inputs, which may not be readily observable. 
The third part (Section 7.4) of the findings represents the organisational lens, 
focusing on how outcomes emerge through the interaction between the environment 
and the firm and the managers' mediating role in this process. It provides a more 
normative approach to understanding the formation of the hotel firms' strategies, 
and permits the cross-examination of the managers' contribution on how their 
output is reflected to organisational outcomes. In particular, the analysis of the data 
tries to simulate the organisations' responses to changes in the external environment 
over time, through the reflections of the hotel managers. These data are presented in 
two subsections: Section 7.4.1 looks into how the managers perceived and dealt 
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with changes in the external environment, or uncertainties that emerged as a result 
of the changing environment. Section 7.4.2 examines the patterns of organisational 
outcomes as they form over time, taking a more longitudinal approach. The results 
are again juxtaposed with the managers' constructs, complementing the existing 
results, and show the dynamism of the managers' contribution to the strategy of 
their firms. 
The three parts of this chapter present distinct data sets, which entail a different 
level of inquiry, assumptions and degree of generalisation (see table 5). They are, 
however, complementary, as they are interlinked. The hotel managers' ability to 
contribute to and shape their firms' strategy is something that is ingrained in their 
common knowledge of dealing with their firm's uncertainties. This common 
knowledge is socially constructed and is therefore shared across their occupational 
community. Their ability to contribute and shape their firm's strategy should also 
become empirical and manifest in their everyday practice. Finally, a normative 
view of the hotel firms' adaptation to the external environment over time portrays 
the outcomes of the managers' efforts. Consequently, the three parts of this chapter 
which represent a different level of abstraction are interlinked, allowing 
communication across the levels of analysis. 
Table 5: The levels of the inquiry 
Level of Assumptions Level of abstraction Data collection 
inquiry technique 
Knowledge Socially constructed, The occupational group Interview 
common understanding for 
dealing with organisational 
uncertainties 
Activity Observable activity which The occupational group and Observation 
reflects the managers' work clusters of firms depending Interview 
pattern and is dependent on on their organisational 
their organisation's specificities. Abstractions 
uncertainties about the managers' 
activity are made based on 
the characteristics of the 
hotel unit 
Outcomes Represent the hotel firms' The hotel firms of the Interview 
response to changes in the sample. Can be firm- (structured) 
external environment. The dependent or firm-cluster 
managers act as mediators dependent 




7.2 Interpreting the interviews 
7.2.1 Theme 1: The nature of the environment 
The nature of the environment arises as a theme because the respondents often 
provided a rationale for their actions by referring to the nature of the business and 
the environment. Managerial and organisational actions need not be rational in 
terms of the calculative benefits/costs they might bring about. When strategy- 
making, they have to reflect the external influences over which the firm has no 
control. These influences are `facts' as far as the situation is concerned; however, 
they are not self-evident, or readily obvious to outsiders. Their identification, 
selection and evaluation is part of the strategy-making process. During interviews, 
the respondents implied that their action was dictated by such `facts'. As far as this 
study is concerned, it is better to view the constructs under this theme as descriptive 
of the context within which the community of managers is located, helping us to 
understand the causes of their action. 
The most obvious feature of the hotel sector is its maturity. Prior to 1990, the sector 
was still trying to cope with demand. The demand, however, reached its peak soon 
after 1990, but the accommodation offer on the island kept growing. Considering 
the fact that the island has a finite capacity for receiving foreign travellers, it would 
make no sense for hotel firms to keep growing in capacity. Constructs 1 &2 describe 
how hotel firms achieve growth, and how this is tightly linked to their nature as 
independent, family-owned businesses. Their growth seems to be spatially 
confined, because as family-owned businesses, they wish to stay within the locus of 
control of the family. By understanding this feature of the independent hotels, we 
can also understand why some units persist in growing by increasing their capacity. 
Business growth follows the growth of the family and, as the business cannot be 
handed over to family members in terms of separate facilities, it has to be achieved 
in terms of capacity. 
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The `facts' that are pertinent to the hotel firms are contingent to their location on 
the competitive map, which, not surprisingly, is linked to their location on the 
geographical map. In construct 3, we see that the hotels' distance from access 
points in the island affects the desirability of their product to both suppliers and 
consumers. The concentration of hotel units in the area may also determine whether 
they will conform with or differentiate from their immediate competitors. In 
construct 4, we see another side effect of the hotels' surrounding morphology to 
their operation, namely their limits in drawing from a sufficient labour pool. 
Labour, a critical resource in a hotel's operation, is not readily available to all 
hotels. Hotels in the south axis of the island have difficulty in finding skilled 
labour, whereas for lower category hotels (the 3* mentioned in the sample), it is 
difficult to find mid-management staff. Hotel managers respond to those issues by 
adopting particular practices to compensate for the disadvantages inherent to their 
hotel units. 
Construct 1: Capacity increase versus facilities' improvement 
The dramatic growth of the accommodation offer in the first eras of the local 
tourism industry (mid-1970s and the 1980s) is not surprising when considering the 
immense tourist demand which could not be covered by the existing tourist 
accommodation infrastructure. The entrepreneurs could enter or expand their hotel 
business, knowing that their hotel product would sell anyway. The suppliers would 
give incentives to hoteliers to expand their business, provided that they would give 
them exclusivity over the rights of selling the hotel product. A travel agent 
explains: 
(Agent 1) Yes, the agents were asking for more rooms, the hotelier was 
replying `but I do not have - build more. How much money do you want? 
Here take this downpayment'. The agent was giving 20 million (GRD) lets 
say that time, the hotelier built the rooms and the next year the hotel was 
full. The neighbour was seeing what is going on and did the same. This kept 
going until everyone had built a hotel or had apartments. The T. O. was 
coming here and asked the people `what is this building here? -a building 
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site - what are you going to build? -a house - wh y don't you build 
apartments? Here, take this money... as a downpayment for 2-3 years' and 
the T. O. deducted it from the sales. People built hotels from nothing 
As much as the accommodation growth was justified in previous years, the 
persistence in expanding the capacity of the hotel business now seems totally 
irrational. The declining general demand, the saturated accommodation offer and 
the seasonality figures all concur to an unfavourable competitive environment. One 
answer is that hotels try to grow by increasing their capacity in order to cope with 
the demand in the high season, during which, they have greater profits. The 
increased competition does not allow more profit throughout the tourist season, as 
prices are nearly at cost level in the side seasons. When respondents were asked 
how expanding business capacity is a feasible option amidst unfavourable market 
conditions, they replied: 
(Ba) These are decisions of the hoteliers. You see the feasibility studies here 
are almost non-existent and those that are made are superficial. The people 
who do such moves they think they are better than their neighbour and they 
will sell better.. . The hotelier makes such an investment 
hoping to improve 
the overall financial results. If he achieves that by having better occupancy 
rates during the peak period and increase the capacity to cope with the 
demand in that short period then he does it. Now if this has a wider impact 
and increases the overall offer which creates a more intense competition 
with its neighbours then this is a parameter which is not included in the 
decision; because simply if the hotelier sees that it gives returns he will go 
for it. 
Such decisions are made, despite the fact that demand cannot increase. In most 
cases, profitability keeps decreasing year after year; however, the reinvestment of 
capital in the business has more to do with retaining the family business. These 
short-termist choices are an outcome of simple logistics, with little consideration of 
the changes and the effects on the macro-environment. Although capacity increase 
was the recipe during the golden era of tourism, after the mid-1990s it became the 
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recipe for higher category hotels only. As the tourist offer kept increasing, it 
marginalised 3* or lower category hotel units: 
(Bb) Since the demand is stagnant and the accommodation offer increases, 
the prices in the hotel market have to go lower, because it is difficult to offer 
a different product. 4* hotels are in a more advantageous position than 3* as 
3* are selected out. 4* hotels are not saturated yet 
A competing method of growth is the expansion of the facilities of the hotel unit. 
This is often realised through radical renovation of the infrastructure of the hotel in 
order to accommodate the facilities/services it could not offer in its previous form. 
Such moves are required in order to achieve a price increase or differentiate from 
the competition. In either case, pressure to offer more facilities/services is realised 
by the management: 
(Eb) ... a renovation is needed approximately every 10 years anyway... 
Customers now want more facilities and conveniences as well which we 
could not offer with the previous infrastructure. When we upgraded the 
hotel's category we immediately achieved an increase in our rates of 45- 
50%. This means you have to offer a lot more than before. 
(Da) The renovation did not start earlier although the business climate was 
better simply because we had not identified anything more to give to their 
customers... We only realised that our customers' needs started to change 
after 1990 as they were becoming more demanding 
In the present situation, capacity increase is not nurtured by the intermediaries, but 
they exercise pressure to gain better facilities/services from their partnering hotels. 
The suppliers understand that the game is now played around the facilities/services 
of the hotels. As a result, while the tourist accommodation offer keeps increasing, it 
now increases at a slower pace. 
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Construct 2: Locally confined business activity 
Hotel owners are more likely to expand their business activity in the same area in 
order to keep the business well within their locus of control. Although the market 
conditions are no more favourable, persistence in the hospitality industry is evident 
across the sample. This is an indication of their idiosyncratic exit barriers. The 
acquisition and/or creation of additional hotel units might well fall into the same 
category as capacity increase, but it seems to happen for different purposes. The 
business development of Case H encapsulates a wide array of those factors. 
In 1984, the founder created a 3* hotel in an area close to a major tourist centre. In 
1992, he joined forces with his two brothers and, having joined capital, they built a 
bigger and better 4* hotel closer to the tourist centre. The reason they wanted to 
build a new, upgraded hotel at the beginning of the 90s was to create a better 
product in every aspect, as the market was becoming more demanding. They had to 
offer something more than the local competition. Therefore it was a rational 
decision aimed at maximising the company's resources. In the following four years, 
there were two capacity increases to the hotel. After that, the family (the founder 
and his brothers) each decided to pursue their own ventures. A rent-a-car business 
was started in 1995 by the founder's brothers which, in addition to being a move of 
diversification, worked in close cooperation with their hotel units. In 2001, another 
4* hotel unit was created with the founder's own capital, neighbouring the previous 
business. The close proximity of all these units is necessary in order to allow the 
owners sufficient control and monitoring, given the fact that they are actively 
involved in managing the business. The creation of the last hotel unit was partly 
because they wanted to respond to the evolving needs of their clientele and offer 
them the facilities and services which they could not offer with the other hotel units. 
There was little room for improvement in the other units and it was more 
reasonable to create a new one; however, this does not explain why the founder 
decided to expand in an industry with unfavourable market conditions. 
According to the founder it is most likely that the business will expand. This might 
not have to do a lot with wealth, but is intended to secure his family financially, 
even if his children are interested in business in a sphere other than hospitality. 
100 
Therefore, the expansion of the business is related to the size of the family, where 
the growth of the business follows the growth of the family. The founder notes that 
large families cannot be occupied in a single business. That would create a variety 
of problems and conflicts: 
There are always opportunities out there to take advantage although I do not 
need to do anything more, it is not a matter of wealth. It is something I will 
do as a father because as you can see this is a family business and if the kids 
want to stay in this business or are interested in something else I will be glad 
to give them advice and assist them 
SO THE EXPANSION OF THE BUSINESS HAS TO DO WITH THE 
SIZE OF THE FAMILY? 
It was a thought. The previous businesses were like that. We are three 
brothers and when we started we were single. As the time passed we had 
made families and the shareholders increased. Imagine all 8-10 children plus 
the brides and the grooms and the in-laws to participate in the same 
business... 
The same pattern appears in the majority of the cases. What is important for 
independent hoteliers is to keep the business under the control of the family. As the 
family grows and family dynamics become more complex, one solution is to 
expand the business and to allocate the business capital to the family members, 
absorbing in this way the problems of a bigger and more complex organisation. 
The cases that diverge from the recipe are usually the smaller and lower category 
hotels, as they lack the resources to expand. Other hotel businesses (cases A and I) 
do not follow the recipe just because they rely heavily on the involvement of family 
members. Case I, the specialist hotel, had to convert some rooms and make them 
suitable for winter operation. This entailed a step away from the traditional 
character of the rooms in order to bring them closer to the expectations of their 
clientele. Although this can be seen as an effort to redefine the hotel product, it 
would not have been possible if the family members did not participate in running 
the business. Each family member became occupied with the business after they 
had completed their other obligations. The latest addition of a family member into 
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the business as a full-time occupation was in 1999, a year that marked the addition 
of a new facility in the business, followed by conversion to year round operation in 
2002. 
Construct 3: The effects of morphology on hotels 
As shown in the sample selection, a distinction was made between hotels located in 
the north and south axis of the island, for the reason that the development of the 
regional sector varies significantly along the north and south axis, mainly because 
of the location of the main access points, the international airport and the harbours. 
For hotel managers, thi s matters for various reasons. The metropolitan city of 
Heraklion is the base for the majority of T. As and T. Os and their interaction with 
remote hotels is significantly constrained: 
(Db) The biggest problem we have as a region is the distance from the 
airport. If the road network was better then it would take less than one and a 
half hours the bus needs to come here and it would be easier to transfer 
people to this part of the island. Do not forget that the agency does not bring 
the customers directly to the hotel unless the bus is full with our customers 
only, otherwise it passes by 10-15 hotels along the way and it may even take 
3 hours to come here. The customers get frustrated of course and they may 
choose a hotel on the north coast which can be of inferior quality compared 
to ours 
The source of this constraint is the difficulty of T. As/T. Os to have a branch in a 
remote location. There is either not enough geographical concentration of hotels or 
it is outside their locus of control. This is best illustrated by the fact that all the new 
markets are channelled to the metropolitan area and, when they built a greater 
capacity, they then go to the other resorts: 
(Agent 1) When a new market is attracted to the destination, it always starts 
from the most well known resorts, unless the T. O. is a specialist. 
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(Bb) Differences in the occupancy rates cannot just be explained by the 
attractiveness of an area but also in the number of beds in these areas. Areas 
closer to the airport are always the first to fill up. 
(Ba)... markets like the Israeli market and the Eastern Europe markets 
which have slowly moved beyond the borders of Heraklion... Also some 
small numbers from Arab countries, other north eastern countries; they all 
start from Heraklion. The latter have spread to the rest of Crete but they 
started from Heraklion, the first 2-3 years they were at the Heraklion area. 
The new markets are typically concentrated around popular tourist centres. The 
suppliers want to control these new markets because they do not have the critical 
mass to disperse them everywhere on the island. So, the suppliers keep it 
concentrated in close areas purely for financial-administrative reasons because 
business can be coordinated better and allow the agent a larger profit margin. 
Another problem of the time/distance noted by the respondents is that the 
T. As/T. Os lose revenues from selling excursions because it's difficult to organise 
them. The agents do not promote such far-flung resorts because they have to deal 
with increased process difficulties (intermediation, limitations in organising transfer 
and excursions) if not increased cost: 
(Agent 1) It is more difficult to organise excursions in resorts with long 
time/distance. The handling in this case is given to the locals (local agents) 
as it is not always efficient to organise transfer from the metropolitan city of 
Heraklion... we will more likely deter buyers/partners from selecting resorts 
with high time/distance but if they insist I cannot say no, but then we do it 
with my terms... I avoid such resorts because of the extra time required to 
organise the handling 
From the suppliers' side, time/distance from the access points is a factor that 
directly affects the selection of their portfolio of hotels. Mass tourism 
predominantly goes to the big tourist centres in north Crete. The convenience of 
tourist centres is twofold; they are developed not only close to the main access 
points but also close to the main attractions of the island. As a result, the T. Os 
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programmes will not include the peripheral industry on the south axis and north 
axis unless there is already demand for such resorts. 
As illustrated above, time/distance from the main access points affects the 
geographic concentration of hotel units. Access problems are mediated by the 
reduced number of comparable hotel units, as opposed to the north axis of the 
island. There seems to be a degree of system-regulated differentiation in such 
remote areas, which can be based on the hotels' type of operation, category or 
niche. It is system-regulated, since no hotel would want to compete in the same 
market segment with a neighbouring hotel when the demand for those remote hotels 
is already reduced. The T. O. also benefits from having more extensive variety in its 
regional programme, creating a kind of quasi-monopoly (using the unique hotel 
product to offer a unique variety in the area). In Case D, the hotel manages to 
differentiate in the area, as it is focused on the families' market and there are no 
other similar hotels in the region. Geographical concentration needs to be balanced, 
offering enough variety and size for agents to be interested, but not too crowded so 
that the share of the pie from the market is reduced. In contrast, hotels on the north 
axis tend to conform to the competition, especially in resorts located in tourist 
centres, as the demand is always channelled there first. Whilst it is difficult to say 
whether resort hotels in the north would benefit by differentiating, it can be 
assumed that they favour stability of conformity over the uncertainty of 
differentiation. 
Differentiation is perhaps the only option for marginalised or lower category hotels. 
Although they could manage in the past by offering mainstream tourist products, 
they are now facing considerable pressure. In particular, lower category or 
marginalised hospitality establishments are those that are most affected by the 
saturation in the sector. Currently, 3* hotel units are in a position where they even 
have to compete with 4* hotels, given that their price difference is not great. 4* 
hotels can determine price levels and lower category establishments have to follow. 
Taking into account that most hospitality businesses are based on sales' volumes, 
no one can blame the 4* hotels for unfair competition. 4* hotels, due to their 
consequent size and their ability to utilise economies of scale, have more discretion 
in pricing, leaving smaller hotels with a lower margin. Lower category hotels are 
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constrained by their cost structure, mainly because of their size, and cannot 
differentiate with their pricing alone anymore. Such cases are more susceptible to 
develop mechanisms such as changing the staff to customer ratio (e. g. through 
family involvement), or a change in the type of operation (e. g. club, all-inclusive), 
in order to avoid coming into direct competition with higher category hotels: 
(Aa) This hotel, in this location, in this category, with this capacity cannot 
differentiate. If we try to do that we need to do a lot of effort. Others invest 
huge amounts of money and they offer a lot of things... Now for example 
someone is not obliged to go to x hotel just because it has low price because 
he can find ay hotel with even lower price... That is something 
advantageous for us because there is no other similar hotel in the area... it is 
the only all-inclusive in the area and if an agent has programme in Ag. 
Pelagia then the hotel would probably be selected. 
(Hb) Now because we cannot request the contract prices we should have, we 
are forced to drop our prices and enter the 3* territory... the 4* have the 
capability in some periods to drop their prices and reach the prices of the 3 *. 
The 3* cannot go lower because they have very narrow profit margins and 
although they are slightly cheaper than the 4*, they are not as attractive as 
the 4* and therefore they suffer the costs of low demand for their product. 
Construct 4: The local labour pool 
In the labour intensive hotel business, employees are a critical resource. Low staff 
turnover is always preferable, but it is not realised in the same way or to the same 
extent in all cases. Remote hotels in the south suffer from the low geographical 
concentration of tourist enterprises and are often short of a skilled labour pool. This 
would not be the case for hotels located within tourist centres which, by definition, 
are closer to access points and the metropolitan city. Lower category hotels have 
difficulty in covering certain posts that require proficiency or managerial duties. 
Cases D, G and C illustrate the problems: 
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(Db) If one year we have 70 people staff the next year will come back only 
30 of them, if we are lucky they will be 40 ... Ierapetra is predominantly 
rural and not a solely touristic area and for the locals it is a temporary 
solution, one way to get extra income. 
YOU MEAN THERE ARE NO PROFESSIONALS IN THE REGION? 
Exactly, we do not have skilled workforce and those we find we keep them 
by all means necessary. We are also forced during some periods such as 
July-August to take unskilled staff who do not have the right education to 
respond to the hotel's needs but we have to do it... 
(Ga) ... in the last years there is abundance of workforce, especially for 
positions such as chambermaids, waiters, barmen etc. A business may found 
difficulty to recruit staff in higher positions, such as receptionists or duty 
managers as they prefer to work for bigger hotel units or hotel chains that 
offer better career prospects 
Not surprisingly, the management gives emphasis to retaining staff. Most cases 
present a remarkably low staff turnover. It is important that the management 
cements a mutual commitment with the staff. In resort hotels, business is seasonal 
and the staff are hired for the duration of the tourist season (6-8 months). This is a 
necessary management practice which contents both staff and the trade union. The 
management has to make sure that the staff know whether they are going to be 
hired again the following season or not (see more on Section 7.6), though, and 
ensure their regular employment during the tourist season. It is common for 
employees in the hotel sector to work continuously during the tourist season 
without a holiday and take a long `holiday' during the winter. Low occupancies 
may force the management to give more days off to the staff, which is not desirable 
and may affect their morale: 
(Aa) ... The personnel is affected because the low occupancy 
in April last 
year made people come here once, then leave, come only for a Saturday and 
then leave or do half shift. This affects the personnel's psychology... here in 
Crete more or less everyone has some agricultural fortune and they can 
occupy themselves there, they receive their unemployment benefits and they 
are fine... 
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For the management, this entails a heightened awareness of accountability towards 
the staff. In order to avoid a high staff turnover, managers whom inevitably draw 
from a limited labour pool give incentives to their staff to compensate for the 
disadvantages inherent to their hotel (in terms of category and location). In case G, 
for instance, the management provides long term stability for its staff (the average 
tenure of the staff is nearly 10 years according to the OM), and that is in addition to 
other perks (i. e. accommodation) that are used to compensate for the limited career 
prospects a job in the hotel offers. 
7.2.2 Theme 2: Management tools 
The nature of the business and the environment restricts the managers in terms of 
what they can do to drive the firm forward. Their main goal, however, is simple: to 
maintain and/or improve the firm's performance by operating the hotel at maximum 
capacity, selling the rooms at the highest possible price. Management tools refer to 
the means at their disposal for achieving that goal. Those means are not exclusive to 
individual managers, but are shared among professionals within the sector. As the 
detailed constructs show, they are often the result of the ongoing process of 
institutionalisation, which renders those management tools effective or simply 
applicable in the context of the hotel business. 
Keeping the hotel full becomes increasingly difficult given the maturity of the 
sector and the stagnant tourist demand. This is the management's focus, especially 
when some hotel firms need to achieve high sales volumes in order to survive. The 
erratic demand throughout the tourist season complicates the situation even further 
and becomes the hotel firms' main source of uncertainty (Construct 5). Another 
feature of hotel firms in the sector is their growing distance from their markets. As 
hotel firms do not have the capability to reach their markets on their own, they have 
to rely on T. As/T. Os (the suppliers), which allow the hotels to use their resources 
(i. e. promotion, distribution channels) for that purpose. This growing distance is 
also portrayed in their more introverted focus regarding their promotional activities 
(Construct 6). One can assume that management would aim at those markets that 
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generate the most profit for the business as an objective means to improve the 
firm's performance; however, this has proved to be not always the case. As long as 
circumstances allow, the management would not aim to achieve profit 
maximisation per se, but to reduce operational complexity by selecting markets that 
are more compatible with the hotel's capabilities (Construct 7). It is therefore a 
question of balancing the financial needs with the operational wants. 
Similarly, the management would choose the hotel's suppliers (Construct 8) based 
on their capacity to fill the hotel, but would always be constrained by its available 
options. Hotels will engage into a relationship with the suppliers, made explicit 
through a formal contract. The process of contracting (Construct 9) is a year-to-year 
practice, where the hotels review, renew, revise, or break their contracts with the 
suppliers. In other words, it is the main means to transact with their partnering 
suppliers; however, as noted by the respondents, a contract serves only to display a 
degree of commitment to the partnership; it is never followed to its full extent 
(permitted by clauses in the contract that allow both the supplier and the hotel not to 
mutually commit their resources beforehand but simply to display their intention to 
do so). In this respect, a contract does not represent a business transaction but rather 
serves as leverage to secure resources from either side. This explains certain 
phenomena that cannot be understood through rational transaction cost logic. A low 
contract performance, for instance, should affect the degree of commitment a hotel 
shows to the partnership by lowering the number of rooms it allocates to the 
supplier in the contract. This simply does not happen in the real world, as the 
management seeks to maintain continuity in its relationship with the supplier, in the 
prospect of future returns. This practice inevitably creates uncertainties in the 
hotels' operation. The management responds by absorbing those uncertainties 
through overbooking their hotels' room capacity and transferring the impact to their 
peripheral suppliers (see Construct 8). 
Being the last link of the value chain, within a fragmented sector, reliant upon a few 
mediating organisations (the suppliers), and distanced from their markets, hotel 
firms operate within a sparse information environment, which can be easily 
manipulated by their suppliers to serve their own purposes. Managers deal with this 
issue by embedding network interaction within their routines (Construct 10). The 
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'Tuesday tour' is a characteristic example of how the hotel managers persist in 
some of their routines for no objective reason other than to engage in network 
interaction, to approach external agents and grasp opportunities unavailable to them 
within the confined space of their hotel business. In terms of forecasting the 
demand for their product, hotels are found in the same unprivileged position. To 
counteract this problem, the management gives emphasis to intrinsic indicators to 
forecast demand and assess business performance (Construct 11). This method 
works because of the cyclical nature of demand, as well as the history of 
collaboration between hotel and supplier, which implies a degree of continuity in 
terms of future results and of the suppliers' commitment to the partnership. 
Construct 5: Dealing with erratic demand 
Erratic demand represents the main source of uncertainty for the management. 
Demand typically peaks in the middle months of the high season and becomes 
significantly lower during the side seasons. In this environment, managers have to 
maintain a full hotel in order to cover the fixed costs of the business and, at the 
same time, prevent their prices from dropping to dangerous levels (below cost). The 
pressure on the management is further intensified by the phenomenon of 
seasonality, whereby the tourist season tends to shrink over time. In this 
environment, dealing with erratic demand becomes a critical part of the managers' 
attention. 
Pricing is the management's main tool for mediating the effects of erratic demand. 
Typically, there are three pricing zones over the tourist season, low, mid and high. 
A common practice among the hotels is to give slightly different pricing zones for 
each market, as their demand characteristics vary: 
(Hb) The high season is fixed. That is August and 15 days in July and 5 
days in September. This is de facto. The thing is how you take it. Some take 
it till 5 of September while others take it till the 25th of September. In 
Germany for example the kids' vacation is till 25`h of August. They do not 
have any other vacation till October and the German T. O. has difficulty to 
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sell especially with high price... in Italy it is a period that can hold more but 
they do not do anything further to that... 
Regulation of sales' volumes cannot be achieved through pricing alone, however, 
and emphasis is increasingly given to shorter term pricing practices. As most 
respondents quoted, erratic demand is counterbalanced by giving special offers. The 
majority of hotel industry business is based on sales volumes, and as a result, it is 
typical to give a special offer for certain periods during the season when bookings 
are deemed low. Special offers are unlikely to be given in the high season, as the 
number of bookings, and consequently, contract performance improves: 
(Gb) We avoid doing it but it is the agency that will contact us and request a 
special offer. The agent, though, has to support his request; he cannot just 
call and say `give me a special offer'. The agent sees what is the potential of 
the special offer and accordingly decides for making that request or not. 
(Agent 2) There is a sensitive point: when a T. O. has a problem my aim is to 
help him; meaning that I will try to help either through an offer, or a lower 
commission... 
Cases that do not give special offers are city or luxury hotels. For city hotels, a 
special offer is unlikely to affect overall demand for their product, while luxury 
hotels prefer to retain a uniform pricing policy, as they have a higher margin and 
they do not rely on sales volumes alone. The respondents variously noted that one 
reason they do not go ahead giving special offers is that it would create another set 
of expectations from the agents, who will start requesting more special offers: 
(Ia) Anyway, we never give special offers, not even this year when we had 
terrible gaps in June... if you start giving special offers then you will have 
to do it again because the agents will say `you gave a special offer in June, 
give one in July as well'. If you do it you are looking for trouble because 
you provoke them to use their usual tactics on you but if you remain quiet 
then at least they do not have such requests. Imagine having to give special 
offers in every small crisis. 
110 
It is also possible to include early booking terms in the contract. That is, a discount 
over the contract rate when bookings are made before a predetermined date. This 
way hotel management gives incentives to its customers to book early and reduces 
the uncertainty of not knowing the bookings' status in advance. This does not work 
for the city hotels as they cannot rely on sales volumes like the resort hotels: 
(Fb) The early bookings do not work, forget it. It is not a resort here, it does 
not have early bookings. What sort of early bookings can they make? For 2 
days?... when a hotelier is involved with many agents to get very small 
shares from each one, he does not care about such small things. If they get 
in a brochure, every page of the brochure implies a lot of money for the 
T. O., which may be 10,000 euro per page... it needs customers volumes to 
do early bookings 
In the low season, however, no pricing measure can be enough to fill the hotel. It is 
therefore preferable to make sales to groups in the side seasons to achieve the sales 
volumes that could not be achieved through pricing alone. The pursuit of group 
bookings starts from the winter period: 
(Ab) HOW DO YOU `PUSH' YOUR SALES ON THE SIDE SEASONS? 
Only through special offers, there is no other way... or take a group in the 
hotel which will boost the occupancy... we all know that our occupancy on 
the side seasons would be much lower than the high season and you always 
know that you can get groups, without having the booking position lists or 
anything; without having any information because it is taken for granted 
Construct 6: Tourism exhibitions vs. in-house promotion 
Participation in tourism exhibitions has always served the management in 
networking the hotel with the international travel industry. Certain tourism 
exhibitions have more global character than others, such as the World Travel 
Market in the UK and the Berlin Tourism Exhibition in Germany. Whilst other 
organised exhibitions help hotels and travel agencies to get in touch with a 
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particular ethnic market, it is these two that give the pulse of the market. For 
professionals in the hotel industry, such international meetings allow them to `see 
and be seen' whilst getting first hand experience of the current trends and the 
market status. 
As the character of the international tourism exhibitions changed through the eras 
of the tourism industry, the participation/attendance of hotel managers decreased. In 
the past, they were mainly used as a channel for making direct sales. Nowadays, 
they place more faith on in-house promotion or promotion at the services level. 
Since they cannot affect the market climate and, given low customer loyalty (hotel 
and destination loyalty have decreased; the market now is more price elastic), they 
adopted a more introverted stance. According to many respondents, the only way to 
improve their position is by maintaining a steady clientele, which is translated as a 
high percentage of repeat customers. This way they can ensure cooperation from 
their local and foreign partners far more effectively than by `getting the pulse' of 
the market in international tourism exhibitions. 
The manager in case D explains that they participate in international tourism 
exhibitions themselves, and in smaller ones they commission their partners to 
represent them. He does not find any tangible returns from participating in tourism 
exhibitions other than networking: 
(Db) ... For example, in Russia we work with one agency which participates 
in the tourism exhibition in Moscow. The same thing happens with the big 
ones too such as Neckermann. It is not like it used to be in the past, where 
we used to take the initiative ourselves and go to the tourism exhibitions. 
These days are over. There is no benefit for us anymore to participate in a 
tourism exhibition, it is advertising for nothing. 
SO YOU DO NOT DO IT UNLESS THERE ARE TANGIBLE RETURNS 
Yes, that is normal. In the past, I mean from 1982 till 1990, we used to go 
there ourselves. We booked stands in 10 exhibitions in Germany, Austria 
and Holland, we were driving a van all over Europe and we went to all these 
exhibitions. That time of course things were different. The customers used 
to go there and make bookings. Once I remember we received around 100 
112 
reservations in one exhibition alone; we had group bookings. Now everyone 
tries to find where is the cheapest and go there 
It therefore seems that the impetus for participating in past exhibitions was the 
newness of the hotel product and the need to make contacts in the industry. 
According to the manager, they now have a stable range of partners and do not need 
to make any new contacts. Moreover, there is little for them to gain, as they do not 
make any direct sales in international exhibitions nowadays. Now it is their 
clientele that supports them. That is why they try to promote the sales with their 
own efforts and prove to their suppliers that they are an accountable partner: 
(Ca) The only thing we can do is to keep our guests happy in order to make 
them come back and demand next year a place in our hotel. When the agents 
see that the customers love what we offer only then we can get some 
privileges and/or protection from them. 
(Db) one of our strongest advantages is the level of repeat guests, which 
accounts for 25% from each market. These are the customers we offer as a 
gift to the suppliers. 
On. the contrary, case B does not favour one type over the other. The management 
participates in no less than four international tourism exhibitions every year. 
Whenever possible, after the exhibitions, he visits the headquarters of the T. Os in 
order to strengthen the hotel's relationship with all their subdivisions such as the 
groups' department and the reservations department, so if they need them, they are 
able to contact them directly. The management was also proud to issue information 
about their recent international awards and perhaps that explains the reason they 
have acquired such access: 
(Bb) It is important to have a direct communication channel with the T. Os... 
if we want to increase the release period of the allotment or something like 
that ... we had the chance to gain substantial feedback from those who sell 
our product... Now we have a database of agencies which is around 1600 
agencies right now with whom we try to maintain some contact. 
113 
In Case B, emphasis is given to in-house promotion as well. According to the 
manager, they prefer to promote their hotel mainly at the services level, which can 
be done only via long-term efforts, and not at a price level. This way they avoid 
short-term measures such as special offers, in which case the customers are not 
concerned with the services anyway. Cases E, G and I do not participate in 
international exhibitions but they should not be considered as misfits. The 
specificity of their organisational capabilities makes such actions either inefficient 
or improbable. In case G, the owner/manager finds it difficult to attend international 
exhibitions because the hotel firm cannot afford to participate with its own stand 
and the whole effort cannot be cost effective. The manager in case E finds it 
impossible to attend international exhibitions because he cannot afford to leave his 
post at the hotel. The nature of the business in this city hotel does not allow any 
slack resources for such promotion. Here, the manager cannot be absent or replaced 
by another member of staff. The workload is continuous and such promotional 
activities are effectively prohibited. 
Construct 7: Selectivity of markets 
The respondents often noted that priority is given to selected markets, but not 
necessarily because of their contribution to the hotel's profitability. Their choice 
was the outcome of their efforts to ensure the compatibility of organisational 
capabilities to the characteristics of the markets. It is not uncommon to find hotels 
working predominantly with the British market as ̀ the British typically spend more 
during their vacation', the German market `working with Germans is problem-free', 
or French `because the hotel product appeals more to the French'. The choice of 
markets was severely restrained in the last decade, however, as the accommodation 
offer became saturated, whilst market demand stopped growing. In more recent 
times, the management has had to make compromises and sacrifice efficiency over 
profit by selecting less compatible markets: 
(Gb) The markets we work with are the English, German, Dutch, some 
Italians and French. This season we work mostly with the English and 
secondly the French... This year proved particularly good for the English 
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market... we are open to any partnership though. We will not say no if 
anyone approaches us 
(Ga) If we have the chance we would prefer certain markets, e. g. the 
English as they generate more revenues for the hotel 
(Ab) It would be better, of course, if we could have a German market 
instead of Czech or a Polish... On the other hand how can you reject a 
market? Especially if they give you a good price... 
(Eb) I avoid fly&drive packages because they are one night stay only and 
they are trouble... If we take them, we receive complaints because we do 
not have enough parking space... Roundtrip packages are another issue; 
they are groups doing one night stay. It is usually 10-20 people for a night. 
We have no problems with these bookings and they are always welcome 
Besides the issue of organisational and market compatibility, markets are also used 
as tools to mediate the effects of erratic demand. The pattern of cyclical demand 
differs from market to market and this can be used by the management to cover the 
gaps throughout the tourist season or reduce the organisational workload: 
(Ba) Sometimes we choose the T. O. or better the markets the T. O. deals 
with knowing that the period when a market is up, another one is down. For 
example in July the French market is up whereas the German market is 
falling and we try to complement the gaps of one market with another, 
making sure that they will not clash in their peak season. 
(Db) The good thing about working with different markets is that you do not 
have much discontinuity in the reservations, because they have different 
flight dates and you do not have, lets say, only 2-3 days a week when you 
have arrivals, you have every day. If, for instance, you had arrivals only on 
Monday, Friday and Saturday, these three days you would have a lot of 
trouble and the other days your occupancy would drop. So, if you had a 
problem, that problem would be during these three days but since you have 
every day arrivals-departures you do not have these variations in occupancy. 
The worse thing is to be overbooked one day and the other day to be empty 
but if you play with many different markets you do not have that problem... 
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I know that they sell better during some periods and I manipulate them in a 
way so that they cover each other. 
Construct 8: Choice of partners 
Hotels have to rely on their suppliers to reach their markets, they need to establish 
partnerships allowing them to use part of the suppliers' resources which would be 
unavailable to them otherwise. Therefore, the management has to make choices 
regarding the portfolio of the hotel's partners (suppliers). The first observation is 
that the hotels' portfolio of suppliers is almost fixed, as the contracting is based on 
the previous contracts with the hotels. The number of suppliers for a typical hotel 
usually varies from 7 to 15. A pattern emerges from the cases, as the majority have 
1-3 main suppliers covering the majority of their room capacity and use the smaller 
or peripheral suppliers to cover the gaps. 
The main suppliers are most likely to be big players in the industry (big T. O. s). 
Those T. Os have the advantage of being able to channel large numbers of 
customers to resorts, whereas the smaller concerns have limited capabilities. Big 
T. Os are also considered more reliable in terms of their financial obligations, while 
this constitutes a chronic problem for the smaller. On the other hand, smaller T. O. s 
have access to more niches than the bigger, who typically deal with mass tourism. 
The big operators may offer reliability and sales volumes, but they also get 
significantly lower contract rates compared to the smaller. Despite these 
shortcomings, the management tends to prefer doing business with the big players 
in the industry. Unfortunately, the oligopolic status quo does not allow hotels to 
select them all. It is not common to see hotels working with more than one big 
player in the industry, as the T. Os prefer to split the pie and get exclusivity from 
their associated hotels. 
(Bb) The benefits from our core partners are the occupancy rates they 
ensure us or else the sales, plus a good cooperation, meaning that we receive 
at least our money on time. Usually the big T. Os do not delay their 
payments in contrast with the smaller ones. Moreover you know that you 
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have a reliable counterpart if it is a big organisation and therefore the risk 
you take is smaller. I am saying this because when you work with smaller 
T. Os or agencies there is some risk which is analogue to the anonymity of 
the agency. When an agency goes bankrupt, despite the bankruptcy law, 
there is very little chance to get your money back. 
Retention, rather than selection of partners, is the rule for hotels located in remote 
areas. In the south and other remote areas, the management has to choose from a 
limited array of suppliers (Cases D and G). Such locations, far from the established 
tourist centres, do not appeal to T. Os, and are often not selected for their 
programmes. Thus, location affects the access to suppliers and consequently the 
markets. In the north, lower category hotels do have a wider array of suppliers to 
select but so do the suppliers. The excessive accommodation offer of lower 
category tourist establishments allows the suppliers to find `whatever they want, 
whenever they want'. For this reason, lower category hotels often do not have the 
luxury of selecting their partners. 
(Db) It is important, though, to retain our existing partners as they are 
difficult to replace. Not everyone is interested in an isolated resort like us... 
It is not enough for the T. O. to find 2-3 hotels; they need another 3-4 hotels 
to make a programme in that region. They cannot make a programme for 
one or two hotels only... If they abort their programme they will not start it 
again easily... because they work with some local agencies and if the hotels 
stop working with them they will stop working with the local agencies and 
you approach them two years later then they will have to organise the whole 
thing again from the start... 
As noted earlier, hotels can have a limited number of main suppliers because of 
their small finite number. Often it is not possible to have more than one big supplier 
for each market because of the tendency of the T. Os to demand exclusivity: 
(Bb) Selection of partners is generally not unrestricted. T. Os often request 
exclusivity in a market... In our case with our selected market and our size, 
they are pushing you to have only one T. O.; unless it is a smaller peripheral 
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T. O., for example a T. O. in the French or the Hungarian market that are 
small, we do not have any problems. Problems occur when trying to do the 
same in the German market, the English lately, the Dutch and the Belgian. 
Basically these pressures are exercised by the big T. Os like TUI including 
all its branches and Thomas Cook with all its branches. For example the 
Belgian TUI, the JetAir, seeks exclusivity in the hotels it works with; 
Neckermann the same 
The big suppliers may cover the hotels' room capacity (in a contract) but this does 
not mean they will sell the rooms too. Contract performance varies from season to 
season, reaching its peak during the `hot' summer months: mid-July till mid 
September. The side seasons then prove problematic for hotels, which try to cover 
the gaps through multi-market, multi-agent contracting. This is how they achieve 
balance; by having a large supply of customers from the more reliable big players 
and an incremental but discontinuous supply from smaller. The problem of room 
allocation is not just about performance alone. As some respondents explain, it is 
simply too difficult to manage small suppliers. The miniscule sales quantities they 
can provide, `a hotel cannot fill with 10-room contracts', and often the reliability 
problems are overwhelming. From the small suppliers' point of view, it is 
imperative to be able to offer a wide array of hotel products just like the big players 
but because of their size they cannot sell large numbers. As a consequence, their 
contracts are necessarily small. 
The pattern in the composition of the hotels' suppliers, as described earlier, starts to 
make sense, not only from the aspect of constraints (limited number of big 
suppliers, exclusivity requests), but also from the `pull' of the cyclical tourist 
demand. The management wants to be able to accommodate the hotel's main 
suppliers by allocating the optimum number of rooms likely to sell. The 
management also knows that contracts are not binding and contract performance 
drops in the side seasons. This is where the need for multi-market, multi-agent 
contracting is developed. As stated by the respondents, relying solely on the big 
T. Os is not efficient and counting on the smaller is not reliable. That is why such 
patterns are less likely to emerge. Case H is a characteristic example; it started with 
a focus on a single market, the Germans, and in the process the management 
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decided that it is more efficient to work with multiple markets and suppliers. The 
initial narrow focus was justified by the newness of the hotel product: 
(Case Ha) You must have alternatives, because there are periods where the 
agency has the 80-90% of the occupancy in the hotel and periods where it 
has the 40-50% of the occupancy. There you need to have alternatives and 
cover the gaps so that you will not lose any days. Bear in mind that some of 
these days may be in the high season and lose a lot of money 
Most of the respondents also expressed their willingness to work with any supplier 
that will approach them. Their receptiveness to new partnerships is explained by the 
fact that their suppliers are `recyclable'; a short or small partnership, even though it 
is not very profitable, may be repeated in the future. The management may not have 
great expectations regarding the performance of new partners, as this can only be 
known in time, but they hold expectations on the suppliers' long-term prospects. A 
smaller T. A. /T. O. may grow, be merged with or acquired by a bigger supplier. Such 
developments are expected to enhance the relationship by giving the hotels greater 
access to distribution channels: 
(Ha) ... always be good with the T. As/T. Os because they are few and 
recyclable. You can never know their future prospects; they may be merged 
or acquire another one and gain more power. In that case you would want a 
good relationship with that corporate group. 
(Eb) I never worked with TUI, I could not attract them; I was making them 
offers, I had contact with them but they were not interested and I do not 
know the reason. It happened to work with 2 French agencies, one of which 
was the Nouvelles Frontieres with which we had an excellent partnership. 
After Nouvelles Frontieres was acquired by TUI, I am working with TUI as 
well because of my relation with the Nouvelles Frontieres 
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Construct 9: Contracting 
Contracting is an institutionalised, year-to-year practice that allows hotels to 
establish a formal partnership with their suppliers, being necessitated by their need 
to reach their markets through mediating organisations. The contracts, however, are 
mostly a renewal of the contracts of the previous year, usually because the 
management expects no increase in the contract rates. As a rule of thumb, the best 
deal they can claim is a rate increase at the level of inflation; that is, if no 
improvements are made to the hotel product. According to the respondents: 
(Hb) You know our simplest demand is to raise our prices at the level of the 
inflation. Most of the times they do not even give it to you. They usually 
give you one more euro but they request an extra offer or facility/service, if 
you do not accept they find something else... and we come back to the fact 
that everything is a matter of demand. If the demand is high, the hotel is full 
and you get paid, when it does not go well you do not get paid. Price is not 
as important as to fill up the hotel. If a room is left empty because you gave 
a price 2 euro more than the previous year, lets say 30 while last year it was 
28, and the customers go to the neighbouring hotel which is full and I have 
an empty room. 
(Agent 2) I cannot accept a 3* that has not upgraded its category, has not 
done any improvements in the hotel, to demand price increase. A 1-2% 
increase is understandable, a 3% is understandable but when they ask 10% it 
is inexplicable and there is no way I can accept that. If I see that they 
persist, I will either make the contract, keep it and not promote it or I will 
tell them `I am sorry but we cannot continue our cooperation'. 
Maintaining their position then becomes more important. Ensuring good terms for 
the next season will give good starting point for the negotiations for the season 
after. It is common knowledge to avoid going backwards in their contracts, even 
after a bad season. In such cases, it is preferable to counteroffer something at the 
services level without affecting their pricing. 
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What the hotel managers take for granted is that the (typical allotment) contracts 
have virtual rather than actual value and the fact that they have allocated a number 
of rooms to T. As/T. Os does not mean that it will be covered throughout the season. 
That is why allocating more rooms than the hotel's actual capacity (overalloting) is 
a common practice in the industry: 
(Db) ... the contract is only a paper, it does not have much power. You may 
give in the contract 200 rooms and actually sell 20. You are not covered by 
the contract... We give more than 40% of our actual capacity. 
(Ba) ... you sign a contract by word of honour. A T. 
O. will not guarantee a 
certain occupancy level. 
(Agent 3) Contracts are not followed strictly. They may be fulfilled 
partially, more or less, depending on the situation. Things have changed... 
we do not have to follow the contracts strictly... there is no need for the 
T. Os to make long-term commitments as this `does not make their life 
easier' 
The game is played on the basis of expectations. The management can hugely 
overbook the hotel's room capacity, expecting low contract performance from the 
partnering suppliers, and manage to fill up the hotel through multiple contracts. 
Overbooking serves both sides; suppliers do accept big contracts and do not have to 
know if the hotel is overbooked. They primarily aim to acquire commitment of 
resources from hotels. This is needed because T. As need to have a wide portfolio of 
cooperating hotels to present to their foreign partners, the T. Os. By gaining access 
to more hotel rooms than they can handle throughout the season, they benefit from 
having the allowance to cover that capacity in the high season: 
(Ga) ... T. As make very high overbookings as well. 
They have a huge 
portfolio of hotels and they can make an unlimited number of contracts with 
hotels provided that those are allotment contracts and not guarantee. They 
count that next year tourist activity may improve and they want to create a 
considerable sales margin for them. 
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Contract performance should normally affect the number of rooms the hotels 
allocate. The purpose is to put pressure on their counterparts by expressing less 
commitment to the partnership. Despite the hotels' chronic overbooking, which 
generates uncertainty for the management, this issue is not dealt with by reducing 
the number of allocated rooms in underperforming contracts. This reflects the 
power game between the hotel and its suppliers. Since the suppliers have ample 
choice in selecting their partnering hotels, the hotel management has to ensure their 
long-term commitment to the partnership. By maintaining the number of allotted 
rooms over time, the management aims to secure a formal commitment from their 
suppliers, which even if it does not realise, it maintains the status of the partnership, 
paving the path for future returns. 
Construct 10: The embeddedness of network interaction in managerial 
routines 
Network interaction is necessitated by the sparse information environment within 
which hotel management works. Professionals in the hotel sector can only guess 
their competitor's prices and promotional activities; for non-contractual deals (i. e. 
groups) they can only wait to be approached by the suppliers, and the background 
of the smaller suppliers is anything but transparent. Managers in the hotel sector 
need to have an extensive network of external sources in order to know what is 
going on in the marketplace. As a respondent puts it: 
(Bb) Things like who has given a special offer, the current price levels, we 
come to know these things although there is not any official authority that 
distributes the information such as the situation in the market. There are 
some articles in the newspapers supposedly of tourism research but they are 
based on the same sources. They will ask someone from the industry who 
will give the same information. They do not even publish the stats on a 
weekly or monthly basis; imagine that they have not published the last 
year's stats yet. 
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The respondents frequently cited the importance of the Tuesday tour for that 
purpose. The Tuesday tour has become an institutionalised managerial routine. The 
initial purpose of the Tuesday tour was to clear outstanding invoices at the end of 
each week following the customer turnover, which varies from 1-2 weeks. Through 
the passing of time, this managerial routine should have had become obsolete 
because of the improved integrity of banking and communication channels; 
however, in the majority, hotel managers persist in performing this routine, not for 
the payments alone but also for various other reasons. For example, they want to 
inquire about the status of the bookings, to meet their partners and colleagues, to 
receive information they could not obtain otherwise, `to see and be seen'. Being 
there also enhances the opportunities to be given priority over other hotel units in 
terms of promotion. 
What is observed across the sample is that cases with greater time/distance from the 
metropolitan city of the island have ceased performing the Tuesday tour or perform 
this routine on less frequent basis. More specifically, this is observed in cases B, G, 
C and D. The management in case B has partially changed its practice and performs 
the Tuesday tour regularly, though less frequently. Interestingly, this task is rotated 
between the GM and the DGM; they rotate in order to maintain their personal 
contact with the suppliers; 
(Db) This is not something we do on a regular basis... It is usually Tuesday 
because Tuesday is the payments day but we have aborted this practice as 
the money are transferred directly to our bank account... 
(Ba) The Tuesday tour in some cases has kept its traditional form, especially 
when dealing with smaller agencies... of course the money are not paid 
from the moment the customers arrive; so we still have to chase the agencies 
and ask for our money. Except the payments someone should try and find 
what is going on in the market, if there are any customers, any groups 
(Bb) Payments were the major reason we went there in the past, now it is 
more `to see and to be seen'. That is for the big T. As/T. Os, the smaller ones 
are another story and there you have to push in order to get paid... We have 
a stable pattern though, approximately every 3 weeks. 
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On the contrary, the managers of hotels on the north axis firmly persist in 
performing the Tuesday tour. The relationship with their partners is sustained 
through contacts, which are translated as the Tuesday tour. The GM in case A notes 
that: `... what counts is the interpersonal relationships I have with the agents 
through those visits'. Although this routine is now less about payments, the 
traditional form of contact has carried on. Some respondents emphasise that the 
Tuesday tour allows them to have direct contact with certain people and establish 
communication channels for further requests and enquiries: 
(Hb) The purpose of the Tuesday tour is not just to sort out the payments, 
these can be arranged through the post. You go there to talk to some people, 
to hear the recent news, to see if you need to do something, if there is any 
problem, or if the agent needs some help or you need the agent's help. The 
payment is an excuse... 
(Db) Either way, some issues cannot be discussed anytime. If your hotel 
does not sell well you need to arrange appointment to talk about it because 
the agent will devote some time for you and you will need to find a solution 
but the contact is always there. Do not think that the contact is always 
measured by the number of bigshots you know, it is also the simple 
employees who make the reservations 
Construct 11: Emphasis on intrinsic indicators 
Many of the decisions the hotel managers make concern the pricing, the allocation 
of rooms and the various promotional offers; however, they are unable to forecast 
the general demand for the hotel and therefore cannot make their decisions on that 
basis. Contract performance is a better indicator of forecasting. The cyclical pattern 
of demand is taken into account, coupled with the suppliers' performance over 
time. Given the fact that booking times have shortened drastically in the last 
decade, managers have to estimate the hotel's performance based on intrinsic 
indicators: 
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(Hb) I cannot predict the future demand for the hotel, I always judge based 
on the current conditions. The fact that there will be high demand in August 
is quite indefinite, although everyone knows that if you do not keep your 
hotel full you can never be sure. You can only estimate on averages but you 
cannot predict... you can never be sure with the bookings made very close 
to the release period 
(Aa) I have to go back and see the performance of the contracts of a specific 
agent for the past years... I cannot compare it with the neighbouring hotel, 
because they have other variables there. I want to see the sales 
predisposition of my product 
(Db) ... when you start with a new supplier you do not know how it is going 
to work... You can estimate based on its cooperation with another hotel but 
that is not very reliable. 
(Ca) I believe it will not work out very well if I go to another T. A. with 
whom I have not worked in the past because I do not know them and they 
do not know me. Other agents may have more solid cooperation with other 
hotels and so on 
A precondition for estimates of contract performance is to have established a long- 
standing partnership with a supplier. The application of this type of projection 
technique is broadly applied across the cases of the sample: 
(Db) We cannot estimate the agencies' performance during the tourist 
season. We can only rely on last years' data and expect the same sales 
pattern. In which periods, which agencies work better. This is made possible 
only if we maintain long-term partnerships. 
Contract performance, even in light of a new partnership with a supplier, should not 
be compared with other hotels. As the circumstances of each hotel firm vary, so 
will their performance, which makes such comparisons only indicative and 
unreliable. A decrease in tourism demand is the same to everyone, however, 
meaning that, in the long term, the hotel's performance will balance with the 
industry's standards. It is uncommon to have significant deviations from the 
industry standards: 
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(Db) If another hotel at the same category goes better or worse it does not 
matter because we are different. The other hotel may be better and I may not 
be able to compare. You may be able to compare another hotel with the 
same standards as yours but that is unlikely to happen. Usually we talk 
about our occupancy rates but that is not always right... However, a 
decrease in tourism demand is the same to everyone 
YOU MEAN IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR YOUR NEIGHBOUR TO DO 
WELL AND YOU WILL NOT 
Exactly. It may happen for one year, two the most, you or the other not to 
work very well compared to the industry standards but in the long term you 
should be balanced. If something happens it will affect everyone, some less 
and some others more but it is sure that will be affected. 
(Hb) ... myself I will deal with an issue or a situation with my own way and 
my competitor with another way, we are not the same. Myself I may have 5 
billion (GRD) in the bank, idle, and I may not be interested so much in the 
hotel's operation while the other one may have a debt 5 billion and his 
policy will be related to his needs, we are not the same because we are not 
under the same standards. You cannot always say this is my course of action 
because every case is different and you have to examine it differently 
7.2.3 Theme 3: Management mechanisms 
Management mechanisms describe the causes or processes of the managers' actions 
and choices. They provide a rationale behind the use of management tools, which 
may occasionally seem irrational. The management's favouritism towards the main 
suppliers of the hotel (identified as those which have been allocated the highest 
number of hotel rooms), for example, is rationalised as a necessary tactic to 
maintain their symbiotic relationship (Construct 12). Given that the power of the 
hotels over their suppliers has been diminished, as a hotel product is not valuable or 
irreplaceable in the eyes of the supplier, the managers try to sustain the symbiotic 
element in the relationship by buffering the supplier's own operational uncertainties 
and establishing a history of collaboration between them that can be used to 
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leverage the hotel's bargaining power. In doing so, the managers may have to 
sacrifice their leverage over peripheral suppliers in order to promote their 
relationship with their core suppliers. 
Managers within the occupational community are aware of those mechanisms, based 
on which, they hold expectations about the outcomes of their actions. The 
institutionalised practice of contracting, for instance, is not expected to bear fruit 
but rather serves as a formal binding of each side's commitments (Construct 13). 
Expectations, however, are also likely to be used to justify inaction. Construct 14 
shows that, despite the saturated accommodation offer, the hotel products remain 
largely undifferentiated. In addition, they have developed overlapping niche widths, 
whereby hotels in the periphery of the market (lower category hotels and/or located 
on the south axis of the island) have become marginalised, suffering from low 
demand. Such hotels are more likely to relocate their niche width (or range) and 
position themselves in a less crowded market segment. Such actions, however, 
remain the last resort for the management, taken after all other remedial tactics have 
been used. This remedial character is better understood on the basis that such 
actions have to be sanctioned by the hotels' suppliers, and marginalised hotels 
already have a fragile supply network, which they prefer to leave undisturbed. 
Construct 12: Maintaining the symbiotic relationship 
The relationship between hotels and their suppliers is symbiotic, in terms of having 
to rely on one another to achieve their goals. The T. As/T. Os need to have a 
portfolio of hotels and a number of available hotel rooms to channel their 
customers, whereas the hotels have always relied on those suppliers to reach their 
markets. Given the fragmented nature of the hotel sector, however, the bargaining 
power of the hotels over the suppliers is limited. As the industry structure changed 
over time, the hotels' bargaining power became almost nominal and the 
management's effort to maintain the symbiotic relationship with the suppliers is 
more than apparent: 
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(Ba) The terms of collaboration have changed because our negotiating 
power was x and now has dropped to x/10 while theirs used to be y and now 
is 10 times y 
(Ca) the suppliers hold `both the cake and the knife', this is the reality. The 
hotels cannot exercise any pressure and inevitably depend on them. 
The management therefore try to build interdependence between the hotel and its 
suppliers, even if the hotel offering on its own is not unique or unsubstitutable. In 
construct 9, we saw that the symbiotic relationship is exemplified through the 
practice of contracting. Contracting may be a formal agreement between the hotel 
and the supplier, denoting the extent to which each party can draw resources from 
the other, but it is not a committing agreement. As seen in construct 9, contracts 
have only virtual and no actual value for the management, with the contractual 
agreement fulfilled only partially. To deal with this uncertainty, the management 
resorts to overalloting the hotel's rooms to the suppliers. This practice helps the 
management to deal with erratic demand and low sales in the side seasons. 
Inevitably, the hotel is overbooked during some periods of the tourist season 
(typically in the high season) and, in that case, some of their suppliers need to take 
their customers elsewhere. To avoid this additional processual burden and a 
possible degradation of their image, the suppliers request the help of the hotels to 
accept the customers' reservations. The management use this rare occasion of being 
in a position of power to secure the commitment of the suppliers by responding to 
their requests. 
As the practice of overalloting is common to all the hotels and, as the high season is 
the period when all the suppliers request all their allotted rooms, the management 
has to select which ones to serve. The management makes its choices by prioritising 
the hotel's suppliers. An underperforming, unreliable T. A. /T. O. would be at the 
bottom of a hotel manager's priority list, whereas more stable T. As/T. Os would be 
accommodated when the need arose. This is the basic recipe used by most hotels in 
the sample: 
(Ia) We give priority to our old partners who renew their contracts with 
confidence, without necessarily getting better occupancy rates or bigger 
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contracts... Since they have sold our product in the past, it is beneficial for 
them to continue our partnership. Provided that they do not have any 
complaints from the customers and the hotel responds to their customers' 
needs, they do not have any reason to stop the contract. They have already 
established a clientele with the hotel they worked with for so many years... 
(Aa) ... we do not want to create problems to the big and stable suppliers 
because in August they will request more rooms and they expect to make 
more profit that period. If you do not accommodate them during that period, 
they might create problems for you in the future. That is why we are careful 
on where we give priority 
(Ga) a T. A. may cover 3-4 rooms from the contract since April and would 
want to send 15 rooms in July-August, and request overallotment on top of 
that. This is something all the T. As do but we cannot accommodate all 
them; if we do not accommodate them then we are `bad' because they will 
say `we asked you a favour and you did not help us. The only thing we can 
do is give priority to those that have supported us in the past. 
The hotel managers prefer to treat their interaction with the suppliers as an 
interpersonal relationship, something that allows them to capitalise on the symbiotic 
relationship. By treating the transactions with the suppliers as personal favours 
among colleagues, they can induce cooperative behaviour from their counterparts: 
(Hb) WHAT KIND OF FAVOURS ARE WE TALKING ABOUT? 
A special offer when he has empty seats on the flights, a request, anything... 
various favours from time to time because their disadvantage is that they 
have prepaid their flight seats and they rely on sales' volumes just like us 
(Db) the Arion hotel had suffered serious damages from the flood and they 
sent us 80 customers. In that case we accommodated them just because we 
wanted to help a fellow hotel 
DOES THIS MEAN YOU DID NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT? 
No, because we see them as partners and we gave them the same price we 
give to others. We did not take advantage of it because if we do that one day 
we may need help ourselves and we would want them to do the same for 
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us... they work with the same T. A. as we do... The assistance was therefore 
both to the hotel and the T. A. and both of them appreciate that. 
(Agent 2) Overbookings do have an impact on the agency but I try to do 
anything not to lose the booking because of that. The extent of how well you 
will manage it mainly depends from the cooperation with the hotels. Lets 
not fool ourselves, a hotel can take a reservation even if it is overbooked, 
provided that there is a good relationship 
Construct 13: Commitments 
We saw that contractual agreements do not necessarily entail commitment from 
either the hotel or its suppliers. Commitment lies mostly at the domain of 
expectations (Construct 12), and is used by the management to maintain the 
symbiotic relationship with their firm's suppliers; however, it is not only the 
management that plays with the extent to which it displays the hotel firm's 
commitment to the partnership with its suppliers, but the suppliers as well. 
The main suppliers of the hotel (Construct 8), being big players in the industry, 
have the capacity to generate more sales for the hotel. In exchange, they are given 
priority when it comes to allocating rooms in the high season. What the big players 
do is negotiate their commitment to the partnership in exchange for favours that 
absorb their uncertainty during the high season. The peripheral suppliers may have 
a disadvantage in terms of acquiring resources from their partnering hotels, but they 
also play with how they will fulfil their financial commitments. The respondents 
have often noted a long delay for clearing outstanding accounts with some 
suppliers, sometimes taking over a year. This should be linked with the evolution of 
the travel industry and decreased demand: As foreign T. Os fail to reach their 
financial targets or cover their costs, which are mainly from overheads from 
chartering flights, they leave the local correspondents exposed and, in turn, this 
impacts on the hotels. From the hotels' side, the management displays a 
considerable degree of tolerance, because it tends to rationalise such situations as 
inevitable: 
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offer, combined with the strong destination awareness, left ample freedom to new 
entrants in the industry to locate themselves in the market. Whilst the monetary 
crisis during the second era did not help business development, destination 
awareness remained strong. What had changed was the structuring of the market, 
which was slowly finding its balance, with clear market segments in which hotel 
businesses could locate their niche width (or range). The third and most 
contemporary era is characterised by an excessive accommodation offer, which 
inevitably resulted in overlapping niche widths among hospitality businesses. 
Moreover, the third era was marked by some major developments: the 
consolidation in the international travel industry, which affected the number and 
composition of their suppliers; the appearance of new distribution channels through 
the increasing use of the internet by travellers; the dramatic conflation of bookings 
and travel; and the change of the travel preferences of the consumers, which 
resulted in a loss of loyalty to any specific hotel or destination product. 
Within this context of increased competition and a saturated market, hotels have to 
deal predominantly with liquidity problems whilst the overlapping niche widths 
give rise to increased demands from the otherwise undifferentiated hotel products. 
According to the respondents, in order to make something that counts `you need to 
create something very big and impressive to be able to negotiate better terms'. Such 
actions are inhibited due to the liquidity issues typically faced by hotel businesses. 
For hotel businesses that become marginalised, it is far easier to relocate their niche 
range towards the less crowded market periphery. This also allows them to regain 
access to distribution channels (Section 7.4.2: Portfolio of partners) unavailable in 
their previous market location. The hotel manager of the 4* south resort hotel 
explains: 
(Db)... just from the rumour of turning to all-inclusive, we were approached 
by several agencies. If you have a reputation in the market then you are 
sought after. I am now working with Neckermann but the LTU, the 
Airtours, TUI; they know our product in Petra Marc and how well it sells. 
Case D is a hotel that has reached an optimum form. After 6 years of renovation 
and with no allowances to expand its capacity, it had no other option than to 
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relocate its niche range. It remains a hotel for families, unique in the region, but 
needed the boost of the up and coming demand for all-inclusive resorts. After the 
latest addition of the water park in 1999, it enjoyed superfluous demand every 
subsequent year until 2002. That year, the management started receiving special 
offer requests, not only for the side seasons but during the high season too. 
Combined with the fact that the sales from other departments had been steadily 
diminishing since the early 90s, the management decided to change its operation to 
all-inclusive in 2004. In this form, they can claim better contract rates and regain 
the difference from the lost revenues of the extras. This change is expected not to 
impact on the hotel's profitability, despite the increased costs. Similarly, case H 
changed its type of operation because it faced pressure from increased competition 
and was forced to compromise with lower-mid level clientele: 
(Hb) There are many new, good hotel units that have attracted the quality 
tourism and ourselves have inevitably attracted a lower category of 
customers. For example, the people who go to the 5* hotels are not enough 
and the 5* try to attract clientele from the 4* in order to fill their rooms. 
Ourselves then, we are forced to attract customers from the 3* hotels and 
even lower. These customers cannot generate revenue to our departments, 
that is why we try to compromise and find a solution to cover this gap 
The benefits of the niche relocation are also processual and the management has 
better control of the bookings: 
(Hb) This clientele also has the distinctive characteristic that it makes its 
bookings in advance, even though this segment is huge. You can count 
families... all the pensioners prefer all-inclusive. This ensures good 
occupancies and allows a good financial policy on behalf of the hotel. You 
do not need to worry about so many things 
DOES IT HAVE TO DO WITH THE DECREASING COSTS FROM THE 
F&B DEPARTMENTS? 
They are decreasing, that is true. Now with the all-inclusive, the 
consumption will increase but since the quality of the offered products will 
drop as well, we will reach at least the same levels as in the past year, if not 
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higher. The hotel makes cost savings from the decreased pilferages, we do 
not have the anxiety for the success of the departments, we do not have to 
deal with each ones individual demands. These are the advantages and, 
although the consumption is higher, the drop in quality, combined with the 
better control of the production, which becomes mass production thereon, 
and getting a higher price than the half-board, we expect the same or better 
results... also the money go directly to the pocket of the hotelier, they do 
not go through the tax office. That is what I am telling you, you gain from 
other things. You do not evade the tax, but you evade the control from the 
tax office and things like that which do not take much of your time. 
Therefore, it can be said that pressure on hotels is felt mostly through the 
diminishing of income generators. It is also self-evident that marginalised hotels 
cannot use the same arguments at the negotiating table as other hotels located in the 
market centre. The outcomes are the less favourable terms in contracts (such as the 
size of the subseasons, release period, room rates) and the increased tolerance 
allowances of these hotels (regarding the payments and performance of their 
suppliers). 
Relocations of market niches are often preceded by certain remedial practices such 
as expansion of the niche range or the strengthening of their already established 
niche (through pricing, promotions); that is, as long as the suppliers are responsive 
to such efforts. The precursor for relocation of niche width seems to be 
comparisons with hotel units within the local area. The management will not 
proceed to market relocation unless they are persuaded of the success of early 
adopters: 
(Hb)... from all the hoteliers I know, no one returned to the half-board from 
the all-inclusive, even though that operation is preferable, because the 
money are much better and the customers ask for it... 
(Ba) Those that turned to all-inclusive, they did not like it. They do it in 
order to get better occupancies. The all-inclusive entails a major 
restructuring in the hotel as you are forced to feed the people from morning 
till the evening. The labour costs increase, the operating costs increase, the 
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prices increase as well but the increase in the price follows more or less the 
increase in the costs. The outcome is not that the hotel unit earns more 
money; it simply manages to survive whereas this was in doubt with its 
previous form of operation. 
The initiators of change are often marginalised hotel units. In these cases, 
continuing failures to revitalise the demand for the hotel add up to the quantum leap 
of relocating their market niche. One respondent explains: 
(Ba) It was the more remote hotels that faced the first difficulties. Ourselves 
we are close to the city, we did not have these difficulties, or we did but not 
at the same extent. We can still sell ourselves better than them. Therefore 
those that had problems because of their location, either because they are 
not close to the sea or they are too isolated and they are not within a piazza, 
those are usually the ones that turned to all-inclusive because they 
experienced first the impacts in the form of low occupancies. 
7.2.4 Summary 
At this point, it is possible to summarise the type of actions that managers adopt in 
the local hotel sector when dealing with uncertainty. Assuming that business is 
confined within local boundaries (Constructs 1 &2), and that the managers' role is to 
keep the hotel full, whilst selling the hotel rooms at the highest possible price, then 
the managers would systematically: 
- Select markets that are compatible with their hotel's offering (Construct 7). In 
such cases, their focus would not be on the optimisation of the firm's profits but 
on avoiding operational complexity. 
- Go through T. As/T. Os (the suppliers), which, as mediating organisations, will 
help the hotel firm reach its markets using their resources and distribution 
network (Constructs 6&7). 
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- Take steps to reach their markets through the hotel firm's own resources only if 
they see any tangible benefits from this approach (i. e. sales or expanding their 
supply network; Construct 6). 
- Select their suppliers based on their capacity to fulfill their commitments (fill 
the hotel and meet their financial obligations; Construct 8). 
- Have formal contractual agreements with the suppliers, which, even if they are 
not realised in actual sales, allow the hotel to draw from the suppliers' resources 
(Constructs 8&9). 
- Build a symbiotic relationship with the hotel's suppliers by buffering the 
suppliers' own operational uncertainties, gaining leverage for their otherwise 
low bargaining power (Construct 12). 
- Demonstrate their commitment to the partnership with their suppliers by 
building a history of collaboration and a capacity to be of value to those 
suppliers over time (Construct 13). This is necessary, as the hotel firms lack any 
unique resources they can offer to gain a competitive edge over other hotel 
firms. As a result, the only distinguishing factor among hotel firms become the 
synergistic benefits they can offer to their suppliers through their ongoing 
collaboration. 
- Keep their hotel product undifferentiated from that of other competitive firms as 
long as there is sufficient demand for their offering (Construct 3). They will 
eventually differentiate when they face chronic low performance and 
diminishing returns from their revenue sources (Construct 14). In which case, 
they will require the consent, or even prompt, of their suppliers, in order to 
avoid disturbing their fragile supply network. 
- Focus on the hotel firm's own historical records to deal with erratic demand, not 
by forecasting the overall level of demand as such, but rather their suppliers' 
(contract) performance (Construct 11). Their incapacity to predict the overall 
level of demand has to do with them being in a peripheral network position, 
from which they cannot obtain sufficient or accurate market intelligence. 
- Engage into network interaction to deal with the sparse information 
environment within which they operate (Construct 10). 
The above actions represent the systematic attempts of the hotel managers to deal 
with the fact that their firms are at disadvantage. The market has reached a level of 
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saturation, with the offer surpassing the demand, which increases the competitive 
rivalry in the sector. Also, being the last link of the supply chain in the tourism 
industry, they are unable to reach their markets directly. For that purpose they have 
to go through mediating organisations, T. As/T. Os, and use their resources. This 
process is not straightforward, however; even if they have a contractual agreement 
with T. As/T. Os, they cannot secure their cooperation. A hotel firm does not have 
any valuable resources to trade, whereas the supplier holds the means to sell the 
hotel product in the market. Furthermore, the negotiating power of the hotel firms is 
not helped by the fragmentation in the sector and the oligopolic state of the supply 
side. 
The key to overcoming their firms' disadvantage is to develop a relational bond 
with the suppliers, built through their history of collaboration. Contracts are treated 
by the management as an intangible resource, a formal agreement of their 
partnership with their suppliers, which forms the basis for their negotiations. The 
managers use the hotel firm's reputation to support their negotiating power. They 
build the hotel firm's reputation by working with the same markets for years, those 
that are most compatible with the hotel firm's competencies. In the domain of the 
industry, the hotel firm's reputation is built through transactions with suppliers, 
based on the extent to which the hotel firm manages to reduce the suppliers' own 
operational uncertainties, something that is reflected in their history of 
collaboration. Network is another important resource for the managers, being used 
as a means to compensate for the hotel firms' peripheral network position. 
The above summary, however, represents the managers' common knowledge and 
therefore is a simplification of a detailed understanding of their contribution to their 
firms' strategy. Variations in the management's responses to uncertainty exist and 
they are closely related to the specificity of the firms' capabilities. In turn, their 
capabilities are dependent on broad, identifiable characteristics, which relate back 
to the factors that determined the sample of the study. In particular, their main 
distinguishing factor, their category rating, affects the demand for the hotel product. 
Lower category hotels are a product of an older era, nurtured by an almost nonstop 
growth of the market till the early 1990s. The period that followed, however, 
marked a change in the industry lifecycle, characterised by stagnant demand, and an 
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evergrowing saturation of hotel product offerings. Lower category hotels were 
economically built and were efficient in a previous industry era. Now they hold no 
advantage over the higher category businesses. Both have a similar cost structure, 
with the higher category hotels making use of a wider range of facilities/services. 
The lower category hotels can differentiate only in terms of pricing and, having an 
inelastic cost structure, they are forced to operate with wafer-thin margins. 
The result is that the management are inevitably preoccupied with achieving high 
sales volumes, which is problematic considering the desirability of their hotel 
product. Similarly, hotel firms in the (less developed) south axis of the island offer 
a less desirable product, compared to hotels located on the north axis. Their 
distance from the main access points of the island (all on the north axis) makes 
them a second choice for both the suppliers and the consumers. These two broad 
types of hotel firms are located in the periphery of the market; they are firms the 
market could do without; however, they persist in their current operations 
(Constructs 1&2) even though they are marginalised. The management of those 
firms is restricted in the options it has to drive the business forward, as their firms 
play in a much less favourable domain. In such cases, the management is more 
likely to choose to differentiate the hotel product (Construct 14) in order to move to 
a less crowded competitive domain: it would rely more on mediating organisations 
to reach its markets (Construct 6); it would have to make compromises when 
selecting markets for the hotel product (Construct 7); adopt short-termist pricing 
practices in order to ensure a sufficient working capital and maintain sales' volumes 
even if profits are squeezed further (Construct 5). 
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PART 11 
7.3 The ethnographic lens 
The main interview provided us with an understanding of the types of actions the 
hotel managers' take when dealing with uncertainty. This understanding is 
grounded on the managers' common knowledge of what they ought to do in order 
to optimise the performance of their business in the context of the local hotel sector. 
This next level of analysis centres on the hotel managers' work activity, an 
analytical lens that sheds light on the process of strategising; the manner by which 
those actions are reflected in their day-to-day activity. 
It is shown that, while their work activity pattern is primarily fragmented and 
remedial in nature, it is purposive and efficient (Section 7.3.2). The hotel managers 
concentrate on dealing with their firms' operational uncertainties, denoting a rather 
introverted focus within the firm. However, when seen through the lens of their 
common knowledge, which is ingrained by dealing with uncertainty within the 
boundaries of their local context, the work pattern is found to support the hotel 
managers' efforts by leveraging their firms' bargaining power (Section 7.3.3). 
Thus, the hotel managers' work activity reflects how their common knowledge 
becomes empirical and is manifested in their everyday practice. 
The additional inquiry on the hotel managers' annual work cycle (Section 7.3.4), 
however, delineated the more outward elements of their work, in contrast with the 
observation data. In particular, it unearthed predictable managerial practices which 
occur at fixed periods during the year, following the hotel firms' recurrent action 
patterns, whereby the managers consciously try to control elements of the external 
environment. 
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7.3.1 The hotel managers' work compared 
This section provides an `objective', quantitative account of the hotel managers' 
work activity, which is useful for comparative purposes. The presentation of the 
data draws from managerial work literature, which analyses managerial activity 
through patterns of action and interaction. This is the line followed here, presenting 
elements of the hotel managers' work based on the type of activity they perform 
and with whom they engage; also its location, source, recurrence and predictability. 
The results portray the hotel managers' work activity as fragmented (see mean 
number of events/hour), indicating a non-planned activity pattern. It was possible, 
however, to identify predictable `chunks of work', or specific sets of activities (i. e. 
chock-initiated), whose occurrence and frequency indicated intentional initiation of 
action in the pursuit of some desired outputs. In general, the observation did not 
elicit much evidence that the managers engage in apparent ̀ strategic' activity such 
as planning or even scheduled meetings. Instead, it illustrated a preoccupation of 
the managers with some of the more mundane activities such as routine deskwork, 
observational tours and frequent interaction with others. Furthermore, most of the 
hotel managers' activity was found to be remedial in nature, following the needs 
and the problems that occur during the day. In fact, much of their work pattern can 
be explained from their emphasis on identifying problems in their genesis. In this 
sense, the managers seem to primarily deal with the operational uncertainties of the 
business. Another obvious finding of the hotel managers' work is that it is 
adaptable to the specificities of the hotel firm. This explains, to a large extent, the 
variations of the results across the sample and shows that the managers' choices of 
how they perform their activity depend on the capabilities of their firm, which they 
have to support. Thus, their work activity pattern is contingent on the output they 
seek to produce for their firm. The above findings are described in detail in section 
7.3.2, which dwells further on the features of the hotel managers' work. 
The hotel managers' output, however, is not observable in this `objective' 
quantitative presentation of the hotel managers' work. This presentation of the data 
illustrates patterns in their work activity, which brings forward some of its 
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prominent features; however, these features, if analysed in isolation, do not portray 
any evident `strategic behaviour. In other words, they do not explain the managers' 
contribution to the strategy of their firm as it manifests in their everyday activity. 
As suggested in the literature review, the managers' contribution can be best 
understood if seen through their context of intention, their intended contribution to 
their organisation. 
For that purpose, the ethnographic lens is complemented by two further analyses. 
Section 7.3.3 brings together the features of the hotel managers' work and their 
common knowledge when dealing with organisational uncertainties, in order to 
elicit their intended output at the organisational level; put more simply, what they 
are trying to achieve through their work activity. Section 7.3.4 provides an 
overview of the hotel managers' annual work cycle, complementing the observation 
data and allowing for a more rounded view of their inputs. 
141 





%Time spent %events 
Managerial events: 
Tours 20.89 0.98 34.81 9.19 
Interaction 9.92 3.63 16.54 34.05 
Deskwork 13.04 2.08 21.73 19.46 
Scheduled meetings 6.87 0.46 11.44 4.32 
Unscheduled meetings 3.06 0.35 5.09 3.24 
Telephone calls 4.85 2.77 8.08 25.94 




Other 1.27 0.35 2.11 3.24 
Total 60.00 10.68 100.00 100.00 
Purpose of contact: 
Scheduling 2.04 0.66 3.42 5.19 
Ceremony 14.77 0.72 24.55 5.66 
Status request 4.26 1.92 7.14 15.09 
Action request 4.02 1.92 6.74 15.09 
Info exchange 10.21 3.12 16.95 24.53 
Review 12.01 1.62 20.12 12.73 
Negotiation 8.59 1.26 14.39 9.90 
Action enquiry 0.54 0.42 0.90 3.30 
Other 3.54 1.08 5.93 8.49 
Total 60.00 12.72 100.00 100.00 
Form of initiation: 
Principal 15.37 4.54 25.63 42.85 
Opposite party 6.06 2.21 10.10 20.88 
Mutual 11.41 1.51 19.03 14.28 
Clock 24.17 1.69 40.29 15.93 
Other 2.97 0.64 4.95 6.04 
Total 60.00 10.59 100.00 100.00 
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%Time spent %events 
Managerial events: 
Tours 8.86 0.77 14.76 14.49 
Interaction 2.39 0.92 3.98 17.39 
Deskwork 15.48 1.39 25.80 26.09 
Scheduled meetings 19.34 0.38 32.22 7.24 
Unscheduled meetings 4.47 0.38 7.44 7.24 
Telephone calls 3.16 1.00 5.26 18.84 
Operational 0.08 0.08 0.001 1.45 
Travel 
Personal 
Observer interaction 3.39 0.23 5.65 4.35 
Other 2.85 0.15 4.75 2.90 
Total 60.00 5.30 100.00 100.00 
Purpose of contact: 
Scheduling 6.69 0.65 11.40 8.33 
Ceremony 15,32 0.74 25.52 9.37 
Status request 1.71 0.98 2.85 12.50 
Action request 1.71 1.64 2.85 20.83 
Info exchange 17.11 1.15 28.49 14.58 
Review 13.37 1.40 22.79 17.71 
Negotiation 0.86 0.33 1.41 4.17 
Action enquiry 0.86 0.82 1.41 10.42 
Other 2.41 0.16 4.00 2.08 
Total 60.00 7.87 100.00 100.00 
Form of initiation: 
Principal 17.85 3.02 30.00 49.38 
Opposite party 6.43 1.13 10.72 18.52 
Mutual 16.98 0.60 31.65 9.87 
Clock 16.72 1.36 27.87 22.22 
Other 
Total 57.98 6.11 100.00 100.00 
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%Time spent %events 
Managerial events: 
Tours 5.13 0.59 8.55 13.23 
Interaction 9.59 2.00 15.98 39.70 
Deskwork 9.59 0.96 15.98 19.12 
Scheduled meetings 5.05 0.07 8.42 1.47 
Unscheduled meetings 2.23 0.30 3.72 5.88 
Telephone calls 0.37 0.30 0.62 5.88 
Operational 0.37 0.22 0.62 4.41 
Travel 18.60 0.07 30.97 1.47 
Personal 
Observer interaction 
Other 9.07 0.44 15.12 8.82 
Total 60.00 4.95 100.00 100.00 
Purpose of contact: 
Scheduling 3.23 0.11 5.38 2.08 
Ceremony 9.23 0.11 1.53 2.08 
Status request 5.67 1.84 9.42 33.33 
Action request 1.38 0.69 2.31 12.50 
Info exchange 1.38 0.92 2.31 16.67 
Review 14.65 1.04 24.42 18.75 
Negotiation 2.88 0.11 4.81 2.08 
Action enquiry 0.81 0.34 1.34 6.25 
Other 20.46 0.34 48.46 6.25 
Total 60.00 5.50 100.00 100.00 
Form of initiation: 
Principal 5.55 1.65 9.25 33.33 
Opposite party 8.27 1.65 13.79 33.33 
Mutual 11.68 0.68 19.48 13.72 
Clock 5.94 0.68 9.90 13.72 
Other 28.53 0.29 47.56 5.88 
Total 60.00 4.95 100.00 100.00 
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%Time spent %events 
Managerial events: 
Tours 14.31 1.57 23.85 12.76 
Interaction 7.25 3.20 12.09 26.06 
Deskwork 22.22 3.59 37.03 29.25 
Scheduled meetings 7.51 0.26 12.53 2.13 
Unscheduled meetings 1.96 0.39 3.27 3.19 
Telephone calls 4.57 2.94 7.62 23.93 




Other 1.57 0.06 2.61 0.53 
Total 60.00 12.27 100.00 100.00 
Purpose of contact: 
Scheduling 6.93 0.64 11.56 5.05 
Ceremony 8.99 0.96 14.98 7.57 
Status request 2.37 1.41 3.95 11.11 
Action request 2.82 1.54 4.70 12.12 
Info exchange 6.10 2.57 10.17 20.20 
Review 21.84 3.02 36.40 23.73 
Negotiation 2.82 0.45 4.70 3.53 
Action enquiry 1.09 0.70 1.82 5.55 
Other 7.00 1.41 11.67 11.11 
Total 60.00 12.70 100.00 100.00 
Form of initiation: 
Principal 24.28 6.34 40.45 41.70 
Opposite party 3.17 2.16 5.28 14.22 
Mutual 13.25 1.87 22.09 12.32 
Clock 16.71 4.03 27.85 26.54 
Other 2.59 2.59 4.32 5.21 
Total 60.00 16.99 100.00 100.00 
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%Time spent %events 
Managerial events: 
Tours 5.87 0.44 9.78 2.75 
Interaction 11.03 6.31 18.45 39.31 
Deskwork 20.15 3.54 33.58 22.06 
Scheduled meetings 
Unscheduled meetings 2.32 0.66 3.87 4.13 
Telephone calls 9.52 4.32 15.87 26.90 
Operational 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.69 
Travel 9.63 0.33 16.05 2.07 
Personal 
Observer interaction 
Other 1.33 0.33 2.21 2.07 
Total 60.00 16.04 100.00 100.00 
Purpose of contact: 
Scheduling 1.79 0.84 2.99 5.00 
Ceremony 14.89 1.48 24.82 8.75 
Status request 3.17 2.53 5.28 15.00 
Action request 4.12 1.90 6.86 11.25 
Info exchange 5.38 3.69 8.98 21.87 
Review 18.58 2.95 30.98 17.50 
Negotiation 4.86 1.26 8.10 7.50 
Action enquiry 0.74 0.53 1.23 3.12 
Other 6.44 1.67 10.74 10.00 
Total 60.00 16.87 100.00 100.00 
Form of initiation: 
Principal 11.75 7.54 19.59 43.00 
Opposite party 6.54 3.10 10.90 17.72 
Mutual 5.10 2.44 8.50 13.92 
Clock 28.50 2.77 47.50 15.82 
Other 8.09 1.66 13.49 9.49 
Total 60.00 17.51 100.00 100.00 
146 





%Time spent %events 
Managerial events: 
Tours 7.33 1.13 12.20 6.52 
Interaction 5.67 7.16 9.44 41.30 
Deskwork 13.00 3.39 21.65 19.56 
Scheduled meetings 8.51 0.75 14.17 4.34 
Unscheduled meetings 16.78 1.13 27.95 6.52 





Other 3.07 0.38 5.11 2.17 
Total 60.00 17.33 100.00 100.00 
Purpose of contact: 
Scheduling 2.67 0.73 4.50 3.00 
Ceremony 11.17 0.73 18.62 3.00 
Status request 5.10 2.18 8.50 9.00 
Action request 7.04 2.91 11.74 12.00 
Info exchange 16.02 2.91 26.72 12.00 
Review 11.17 1.46 18.62 6.00 
Negotiation 4.85 0.97 8.10 4.00 
Action enquiry 0.73 0.49 1.21 2.00 
Other 1.21 0.73 2.02 3.00 
Total 60.00 13.11 100.00 100.00 
Form of initiation: 
Principal 20.00 6.35 33.33 58.70 
Opposite party 5.42 1.18 9.02 10.87 
Mutual 8.23 0.94 13.72 8.70 
Clock 3.76 0.71 6.27 6.52 
Other 22.59 1.65 37.65 15.21 
Total 60.00 10.83 100.00 100.00 
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%Time spent %events 
Managerial events: 
Tours 8.36 0.98 13.93 5.97 
Interaction 17.46 8.49 29.10 51.49 
Deskwork 19.56 4.06 32.58 24.63 
Scheduled meetings 
Unscheduled meetings 
Telephone calls 3.07 1.47 5.12 8.95 
Operational 2.58 1.11 4.30 6.71 
Travel 7.13 0.24 11.88 1.49 
Personal 
Observer interaction 
Other 1.84 1.12 3.07 0.74 
Total 60.00 17.47 100.00 100.00 
Purpose of contact: 
Scheduling 3.69 0.98 6.15 6.45 
Ceremony 10.95 0.74 18.24 4.84 
Status request 1.35 0.98 2.25 6.45 
Action request 2.70 0.98 4.51 6.45 
Info exchange 6.64 2.95 11.06 19.35 
Review 12.67 2.34 21.10 15.32 
Negotiation 0.61 0.12 1.02 0.80 
Action enquiry 0.49 0.24 0.82 1.61 
Other 20.91 5.90 34.83 38.71 
Total 60.00 15.23 100.00 100.00 
Form of initiation: 
Principal 16.99 5.29 28.34 32.33 
Opposite party 4.56 2.34 7.60 14.28 
Mutual 11.08 4.43 18.48 27.07 
Clock 22.54 2.95 37.58 18.04 
Other 4.80 1.35 8.00 8.27 
Total 60.00 16.36 100.00 100.00 
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%Time spent %events 
Managerial events: 
Tours 5.60 1.53 9.33 10.77 
Interaction 10.33 5.31 17.21 37.43 
Deskwork 14.91 2.98 24.85 21.02 
Scheduled meetings 3.34 0.29 5.57 2.05 
Unscheduled meetings 6.25 0.44 10.42 3.07 
Telephone calls 4.87 2.18 8.12 15.38 
Operational 6.47 1.02 10.79 7.18 
Travel 4.00 0.14 6.67 1.02 
Personal 
Observer interaction 
Other 4.22 0.29 7.03 2.05 
Total 60.00 14.18 100.00 100.00 
Purpose of contact: 
Scheduling 1.66 0.39 2.70 2.75 
Ceremony 9.94 2.05 16.19 14.28 
Status request 1.18 0.79 1.93 5.49 
Action request 1.66 1.18 2.70 8.24 
Info exchange 10.10 3.16 16.45 21.98 
Review 11.76 2.60 19.15 18.13 
Negotiation 5.84 1.34 9.51 9.34 
Action enquiry 2.52 0.87 4.11 6.04 
Other 12.73 1.97 27.25 13.73 
Total 57.39 14.35 100.00 100.00 
Form of initiation: 
Principal 19.16 5.69 31.93 39.90 
Opposite party 3.67 2.09 6.12 14.64 
Mutual 15.13 2.81 25.21 19.69 
Clock 18.87 2.88 31.45 20.20 
Other 3.17 0.79 5.28 5.55 
Total 60.00 14.26 100.00 100.00 
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%Time spent %events 
Managerial events: 
Tours 2.61 0.61 4.36 6.30 
Interaction 14.03 4.84 23.46 49.61 
Deskwork 3.23 0.84 3.20 10.23 
Scheduled meetings 1.31 0.23 2.18 2.36 
Unscheduled meetings 2.08 0.23 3.46 2.36 
Telephone calls 2.38 1.77 3.97 18.11 
Operational 1.23 0.69 2.05 7.09 
Travel 30.84 0.15 51.41 1.57 
Personal 
Observer interaction 
Other 2.23 0.23 5.91 2.36 
Total 60.00 9.59 100.00 100.00 
Purpose of contact: 
Scheduling 6.69 1.37 11.11 7.77 
Ceremony 29.84 3.09 49.57 17.47 
Status request 2.57 1.89 4.27 10.68 
Action request 5.66 4.80 9.40 27.18 
Info exchange 6.34 2.57 10.54 14.56 
Review 1.37 2.74 2.28 15.53 
Negotiation 0.51 0.34 0.85 2.91 
Action enquiry 1.94 
Other 7.02 0.34 11.98 1.94 
Total 60.00 17.14 100.00 100.00 
Form of initiation: 
Principal 11.73 9.26 19.55 43.90 
Opposite party 4.60 2.82 7.67 15.45 
Mutual 25.41 2.82 42.23 15.45 
Clock 16.49 3.42 27.47 18.70 
Other 1.78 1.89 2.97 6.50 
Total 60.00 20.21 100.00 100.00 
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7.3.2 Features of the hotel managers' work 
" The fragmented and remedial nature of the hotel managers' work 
The findings show that the hotel managers' work is largely fragmented, with little 
time spent on any one particular activity. This is illustrated by the high number of 
activities the hotel managers engage in during the course of their work (the mean 
number of events/hour varied between 4.95 and 17.47, averaging across the sample 
as 11.98 events/hour). Much of this fragmentation is owed to the variety of the day- 
to-day problems and issues that emerge, and the managers' preoccupation in 
dealing with these problems/issues as soon as they occur. Many hotel managers 
noted that they need to respond immediately to any problems/issues because they 
cannot be left to perpetuate. As the manager of the 3* resort hotel stated, issues 
need to be resolved immediately and within the hotel, without the intervention of 
the supplier (T. A. or T. O. ), because if that happens the problem can only get worse. 
By responding immediately to emergent problems/issues, the managers of the 
sample engage in a sequence of activities until the issue is resolved. Thus, 
managerial activity switches to become goal oriented, diverging from any 
typical/predictable work pattern that may have been followed otherwise. This 
unpredictable work pattern is very evident in the manager of the 4* south resort 
hotel, which largely follows the daily problems and needs. The following sequence 
of events demonstrates the very short lag between the identification and resolution 
of problems within the hotel. Late on the first day, the owner (entry 114) reports that 
the football on the beach is becoming disturbing. People sunbathing are getting 
annoyed with the kids playing football all over the place. During this short 
interaction, no solution is given by either the owner or the manager; however, on 
the second day, the manager met the pool supervisor and a maintenance worker 
(entry 120) to discuss how they were going to create a football pitch. This initiates 
information exchange from both parties, negotiating the best way to do the task. 
The communication is goal oriented. At a later point, during an unscheduled 
meeting with the animateur (entry 174), the manager mentions the works at the 
beach and asks the animateur to check whether they are done properly. The 
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manager follows up with another interaction (entry 178), reviews the situation and 
sets goals: `empty the space on the beach so that they can start working tomorrow'. 
Aside from the emergent problems/issues that hotel managers have to deal with, a 
common factor that leads to the fragmentation of their work is their interaction with 
others. The data shows that, whilst interacting with others takes up a relatively 
small part of the total time spent of the managers' activity (average percentage of 
time spent on interaction 16.19%), it accounts for a significantly higher percentage 
of the total number of events (36.48%). It seems that the managers of the sample 
allow their work to be interrupted and engage in short-span interaction with others. 
The observation showed that interacting with others is important to make other 
actors, upon whom the managers' performance depends, cooperate. The manager of 
the 3* city hotel, for instance, needs to know the bookings' status at any given time, 
engaging frequently in interaction by making status requests (15% of events) and 
exchanging information (21.87% of events). Such frequent interaction is necessary, 
as the hotel manager has to deal with the volatile nature of the demand. As a city 
hotel, it has an average of less than 2 nights stay per customer compared to the 
typical 10 of a resort hotel, and therefore long-term stability cannot be sustained. 
The hotel can have low occupancy on certain dates, whilst being highly overbooked 
on others. By being informed of the bookings' status, the manager is able to act 
accordingly and handle the situation. 
From one perspective, the hotel managers' fragmented work pattern seems ad hoc 
and remedial, focusing on dealing with problems/issues as soon as they occur. On 
the other hand, this fragmented work pattern is an efficient way of dealing with the 
operational uncertainties of the business. 
" Preoccupation with tasks 
During the observation, it appeared that some activities/tasks consume more of the 
hotel managers' time and therefore can be considered important in terms of 
producing the desired output. The following activities are found to be of particular 
importance: 
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All managers have high mobility, which is often predictable (see clock initiated 
activities). This aspect of their work is manifested as observational tours, which 
have an important role in the managers' daily work pattern. While one would 
expect observational tours to be for monitoring purposes only, they actually 
have a much more purposive character. Observational tours are unequivocally a 
means for the managers to position themselves in areas at the hotel where 
problems are more likely to emerge: for instance, at the opening of the 
restaurant, at the bar during the evening, or during the arrival of large groups of 
customers when the workload is particularly high and things are more likely to 
go wrong; however, problems are not always identified by the managers. 
Instead, they are brought to their attention. A very interesting finding is that the 
presence of a manager in various areas within the hotel allows him/her to be 
approached by members of staff who want to make action enquiries, or report 
status and possible problems. This is particularly evident in the 4* south resort 
and 3* resort cases, where the managers' mobility induces interaction with staff 
which could not be performed otherwise. This interaction may also be seen as 
an ongoing negotiation sequence, as the managers and their staff discuss the 
operational necessities of the hotel and agree on a course of action; for instance, 
discussing and agreeing on the staffing levels for completing a task. 
They spend large amount of their time on deskwork activity, which consumes, 
on average, 24.04% of their time. This demonstrates the hotel managers' 
preoccupation with certain duties, i. e. handling the reservations and reviewing 
performance data. Although some deskwork activity may be considered 
mundane, and could possibly be delegated to other members of staff, the 
managers withhold their involvement in particular deskwork activities. 
According to the respondents, this deskwork, although fragmented (accounting 
on average for 21.27% of the total number of events), helps them to unearth 
problems and assists them in their planning. The manager of the 3* city hotel, 
for instance, spends a considerable amount of time reviewing the bookings' 
status frequently, responding to reservation requests and filing all the 
documentation to avoid any problems. As he explained: `sometimes a travel 
agent sends the customers even though he has disconfirmed. Travel agents do 
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that on purpose but I want to avoid such confusion. ' This is even more evident 
in the work of the manager of the 4* south resort hotel, who spends 37.03% of 
total time spent on deskwork, most of which is on reviewing (23.73% of events, 
36.40% of total time spent) the bookings' status on very frequent basis to avoid 
problems with the suppliers. He noted that the suppliers send their bookings in 
at the last minute, so that the hotel would have little slack for reaction. It is a 
common trick of the trade used by the agents who want to create artificial 
uncertainty for hotels. The work of the manager of the 4* resort hotel also 
emphasises deskwork (25.80% of time spent), which involves reviewing 
(22.79% of time spent) performance data such as audits, bookings, the 
customers' questionnaires and the performance of the hotel's suppliers. The 
review of the questionnaires, although a task that could be done by other 
members of staff, is something the manager prefers to do himself. He explains 
that, although this may not seem to be decision-making, it actually assists the 
long-term planning for the hotel. By reading the customers' comments, he 
understands their needs and he and the owner make decisions together during 
the winter regarding the changes that need to be made. 
- They assume the role of host and custodian of the hotel. While not readily 
apparent in the observation data, this is entrenched largely in their interaction 
with others, as well as in activities of ceremonial character. The managers of the 
sample frequently socialised with customers, something they broadly term as 
`public relations', which emphasises their role as host. Furthermore, they 
participate in or initiate a number of ceremonial activities, primarily with 
members of staff, reasserting their role as custodian of the hotel. An extreme 
example here is the manager of the specialist hotel, who spends 49.57% of his 
time on ceremonial activities. This particular example represents the manager's 
customary interaction with the hotel's customers, as well as with its partners. In 
other cases, however, interaction with customers does not appear as a 
ceremonial activity. In their majority, ceremonial activities are occasions when 
the manager participates in customary interaction with staff, setting the context 
for a specific type of agenda. The owner-manager of the 3* resort, for instance, 
customarily meets with staff during their morning break While this may appear 
as a simple interaction, it is important for exchanging information about the 
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daily tasks, issues or problems and negotiating the time spent on tasks, 
especially since all members of staff are gathered together and they can all 
agree on a common course of action. Similarly, the owner-manager of the 4* 
resort would participate in an unscheduled but customary family meeting every 
evening, where he would discuss issues of the hotel, business problems and 
business options. This informal meeting serves to gain confirmation from the 
family for his current course of action. 
" Adaptability in the managers' work pattern 
Some variances in the work pattern of the hotel managers of the sample were found 
to correspond to certain specificities of the firms. This observation was 
strengthened by the clear distinction between the hotel firms of the sample in terms 
of size, type of operation, type of ownership, location, and market niche. The 
results illustrate some consistent work patterns, which, although sharing some 
features with the rest of the hotel managers of the sample, are adapted to the 
organisation-specific nature of the problems they face, as well as the resources they 
have available. 
In lower category hotels, for instance, the managers' work is more fragmented (see 
total number of events) and disruptible (see principal initiated activities vs. others). 
This can be attributed to the general absence of middle management staff in lower 
category hotels, simply because their scale of operation is much smaller. In 
contrast, the work of managers in higher category hotels is less disruptible, 
obviously because their workload is buffered by middle management. The hotel 
managers become involved only when a problem comes to their attention. This 
applies particularly for the managers of the 4* resort and 4* city hotel. In both 
cases, their assistant managers reduce their workload. An exception here is the 4* 
south resort hotel, which has no middle management to buffer the hotel manager's 
workload. Being in the market periphery, the 4* south resort hotel does not have a 
high hierarchical structure and the manager takes on all the monitoring and 
coordination. The manager's mobility here is very high, as he needs to cover more 
areas and departments. This is demonstrated by the mean number of tours, which is 
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1.57/hour, the highest within the sample, even though it does not equally qualify for 
the highest time spent for that activity. 
Furthermore, where there is a flat organisational structure, managers have high and 
frequent interaction with staff, because of the lack of formal communication 
channels. This would include the lower category hotels, hotels in the south, and 
owner-managed hotels; in essence all but the 4* resort and 4* city hotels (where 
interaction accounts for 3.98% and 9.44% of the total time spent, the lowest within 
the sample). 
In both owner-managed hotels, there is high predictability of activities (31.93% and 
37.58 % of time spent on clock initiated activities for the 4* owner-managed and 3* 
owner-managed hotels respectively). Both hotels are characterised by the owners' 
involvement in their operation and they have relatively flat organisational 
structures. They tend to have a low staff turnover, because the owners prefer to 
have people that they can trust with long tenure in the business. The staff's loyalty 
is nurtured by their job stability and other benefits they may negotiate with the 
owners. The same long tenure allows the staff to carry out their activity with 
minimal supervision or coordination (demonstrated by the low frequency of 
action/status requests and time spent). As a result, the managers' work is more 
predictable. Also, the fact that they spend more time on travel (6.67%, 11.88%) and 
ceremonial activities (16.19%, 18.24%) can be attributed to the relative slack in 
their work. 
Travel is an activity that allows interaction with the external environment of the 
hotel firm and often denotes a boundary-spanning activity. The managers of the 3* 
south resort (30.97%), 3* city (16.05% of time spent), 3* owner-managed 
(11.88%), 4* owner-managed (6.67%), and the specialist hotel (51.41°/x) are 
distinguished from the rest, as travel is a time-consuming activity for them, if not 
always predictable. Earlier, the time spent on travel by the managers of the owner- 
managed hotels was attributed to the relative slack in their work. For the managers 
of the 3* south resort and the specialist hotel, the amount of time they spend on 
travel is explained by the remoteness of the hotel units, and the need to obtain 
resources and liase with others at metropolitan cities. On the contrary, the manager 
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of the 3* city hotel has all the resources and facilities within close proximity from 
the hotel unit. Whilst travel is not necessitated by the access to resources, it is that 
very same ease that makes travel a daily, predictable activity. 
The polar case displays considerable variations. We observe the highest amount of 
time spent on travel (51.41%) and ceremonial activities (49.57%). These 
extraordinary results are better understood when taking into account the 
specificities of the specialist hotel. The food and beverage (F&B) division is the 
major contributor to revenues, whereas the rooms division accounts for only a small 
part of the total earnings. Consequently, the managers' attention is focused on the 
more critical F&B division. This division operates at full capacity in the evenings, 
which leaves the manager time in the mornings to travel to the metropolitan city. As 
for the ceremonial activities, they represent the manager's role as host to the 
business' customers. His work was also characterised by a fair amount of 
scheduling (6.69% of time spent), which demonstrates the incremental type of 
planning the F&B division requires. 
7.3.3 The output of managerial work activity 
The hotel managers' work activity is found to be introverted in nature, being 
preoccupied in dealing with day-to-day issues and problems, and characterised by 
routine and fragmented activities. Thus, the initial picture one sees is substantially 
different from what was found in the constructs, which represent the managers' 
common knowledge. In the constructs, the managers are shown to be outward 
oriented, managing their relational bond with the suppliers. What came across the 
constructs was the continuous struggle of the hotel managers to leverage their 
firms' bargaining power. This is a necessity, as they are at a disadvantage in 
relation to the suppliers, occupying a disproportionately small position in the 
market, which means they have very few valuable resources to trade. 
On examination of the observation data under this common knowledge, the hotel 
managers' work activity can be reinterpreted, taking into account their efforts to 
leverage their firms' bargaining power. Their work pattern, however fragmented 
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and remedial in nature, is linked to their efforts to leverage their firms' bargaining 
power. In particular, a re-examination of the prevalent features of their work shows 
that they serve the following three purposes: 
Maintaining consistency 
Much of the hotel managers' work activity is the result of their pursuit to maintain 
consistency. This is illustrated by the nature of the interaction between the hotel 
managers and their staff members, whereby the managers try to entrench 
organisational values in their staff members. In the observation data, this type of 
interaction is labeled as ceremonial, althou gh it also partially accounts for the 
managers' interaction with customers. 
The managers' efforts to maintain consistency in the delivery of their hotel product 
originates from the needs of their business which, being service based and thus 
labour intensive, makes it difficult to standardise the service delivery. In turn, the 
delivery of the service essentially relies on the performance of the staff. As some 
hotel managers put it: `it all depends on the interaction between the staff and the 
customers, and it is the staff that interact with the customers, not the manager. ' 
The 4* resort hotel is a good example of a case where the manager concentrates his 
efforts to maintain the consistency in the delivery of the hotel product. In this case, 
the managers' efforts are seen through some clock-initiated tasks (i. e. observational 
tours) and ceremonial tasks (i. e. ceremonial meetings with staff), where he uses 
rhetoric to build up a common line of action and entrench the correct organisational 
values in the staff members. The manager here claimed that they have already 
achieved a high standard of consistent service delivery and it is shown in the 
reputation they have build over the years. From his perspective, however, his job is 
to ensure that his hotel unit continues to deliver the same high standard of service 
now and in the future. This case represents a hotel unit located in the centre of the 
market, enjoying high demand from both the suppliers and the consumers, where 
maintaining the consistency in the delivery of service is pertinent to maintaining its 
reputation in that market. In other cases, where the hotel unit suffers from low 
demand for its product, the aim is more likely to be the achievement of a good 
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delivery of service, which has to be consistent if it is to count. The managers' 
efforts as reflected in their work pattern, however, remain the same. 
The difficulty of standardising the delivery of service is a source of uncertainty 
which does not appear in the constructs. It is evident in the observation, though, 
when taking into account the hotel managers' ongoing pursuit to leverage their 
bargaining power over their counterparts, their suppliers. This is reflected by 
construct 6, where it is shown that the hotel managers prefer to promote their hotel 
product from within, by delivering value to their customers and building a loyal 
customer base. That customer base becomes a resource they can trade with their 
suppliers, and thus, leverage their negotiating capacity. 
" Protecting the hotel's reputation 
One very obvious feature of the hotel managers' work is its problemistic 
orientation, whereby they engage in simple routines, aiming to unearth potential 
problems so that they can resolve them at their genesis. This is strongly linked to 
protecting the hotel's reputation. As many respondents said: `problems should not 
be left to perpetuate as they can only become worse'. Many respondents explained 
that problems in the hotel's operation affect the customers, and then the customers 
inform the tour reps or inform the T. As/T. Os through the feedback forms they 
submit at the end of their stay. When those problems reach the suppliers, the 
repercussions are not only financial but also affect the hotel firm's reputation 
(Construct 12). 
The observation data shows that the hotel managers purposely engage in an array of 
activities that seek to unearth potential problems/issues within the organisational 
domain. For instance, hotel managers are located at the place and time where the 
work burden is highest and problems are more likely to occur. Observational tours 
around the hotel take place at periods when the workload is higher and 
problems/issues become more apparent. Observational tours also serve as a means 
to approach and interact with staff. They are not solely a monitoring activity, but 
primarily a way for the hotel manager to allow staff to approach and inform the 
hotel manager regarding the current issues/problems. Therefore, this particular 
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activity makes the manager an attractor of problems/issues, which may not have 
risen to the surface otherwise. The short and frequent deskwork activity is also 
imperative for detecting issues that otherwise may not come to the manager's 
attention at all. It is common among all managers of the sample to review their 
bookings' status frequently during the day. Given the erratic demand and the 
subsequent actions the managers may have taken to reduce the uncertainties from 
that demand (e. g. overbooking, special offers, zero release period), the bookings 
status may change unpredictably and may have significant repercussions on the 
hotel's operation. In order to be able to detect sudden changes in the bookings' 
status and avoid further problems, hotel managers need to engage into frequent 
deskwork activity. 
The problemistic orientation of the hotel managers' activity demonstrates their day- 
to-day efforts to protect their firm's reputation. The importance of organisational 
reputation and the way by which is used to support their bargaining power is 
evident in the constructs. Construct 12, in particular, shows how the hotel firm's 
reputation is built through their history of collaboration with the suppliers. By 
making sure that they do not transfer any problems to their suppliers, they can 
portray themselves as a `problem free', and therefore valuable, partner. At another 
level, however, the managers make choices minimising the potential problems in 
their hotel's operation. Construct 7 shows that, by being selective in the choice of 
markets they deal with, they ensure the compatibility between their market/s 
characteristics and their firm's competencies. Thus, they minimise the occurrence 
of problems which, in turn, supports their firm's reputation. 
" Developing a capacity to negotiate 
While the managers' work pattern is primarily introverted, focusing on resolving 
day-to-day problems and issues, a degree of political behaviour has been variously 
observed across the sample, aiming to negotiate the exchange of resources with 
their suppliers (T. S. /T. Os). The hotel managers of the sample have consistently 
shown systematic efforts in order to develop their capacity to negotiate with their 
suppliers. This can be seen in their tendency to exclusively perform certain duties; 
for instance, handling the reservations and enquiries, which is a purposeful political 
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behaviour. While this behaviour shows a relative preoccupation with those duties, 
when considering that these duties could be performed at lower hierarchical levels 
by other staff, we can only infer that the hotel managers seek to preserve their work 
duties. This is a political move on their behalf, in the sense that they are making 
themselves the only medium through which the suppliers can contact the business 
when making a request. In effect, this enables them to negotiate every time they 
speak to the suppliers, drawing upon their history of collaboration, a knowledge 
which is inaccessible to other staff members. One characteristic event was an 
instance of communication between the manager of the 4* south resort hotel and a 
T. A. The manager phoned the T. A. to reject their request for more rooms but, 
despite the fact the T. A. did not sell many rooms in the low season and the fact that 
the hotel was already overbooked, he did not cancel any of the T. A's rooms but said 
if he had any available rooms he would let the T. A. know. 
This type of political behaviour was also observed in the case of the 4* owner- 
managed hotel. The manager received a call from a T. A (entry 104), who requested 
rooms. The manager replied that he had no rooms available, because he had already 
promised those rooms to someone else. In fact, the reason for the manager's 
negative reply was that the T. A. was requesting too many single rooms (entry 114), 
paying room rates for a single room rather than a double. As the manager 
explained: 
`it is not just the room rate which is important; it is the other revenues we 
get from other departments. Also the people who take single rooms are a bit 
alienated and they do not generate a lot of revenue. If it is for a short period 
of time though, it is ok' 
In another instance, when the manager identified a period where the hotel would 
become overbooked, he had to contact a range of hoteliers and hotel managers in 
order to make a good arrangement. This initiated a prolonged sequence of 
interaction. Requesting availability from one hotel and sorting out the problem was 
not enough. The manager wanted to find a hotel that could accommodate his 
overbooked rooms at a better price in order to make some profit from this 
arrangement. According to the manager, the counterpart does not need to know the 
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prices of his hotel. This gives him the allowance to ask for an even lower price, e. g. 
to give 28 euros while he sells for 30 euro. His counterpart may accept it or may 
even ask for 40 euro. If the price difference is small, the manager is willing to 
suffer the cost in order to get these 10-20 rooms off his back. In order to leave 
allowance for negotiation, in his communication with other hotels he quoted that he 
needed 5 rooms initially whilst the hotel was overbooked by 30 rooms, just to leave 
some doors open and avoid losing face in case he did not send the customers. In this 
case, the manager purposely chose not to involve the supplier at all, as he requested 
the charge to be made to his hotel directly. As he notes: 
`The right thing, of course, is to inform the T. A. and let it handle the 
situation. It is even better if the T. A. contacts their customers and ask them 
if they accept this change. However, in that case, from 100 customers, only 
the 10 may accept. This is not the best way to do business though... 
definitely it does not help if you involve many people'. 
The above examples demonstrate how the hotel managers preserve some of their 
work duties, something that helps them develop their capacity to negotiate with 
external agents. Such political behaviour is necessary, as their firms have very little 
valuable resources to trade with the suppliers. The managers know (as seen in the 
constructs) that their firms are at disadvantage, being fragmented, in a saturated 
market, and reliant upon a few mediating organisations (the suppliers) in order to 
reach their markets. Thus, they try to compensate for having very little to negotiate 
with by making sure that they negotiate for whatever resources they have. 
7.3.4 The yearly work cycle 
The observation data provided an overview of the hotel managers' detailed inputs 
in real time, as seen in daily work activity. The results of this analysis were 
juxtaposed with the managers' common knowledge and they were found to support 
their firms' value-generating strategies, leveraging with their bargaining power. 
This section provides an overview of the hotel managers' annual work cycle, 
complementing the observation data and allowing for a more rounded view of their 
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inputs. Hotel businesses operate on a repetitive annual cycle, within which the 
managers' activities are expected to display variations. The observation that took 
place is representative only of the hotel managers' work during the tourist season, 
which accounts for half of the operating year. 
The hotel managers' annual work cycle is shown to be closely linked to the hotel 
firms' repertoire of recurrent action patterns. During the operating season, hotel 
managers are preoccupied with the day-to-day operation of the hotel, whereas in the 
off season, they have enough slack to be concerned with the renewal of their hotel 
unit. At fixed periods, hotel managers would follow specific activity patterns. At 
the end of the season, they would pursue outstanding accounts with other hotels and 
T. As; prior to the beginning of the season, they would chase the T. Os for the 
booking position lists and, at the start of the operating season, they would intensify 
their network interaction in order to get group bookings for their hotel. 
Compared with the observation data, the hotel managers' annual work cycle 
demonstrates the more outward oriented nature of their work. Their interaction with 
the external environment is more prominent here, shown by the setting up of 
partnerships with mediating organisations, T. As and T. Os, through contracts in 
order to reach their markets (Construct 9). Similarly, they participate in tourism 
exhibitions (Construct 6) `to see and be seen', allowing them to network and 
familiarise themselves with other organisations across the supply chain. 
Through this lens, the hotel managers' work is not only outward oriented but also 
more proactive. Their interaction with the external environment on a recurrent, 
predictable manner aims to manage and control selected elements in that domain. 
For instance, they deal with the scarce information environment of their firm by 
chasing the T. Os during the off-season in order to get the booking position lists and 
adjust their sales strategy accordingly. With this practice, they aim to maintain the 
information flow, knowing that without prompt, the T. Os will deliberately delay 
their distribution in order to further increase their bargaining power over their 
partnering hotels. At the end of the season, we observe the hotel managers' efforts 
focusing on closing any outstanding accounts with their suppliers. Since many of 
their peripheral suppliers are incapable of paying their outstanding balance to the 
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hotels in due time (Construct 8), the hotel managers leave allowances and use it as 
leverage to negotiate their future terms of collaboration and secure their suppliers' 
commitment (Construct 13). 
Therefore the inquiry on the hotel managers' annual work cycle complements the 
observation by unveiling practices which are not readily observable, and delineates 
the boundary spanning elements of the hotel managers' work. In particular, it shows 
that the recurrent practices they engage in aim to influence and control aspects of 
the external environment, something which does not appear in their observable, 
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The tourist season 
During the tourist season, the hotel managers' work has all the features 
demonstrated by the observation. According to the hotel managers, the nature of 
their work throughout this time essentially remains the same, focusing on dealing 
with day-to-day issues and performing certain routines: 
(Db) The work during the tourist season May-October is fixed, you cannot 
deviate a lot unless something urgent occurs. These six months are all about 
the hotel's operation and contacts with agencies, nothing else... This work is 
done every day. Now if something urgent occurs such as a technical 
problem it does not exactly mess your programme, you just need to deal 
with it. 
Contracting also takes place during the tourist season, typically starting from June 
till August. No particular pattern governs when the contracts are signed, but as a 
rule of thumb, the contracts that are taken care of first are those with the major 
partners; however, contracting may be hastened by the hotel managers when the 
signs of tourist demand are favourable or delayed if they are not favourable. It also 
depends on the markets. Typically, the contracts for the English market are signed 
earlier in April-May because the suppliers (T. Os) produce early editions of their 
travel brochures. Conversely, the contracts for the French market can be delayed 
until September, because the French T. Os delay the distribution of their brochures. 
End of season 
At the end of the tourist season, the management does the groundwork for closing 
down the hotel and plans the tasks required in the off-season. As soon as the hotel 
closes down, the management start to sort out the outstanding accounts with other 
hotels and T. As. During the tourist season, they deal with the balance of 
overbooked rooms with collaborating hotels. The management always leaves some 
allowances for receiving payments from the T. As (Construct 13). By the end of the 
calendar year, all these accounts must be dealt with. 
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One characteristic aspect of the closing down process is the ceremonial dismissal of 
staff. After the hotel closes, the staff meets with the management to receive their 
last paycheque, but the whole purpose is for both parties to exchange information 
about their intentions for the next season. The ceremonial dismissal of staff is the 
first step for recruiting for the next season, allowing the management to identify 
staffing needs. This practice enables the managers to plan ahead and avoid the 
limitations of the local labour pool, which are particularly constraining for lower 
category hotels (3 *) and hotels on the south axis of the island (Construct 4): 
(Db)... just after we close the hotel they come here to get paid. Ourselves 
we have already planned our staffing needs for the next year, what raise we 
will give, what changes we will make and we inform them before they leave 
because some of them they may not like it and may decide to leave... We 
have to know so that we can search elsewhere. If they want to stay for the 
next year they apply at the same time and we know what we have to do 
next... we talk about what is going to happen the next year but till 3 1S` of 
January we must have clarified who is working and who is not 
Closing down the hotel in October is a process which involves the closure of 
departments and the gradual decrease of staff numbers according to the decrease in 
the overnight bookings. In other words, it is the gradual closing of the hotel. The 
actual date the management chooses to close down the hotel depends on the 
(projected) occupancy rates, and is always in collaboration with the suppliers: 
(Aa) when the flow is not what it's supposed to be, in the beginning of 
October I will inform the T. As that we close the hotel at that particular date. 
As the agencies have other alternatives they don't care much if I close 
earlier 15-20 days let's say but if there are 500 people they have to take to 
other hotels, they will not like it 
In previous years, however, hotels used to stay open and disregard the occupancy 
rates, something that indicates the financial pressures marginalised hotels currently 
face. Under normal circumstances, the management would prefer to keep the hotel 
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open to accommodate the supplier's customers, even if they were very few in 
number, thus demonstrating their commitment to the partnership. The fact that they 
cannot do the same thing now reflects the pressures marginalised hotels face, 
forcing the management to change their practices. 
The off season 
The off-season, in the winter, is devoted to the renewal of the hotel, concentrating 
on maintenance and other improvement tasks. The planning for these tasks, in 
particular, starts before the end of the tourist season. The changes made to the hotel 
unit can be prompted by customer comments or complaints during the season or by 
the suggestions or demands of the hotel's suppliers. Time consuming tasks typically 
start first, such as building work, whereas regular maintenance tasks can be 
postponed. During the tourist season, the hotel's operation is continuous. but during 
the off season, the schedule changes to one shift only. Someone has to be in the 
hotel at all times to answer incoming calls or correspondence for queries, 
reservations etc. Managers and hoteliers also need to be there to supervise the 
maintenance and other work that is done in the hotel. They also ensure that enough 
slack is left in their programme for unexpected issues/problems that may arise. In 
order to maintain a fair amount of control and deal with the reliability problems of 
external contractors, hotels keep their own maintenance department on duty 
throughout the year. 
In most cases, managers attend a number of international tourism exhibitions, either 
as participants or visitors. Most important are the Berlin exhibition in Germany 
(May) and the World Travel Market in London (November). While participation in 
tourism exhibitions in the past entailed direct sales, now it is primarily for 
networking. The purpose of attending tourism exhibitions now is `to see and be 
seen' and not to directly make sales. 
With regards to bookings, it is common practice among the T. Os to publish a list of 
the bookings they have received by hotel. These are known as booking position 
lists. During the tourist season, they are updated and distributed monthly. Prior to 
the tourist season, they merely offer a faint picture of the demand. It is imperative, 
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though, for hotels to have such information to be able to compare with the previous 
years and plan their actions, such as whether or not to make promotional offers, 
when to open the hotel etc. One common trick of the trade used by the T. Os is to 
delay the distribution of the booking position lists in order to create an artificial 
climate of uncertainty. It is the hotel management's task to then chase up such 
information in order to avoid panic situations: 
(Bb) In February we start enquiring about the first data, because this is the 
period when we receive the first data such as the booking position lists, 
booking forecast etc; the deadline for some early bookings ends and the 
agencies are obliged to give them to us; but they do not usually send them 
unless we start chasing them... The booking position lists start coming out 
every month after the season starts. Usually the game is played on when 
they will give the first booking position. It depends on the season. For 
example, the Germans last year, which was a very good year for the German 
market, gave the booking position lists in January; this year we received the 
first booking position list end of March. Of course, the longer they keep 
hidden the booking position lists and they do not give them, they can 
negotiate lower prices, this is a typical kind of pressure they use, because 
they say `what do you want us to give you? There is nothing going on the 
market, everyone has bottomed down and we need lower prices to improve 
the situation' etc and other typical excuses of theirs. 
Start of season 
The start of season is characterised by a sense of urgency; urgency to finish the 
remaining maintenance and improvement tasks and to generate sales in this 
typically low demand period. The actual period when hotels open varies from the 
end of March until the beginning of May. Typically, the prime hotel units will open 
earlier (4* north resorts). What is more interesting, though, is the opening pattern 
from year to year. 4* north resorts will not change their opening dates dramatically 
because they typically have higher room rates and they can operate with low 
occupancy rates without the fear of bearing losses. It is also a matter of being good 
to their suppliers. Instead of asking their suppliers to transpose the bookings at a 
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later date and take their customers to other hotels, they would rather open earlier 
and help the suppliers accommodate those bookings. This practice simply cannot be 
followed by the marginalised hotels. The 4* south resort will open every year at the 
beginning of May; there is never more than 1-2 days variation. By opening late, the 
management ensures that the hotel has sufficient occupancy rates to operate above 
cost. 3* resorts will determine their opening date by monitoring their level of 
bookings and transfer their opening date accordingly when bookings are too low. 
They simply cannot operate above cost with low occupancy rates. 
The opening of the hotel normally signifies the end of the maintenance and 
improvement tasks; however, hotels of higher category and capacity can carry on 
those tasks `behind the scenes', whereas lower category, lower capacity hotels 
cannot do that because they would have to operate at reduced capacity and would 
eventually underperform. April and May are generally the `settling down' period, 
the intermediate stage within which a hotel starts operating under its capacity, but 
eventually operates at full strength, which may include the opening of several 
sections or departments of the hotel. 
Sales promotions often start at the beginning or prior to the tourist season. That is 
because tourist demand at the beginning of the season is always expected to be low 
and inconsistent. Based on early signs, managers need to decide the extent of such 
promotions in order to minimise their potential losses. Such decisions are usually 
taken early in March as, in order for promotions to take effect, they need to be 
given at least one month in advance. Hence, in March, when the hotel opens, it is 
reasonable to give the first special offers. This is sustained by the very short release 
period and the last minute bookings, which characterise the beginning of the tourist 
season. 
Variation: City hotels 
City hotels, by definition, do not follow the operating cycle of resort hotels; 
however, during the summer season they do work like the resorts, based on 
allotment contracts. The major difference is the average stay of their customers 
which, in the case of city hotels, is much lower at an average stay of two nights. 
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Inevitably, the operating pattern of city hotels is a consequence of the operating 
pattern of the resort hotels. During the tourist season, they attract the customers and 
groups who make short stays, in the off season they monopolise the market. This 
shift is gradual, as resort hotels gradually close during October-November. 
City hotels have a more diverse clientele than resorts, ranging from tourists, 
business travellers and clients who rent the premises for events. In the summer 
season, the clientele is predominantly tourists; after the shift in October they tend to 
work mainly with business clients, although these represent a steady current 
throughout the year; and from January till the beginning of the tourist season, they 
tend to work with groups of travellers. It can be said that the 15th of October till 15`h 
of December is a dead period. The management give the staff a vacation, as this is 
the only period when the workload is reduced. 
At the end of the tourist season, the management has to sort out the outstanding 
accounts with agents, just like the resorts. In a similar manner, managers need to 
chase up the payments: 
(Eb) I go there every day until they get fed up with me and say: `come 
tomorrow and I will give you a cheque'. I have to check these things all the 
time. How I have a 200,000 euro debit and I have to collect these money by 
the end of December. They do not come by themselves; no one will say 
`come over to get paid' 
Even though maintenance work is carried out throughout the year in city hotels, no 
major changes/improvements can be made, as they would disrupt the hotel's 
ongoing operation. Dramatic changes in city hotel units are less frequent for this 
reason. 
Variation: The Polar Case 
The specialist operates in a manner similar to a city hotel, as it has an ongoing 
operation; however, it does have a wider variety of additional departments that 
convert to the winter-summer, summer-winter operation. Consequently, in 
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September-October, the management prepares for the winter operation, which starts 
after November. That is the preparation of the themes of the excursions to the 
museum, of the operation of the summer tavern, the theme of the hotel, how it is 
going to work, with what personnel and with what partners. Of course the variety of 
additional departments is reduced in the winter (off season for the resort hotels): 
(Ia) In December we are within the winter operation, whatever events that 
are in December are organised since November and with the New Year we 
do the preparation for the summer, meaning that we look what are our needs 
for maintenance. We also advertise positions for staff. In February-March 
we have the last contacts with the agencies and whatever contract is that we 
have not signed we do it that period ... the cafe stops working, the 
workshops are either way rented out, the textiles shop is open only when 
there are organised tours and the tavern operates 5 days a week with live 
music in the evening and the big tavern operates on request when there is an 
organised event 
Contracting is delayed in the specialist hotel, not because of its nature but because it 




7.4 The organisational lens 
The previous analyses showed that the hotel managers contribute to the strategy of 
their firm mainly by managing their suppliers, who are indispensable; it is only 
through them that the hotel firms can reach their markets. Their efforts, however, 
are stymied by having few resources to trade with the suppliers, and thus, they have 
very little bargaining power with which to achieve their goals. As a consequence, 
the hotel managers concentrate on building a positive history of collaboration with 
their suppliers and emphasise their symbiotic relationship. The ethnographic lens 
further showed that the hotel managers support their efforts to leverage their 
bargaining power through their everyday activity, as well as through recurrent 
temporal practices. 
This third part of the findings presents a normative view on the formation of the 
hotel firms' strategies, concentrating on the interaction between the environment 
and the firm, as well as the outcomes that are produced from this process. It 
therefore serves to verify the results of the managers' contribution by looking at 
what is actually produced at the organisational level. This is achieved by focusing 
on the hotel managers' accounts on given uncertainties (changes in the external 
environment) and given outcomes over time. As such, it also complements the 
previous analyses by presenting a more dynamic picture of strategy formation. The 
managers here are taken as the medium between the environment and the hotel 
firm. As a result, the data presented attempts to simulate the hotel firms' responses 
to a changing environment through the reflections of the managers. 
This analysis is based on two, supplementary to the main interview sessions (see 
Methodology, Section 5.3), which tried to simulate the hotel firms' responses to a 
changing environment over an extended period of time, through the hotel 
managers' reflections. The first inquiry (Section 7.4.1) focused on how the 
managers perceived changes in the external environment, or in other words on how 
they dealt with uncertainties as a result of the changing environment. The second 
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inquiry (Section 7.4.2) required the managers to explain how some prespecified 
organisational outcomes have changed over time and why. Both inquiries are 
structured, aiming to obtain more accurate and thus, more comparable data amongst 
the cases. 
7.4.1 Responding to changes in the external environment 
The inquiry on the managers' interpretation of issues shows that the hotel managers 
concentrate on those issues that are within their locus of control, and those that are 
linked to external agents, with whom they have a channel of interaction. This 
reflects their focus on the more controllable domain of the external environment; in 
this case, it is the domain controlled by their partnering suppliers. The results 
confirm what was presented in the constructs: a preoccupation of the hotel 
managers with managing their suppliers, which act as mediating organisations 
between the market and the hotel firm. 
In particular, it is found that the hotel managers give attention to issues that are part 
of their transactional language with their suppliers. The issue of the single currency, 
for instance, was found to have changed the balance on their negotiating table, 
simply because it had a significant economic impact on the hotel firms' markets. 
Similarly, the trend of the shortening of the travellers' booking times creates a 
climate of uncertainty for the hotel firms, which may be perceived as a decrease in 
demand. Both issues were found to be used by the suppliers to further leverage their 
bargaining power. Thus, the hotel managers' emphasis on such issues that have a 
direct and/or observable impact on the demand from their markets makes sense, 
knowing that their negotiations would be based on predictions about demand, 
which in turn are grounded on their markets' capacity to buy their product. On the 
other hand, one-off events that do not impact their markets are considered to be 
short-lived, with only temporary effects. Even the September 11th events were 
deemed short-lived by the hotel managers, with imperceptible impact on their 
hotel's performance. 
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Other issues, such as the phenomenon of seasonality and the decrease in the 
travellers' average stay, do not appear to be in the hotel managers' focus of 
attention because they do not affect the hotel managers' dominant tactics of 
managing their suppliers. The seasonality phenomenon, for instance, is considered 
by the hotel managers to be outside of their control, being attributed to the actions 
and interventions of the state. Also, the decrease in the travellers' average stay did 
not register as something important to the hotel managers of resort hotels. As their 
customers have two fixed stay periods in their hotels, any such decrease manifests 
as a decrease in demand rather than anything else. This trend was, however, 
observable by the managers of city hotels, whose customers have irregular, non- 
fixed stays, forcing them to alter their target markets and their product/price mix. 
The consolidation in the travel industry had a definite impact on the power relations 
between the hotel firms and the suppliers. While there is the obvious outcome of the 
supply side turning to oligopoly, increasing significantly the bargaining power of 
the suppliers, the issue that was uppermost for the hotel managers was the 
dissolution of their history of collaboration with their existing suppliers, who 
happened to be affected by the changes in the structure of the industry. In effect, the 
changes temporarily suspended the hotel managers' capacity to negotiate on the 
basis of their firms' reputation in relation to their suppliers. 
These results, which are presented more analytically below, demonstrate that the 
hotel managers attend to issues with which they are already familiar and upon 
which they can act. Thus, their response to changes in the external environment is 
dependent on how they categorise the issues they face. It is seen that many of the 
issues they encounter as the result of changes in the external environment are not 
within their focus of attention. They are likely to select them out, considering them 
peripheral (one-off events that do not impact their markets), inevitable (attributing 
many of the ills in the sector to the role of the state) or beyond their control 
(treating economic factors as the primary cause of impact to their business and 
rationalising the actual impact as `normal' by comparing their firm to other hotel 
firms). As a result, the beliefs the hotel managers hold are in essence a cognitive 
simplifying tool that allows the managers to focus on what, in their view, matters 
most. 
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September II t`' events 
The September 11 ̀h events were expected to have a significant impact on the hotel 
sector. Having created a chain of consequences such as increased security measures 
at international airports which, in turn, pushed the airport fees upwards; increased 
insurance for airplanes; an increase in the oil prices (which was sustained by the 
subsequent military actions that followed), they formed the preconditions for a 
particularly negative climate in the local hotel sector. 
The hotel managers' responses, however, indicated otherwise. In their 
understanding, the September 11 ̀h developments were another, short-lived event 
whose worldwide impact had affected people's travel preferences. Even though the 
September 11th events preceded the following disappointing season, they were not 
directly linked to the outcomes of the season. Furthermore, despite the fact that 
T. Os in 2002 requested renegotiation of the existing contracts and delayed 
downpayments, the hotel managers suggested that it had to do with the performance 
of the previous season and not with the September 11`" events: 
(Db)... we cannot credit only the September l lth for that. We had wars and 
other terrorist attacks which have definitely affected the industry. You must 
remember the threats of Bin Laden, who was saying `I am going to do this 
and that and beware of the wrath of our warriors... ', it was the whole 
aftermath not some isolated events 
(Eb) This is part of a crisis we face every year. One of which is the people's 
fear to travel by planes... 
(Aa) What happened on the September 11`h was unpredictable and affected a 
lot but, in general, the causes lie somewhere else. 
(Ba) The T. Os reappeared in 2002 asking for discounts, delaying the down 
payments they had to pay, requesting renegotiations of the contracts, 
especially with those with guarantee agreements... They could not put 
pressure on me, they could just delay some down payments and that is all. 
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These responses are unexpected for an event of this magnitude; the hotel managers 
do not appear to register it as something with lasting impact. This is, however, 
representative of the hotel managers' views of other developments in the industry 
(Appendix 5) which, according to them, have only short-lived effects. A common 
denominator that typifies their perception is that such developments are not 
attributed to observable outcomes: 
(Hb) These are insignificant events... They affect us but not much and for 
short period of time, they are overcome 
(Ba) This was something amongst others. It came to add to the negative 
climate. We said about the introduction of the euro and the general 
expensiveness, the echo of the September 11`h events, in addition we had a 
noise about the virus last year in May, which took alarming dimensions 
because of its publicity, which was not justified and unacceptable in my 
opinion, plus the rumours about earthquakes which started developing last 
year in May with dilemmas like `we will have, we will not have earthquake 
in Crete' ... All these worked against the tourism 
industry and, in our 
opinion, they are responsible for last year's bad results. 
(Ca) Ah yes, although I think this came and left unnoticed. There was a 
buzz for a week or so but it did not affect us. By talking to our guests, we 
found that it was not something that had particularly scared them. Although 
they were aware about it they were not sceptical in any way about it. 
Single currency 
The introduction of the single currency is a development with a profound financial 
impact in the hotel sector, which affected the demand for destinations within the 
euro zone. From the supply side, the switch to the euro currency did not allow the 
tour operators (T. Os) to use one of their common tactics: to get discounted rates by 
paying in advance with foreign currency, allowing them to buy local currency at a 
cheaper rate. In addition, it signaled the end of monetary-related state intervention 
(i. e. devaluing the currency to improve the trade balance). This is in addition to the 
fact that the state cannot sponsor charter airlines for bringing tourists in the low 
seasons due to the regulations for unfair competition within the EU. 
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The hotel managers, however, emphasised the effect the single currency had on 
their operating costs and the pricing of their hotel product. In particular, the hotel 
managers noted that the single currency started a hidden inflation, which inevitably 
increased the operating costs of their hotel: 
(Ba) We saw with the establishment of the euro last year, and with the 
hidden inflation, many hoteliers increased their prices as well as the T. O., 
who also took advantage of the situation. The T. Os stopped making their 
catalogues in DM and they changed them to euro, getting the opportunity to 
increase their prices... Last year we saw quantum leaps in the prices in the 
T. Os catalogues. The T. Os justified this increase, of course, because of the 
events of the September the 110'. They claimed that the increase in their 
costs was due to increases in the flight costs, because the airport tax is 
increased, because the security costs in the airports have increased... 
(Ha) With the coming of the euro, the prices of goods went sky high. The 
effect it had on us is that it increased our operating costs, and this was 
something we had to compensate for by renegotiating our contract rates and 
by revising aspects of our offering. In our case, we tried to increase the 
revenue from the extras... 
In most cases, the introduction of the single currency was considered the main 
reason for the recession in the industry. More specifically, as the hidden inflation 
reduced the disposable income of people in many European countries, it affected 
the demand in key markets. Most of the respondents noted the impact the single 
currency had on the economy of Germany, leading it to a recession, which was the 
main cause of an overall decrease in demand. 
(Ab) It resulted to financial problems to some tourist markets, especially 
Germany which affects us even more 
(Db) It was the recession in Germany that affected us the most, which we 
observed after the coming of the euro 
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(Eb) I consider first the global economic crisis and especially the crisis in 
Germany which started from the merge of the western with the eastern 
Germany. 
(Hb) This is the biggest problem for Greece (recession in 
Germany)... Especially for Crete, Rhodes and Kos which rely predominantly 
on the German market. Therefore when Germany sneezes, Crete catches a 
cold. 
The above responses demonstrate the attention hotel managers give to the 
economic-related factors attached to issues that may affect their markets. Even 
though the introduction of the single currency had a clear financial impact on hotels 
by a subsequent increase in their operating costs, the managers tended to emphasise 
the economic impact it had on their markets. The relevance of those economic 
factors is taken for granted by the managers, as they are brought to their attention 
by their suppliers: 
(Ab) Their (the suppliers') biggest argument was the euro, for the German 
market first of all. There is a big problem in Germany's economy... Last 
year Neckermann cancelled 150 hotels off its programme. Why? Because 
the previous year it had 100,000 people and last year it had 70,000. This 
year it wants to cancel more hotels. Why? Because it did not have 70,000 
people but 60,000. We move away from variables of the kind `we do not 
have a good airport'. All these count, but they are last part of the chain. The 
first parts of the chain are suffering now, the predisposition and the capacity 
of people to travel... which is the result of the recession 
(Ba) For the British who have not joined the European currency zone, their 
pound has lost value against the euro. So we have lost the advantage and we 
are left with a disadvantage, at least in terms of the viability of the tourism 
sector. This is a negotiating advantage of the British T. O. who say `look 
fellas, we cannot accept any increases because our pound is losing value, 
and since we express our price in British pounds we are more expensive and 
we should not increase our prices because then we will become prohibitive 
for them' 
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This tendency of the hotel managers to concentrate on the economic factors that 
affect their markets can be interpreted as a prioritisation mechanism, whereby the 
managers acknowledge what matters for them the most. It is those economic factors 
that affect their markets and form the basis of their transactional language with their 
suppliers (see also Construct 9), something which is reflected here. As shown in 
construct 9, contracting is primarily a tool used to assert the hotel firm's relation 
with the supplier and maintain a formal partnership. The contract is used as a rule 
of thumb for future negotiations; therefore, the hotel managers seek to negotiate the 
same or better contract terms in the prospect of future returns. 
The hotel managers' responses on the issue of the single currency confirm what was 
implicitly asserted by the managers in discussions related to their negotiations with 
their suppliers. These negotiations are based on a transactional language that is 
related to the status of the demand. The hotel managers rely primarily on their 
suppliers' information regarding the status of the demand and, as it appears to be, 
such information is grounded on `evident' economic factors. This conclusion 
provides further grounding for some of the hotel managers' practices. The necessity 
of their participation in tourism exhibitions, for example (Construct 6& Section 
7.3.4), becomes more evident, as they need to attain a first-hand understanding of 
the situation in their markets, a knowledge they apply when negotiating with their 
suppliers. 
Consolidation in the travel industry 
Consolidation in the travel industry started from the mid 1990s and had an 
observable impact on hotel businesses. Depending on their organisational 
circumstances, hotel managers perceived it as a period of uncertainty, even if they 
were not negatively affected by it. As many have put it, in the past, the transactions 
with the suppliers were more broadly distributed across a higher number of big 
players and peripheral suppliers. Now many of the peripheral players have become 
extinct and the number of big players has reduced to just three. The impact on their 
firms is that they have to rely on a small number of suppliers to penetrate various 
markets, whereas before they had different suppliers specialising in their target 
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markets. The way things are now, the hotel managers target suppliers and not 
markets: 
(Gb) The big T. O. started acquiring the smaller ones; for example TUI 
bought Thompson and Thompson bought the local agent Zeus. It did affect 
us in the sense that we do not talk anymore with 4-5 different agencies but 
with one. Before we used to have 4-5 different alternatives and now we 
have only one. Before we could penetrate different nationalities, French, 
German, English and so on by dealing with different agencies, now we wait 
one agency to bring all these nationalities to our hotel. 
(Ha) You cannot go against a big one because the big one has amassed some 
markets and if you do not get on well with the big one, you do not get on 
well with the rest of its branches. While the small one has a particular 
market and you can have better cooperation 
(Aa)... in the past there used to be 5-7 big ones (agents). Most of them are 
now gone, they are removed from the market. They do not control the 
strings. They had their chance to do so and have a say in the industry but 
they lost it and the control now is in the hands of the `outside players'. The 
locals are only a showcase, now they do not even sign the contracts on their 
own. 
The consolidation in the travel industry affected the contractual relationships 
between the suppliers and their partnering hotels, for better or for worse. During the 
mergers and acquisitions that followed during the 1990s, many of the hotels' 
suppliers changed representatives (T. As), something that caused disruptions in the 
hotels' collaboration with their suppliers: 
(Gb) Another effect of these mergers and acquisitions is that we lose some 
of our contacts; because if you cooperate with some people for a long period 
of time, it is normal to have built a friendly, trust relationship. Now if 
someone buys off this agent and new people get in, then you lose you lose 
your previous contact and you have to start all over again from the 
beginning and become acquainted yourself to the market again and this 
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takes time. At the meantime, while you do all these efforts to approach the 
new people, things change and there we go again. 
(Eb) I never worked with TUI, I could not attract them... since they 
acquired my major supplier, we started anew... Needless to say that it is 
better now that I do not have to deal with small agencies which are 
problematic in terms of getting the payments, whereas TUI is a guarantee 
and you know that you will get your money. 
This development had an apparent impact on what has been described in construct 
12 as the symbiotic relationship between the hotel and its suppliers. The symbiotic 
relationship is nurtured by the history of transactions between the hotel and the 
suppliers, which is in turn based on the interpersonal relationship of the 
representatives of each party. As shown in construct 12, the hotel managers 
capitalise on their conformity to the requests of their counterparts by portraying 
them as personal favours, which feed the history of collaboration between the two 
parties, and upon which they can draw in order to ensure their suppliers' 
commitment to the partnership (Construct 13). This relationship is based on the 
managers' common knowledge that contractual formalities do little to ensure the 
cooperation of their partner. Throughout the period of consolidation in the industry, 
the hotel managers have seen the supply side turn to oligopoly, something that 
gradually reduced their bargaining power. In addition, in the majority, they lost a 
great deal of their ability to draw upon their history collaboration, as they had to 
start building it anew. 
Shortening of booking times 
The trend of travellers to book their vacation ever closer to the actual date of their 
travel appeared in the 1990s and one can say that it coevolved with the increase in 
tourist accommodation. The core of the problem, according to the hotel managers, 
is that `everyone can now find the accommodation they want, whenever they want'. 
Surprisingly, the managers do not attribute this trend to the technological 
developments and the new distribution channels of the last 10 years. For instance, 
the effects of the internet and online sales are not directly related to the shortening 
of the booking times: 
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(Eb) IS IT BECAUSE OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS? 
Of course this plays a role, but it is also the financial crisis, the unexpected 
events and when the people were planning their vacation early in Christmas 
now they leave it for the last moment because they do not know the 
situation in the future. That is because they have paid dearly in the past by 
cancelling their packages and now they say I am not doing the same 
mistake. We no longer have the booking position lists in January that 
showed the activity till August; these are gone, the have disappeared in the 
last 2-3 years. 
The hotel managers correlated this trend with the continuous growth of the 
accommodation offer in the local hotel sector, as well as parallel increase of the 
accommodation offer on the international scene. Objectively, the excessive 
accommodation offer, both at regional and international level, has resulted in a 
sector where hotels are in almost perfect competition, and a market which is more 
price elastic, with no destination or hotel loyalty. Because of the subsequent 
increase in the competitive rivalry amongst hotels, they have tended to resort to 
short-termist promotional practices, which became institutionalised over time: 
(Ab) We have helped them a lot on this thing by giving special offers like 
peanuts, and the customer who books in the winter pays more than the last 
minute customer for the same hotel, same facilities etc, it makes it easier for 
them to book in the last minute and they wait for the special offer to make 
their booking. It is us who spoiled the market 
AND YOU CANNOT HOPE IN LAST MINUTE BOOKINGS 
(WITHOUT MAKING SPECIAL OFFERS)? 
No, because our colleagues have already given their offers and the 
customers will go to them. If I do not give a special offer I will lose those 
customers... The neighbour has already given the offer. If I do not give one I 
will lose, because then it is only a matter of price. 
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The shortening of booking times has created some obvious planning problems for 
the hotels in the local sector, as the managers now have a much less clear picture of 
the demand. As they claim, this has been the reason for their short-term, 
promotional/pricing tactics (see also Construct 5). In previous analyses (Sections 
7.3.2 & 7.3.4), there is evidence that the suppliers deliberately delay disclosing the 
bookings' status to the hotels in order to create an artificial climate of uncertainty 
and reduce the hotels' bargaining power. Therefore, the shortening of booking 
times is not just a trend, but an aspect of the power game played by the hotels' 
suppliers. Hotel managers can, however, respond by focusing on indicators that are 
intrinsic to their firm (Construct 11), making predictions about the level of demand 
based on their past performance data and their history of collaboration with their 
suppliers. 
Decrease in the travellers' average stay 
The decrease in the average stay of travellers has been experienced by city hotels, 
which have seen the average stay decrease gradually from the beginning of the 
1990s. It should be noted that the tourism growth on the island boomed after 1975, 
when the island's airport became international. At that time, only a few city hotels 
were available to satisfy existing demand, and they played the dual role of a city 
and a resort hotel. As the number of resort hotels was increasing dramatically, 
particularly since the early 1990s, city hotels could not play that dual role anymore 
and were confined to particular niches. The city hotels' stats show a gradual 
decrease from the early 1980s until the present day, from an average stay of 12 days 
to slightly less than two days. 
Managers in resort hotels do not experience this decrease, as customers always stay 
either one or two weeks. As a result, the decrease in the travellers' average stay 
manifests as a decrease in demand 
(Ab) I have not observed that. Maybe because now they do not plan their 
vacation as they used to, they split their vacation of 14 days normally into 
7+7 or 7+4 
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(Db) we always sell 7,14 and 21 day packages and these depend on your 
target market. The family for example will always stay for two weeks. If it 
is September-October when we have many elderly pensioners again they 
usually stay for 2 weeks. In June we have people who want to have a short 
one week vacation. It depends on who your customer is. You will not see 
packages under 7 days. First of all it is not beneficial for us to offer less than 
7 days accommodation 
Contrasting the above results with the managers' perceptions of the switch to a 
single currency, one can infer that the managers do not appear to be concerned with 
the decrease in the travellers' average stay. The decrease may be unobservable from 
their standpoint, because it is something that does not affect their typical strategy of 
maintaining their position by commanding the same or better terms in their 
contracts (Construct 9). While the switch to a single currency changed the `rules of 
the game' as the situation in their markets was inverted, resulting in what the 
suppliers claimed to be a decrease in demand, the decrease in the travellers' average 
stay did not concern the hotel managers (bar those of city hotels) because it did not 
seem to be part of their transactional language. 
Seasonality 
Seasonality refers to the tendency of the tourist season to shrink over time. The 
problem of seasonality is mainly reflected by the hotels' opening and closing dates. 
The hotel managers acknowledge that this phenomenon is the result of the largely 
undifferentiated hotel product offerings in the hotel sector. All the hotel managers 
agree that the problem cannot be dealt with by their initiative alone; only collective 
efforts can mediate the seasonality problem. 
(Ba) There is something else besides seasonality; April is becoming a bad 
month. By continuing to emphasise on the bipole sea and sun we do not 
expand but in the end we shrink. April is getting worse, SETE has 
conducted a research showing that over 50% of the tourist activity is during 
July, August, September, and this is very bad because the infrastructure of 
the island has to cope with that burden, whereas it is under occupied in the 
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winter. Therefore SETE considers as solution the penetration of new, 
specialised markets 
(Hb) We will keep facing the problem of seasonality unless there is some 
collective action by the hoteliers in this region. A few years ago, the Creta 
Maxis hotel tried to extend its operating season by staying open for longer 
with moderate success. You see, this city shows a very different face in the 
winter; it is like a dead city, most shops are closed and there is very little for 
the tourists to do. Also, bear in mind that the operating costs are higher 
during the winter; you have to turn on the heating because it's not like the 
summer, and you have to keep all your departments open to keep your 
customers happy, because there is very little for them to do outside the 
hotel. 
All the respondents, however, attributed the problem to the state's inability to 
support the national tourism industry. For them, the seasonality problem is an 
inevitable consequence of the inability of the state to provide a good infrastructure 
to support a healthy level of demand. In addition, there is a general disbelief 
regarding the state-controlled bodies' ability to promote the destination effectively, 
and this is something that has been amplified by their continuous failures and the 
inadequate results of their actions. The hotel managers often noted that state 
initiatives and interventions are irrational and out of place, and characterised the 
role of the state as competitive and not supportive towards businesses in the hotel 
sector: 
(Fa) No director of the GNTO stayed more than one year in the position. No 
matter how competent the director is, he does not have enough time to make 
any progress and display the fruits of his vision 
(Eb) I feel sorry to say that our GNTO still owes the rent for the Berlin 
exhibition in 2001 and last year they almost lost their chance to participate 
again in 2002. 
(Db) State initiatives fail because of the bureaucracy, inefficiency and 
corruption... We cannot expect anything on behalf of the state. 
(Bb) The problems we face as a hotel in this industry have to do with the 
way they are treated by the state, sometimes competitively and deal with its 
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inefficient control and irrational procedures... The end result influences our 
customers' satisfaction, as whatever they find wrong in the outside, they 
bring it with them in the hotel... The state lacks the control mechanisms to 
force hotels to comply and sometimes it falls victim of its own irrational 
behaviour. 
A closer look at the hotel managers' responses, however, shows that they can be 
separated into two groups. One group, mainly the managers of lower (hence 
smaller) category hotels (the exception is the 3* city hotel), emphasises the lack of 
support and incentives from the state; the second group of managers of higher 
category hotels emphasised the infrastructure problems. While both attribute the 
burden of their problems to factors external to their business (in this case the 
inability of the state to support them), the managers of lower category hotels appear 
to require more support, expecting favourable intervention from the state. So, while 
the second group prefers to see the state create the preconditions for improving their 
business' operation, the managers of lower category hotels demand more direct 
support in the form of incentives, displaying a more fatalistic behaviour. 
An objective view on the issue, though, would discover that the problem of 
seasonality has escalated over time, following the increase of the accommodation 
offer in the local, as well as in the international, scene. In addition, the island has 
access limits limiting the number of tourists it can hold. In particular, the capacity 
of the one and only international airport on the island is severely limited and cannot 
handle more traffic during the tourist season. Therefore, the increase of tourist 
accommodation cannot be supplemented by an increase in tourist demand. 
(Ba) DO YOU SEE ANY POSSIBILITY OF THE DEMAND BEING 
MAGNIFIED AS WELL? 
Not with the current infrastructure. Now it is not easy. For example the 
Heraklion airport is saturated, it cannot handle more traffic. Especially 
during some days of the week. I will give you one good example: some 
specialist T. Os requested 14-day packages, provided that the customers 
would have the opportunity to go to Athens for 2 days and watch the 
Olympic event they are interested in. That extra takeoff-landing cannot be 
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handled by the airport. It can handle only charters that bring people who 
stay in the island for 10-14 days and then take them back. 
IS THIS NOT SOMETHING, THOUGH, THAT CAN ACT AS A LEVER 
TO PROMOTE LONG STAY PACKAGES? 
They cannot do that, and actually there is a trend lately to shrink the 
vacation time, meaning the average stay... It clashes with the preferences of 
the customers for shorter stay. As I said earlier, a new trend is emerging 
where the average stay is decreasing, while the number of travels per year is 
increasing. 
Taking this into account, the hotel managers' responses may seem narrow-minded, 
but they once again serve as a selection mechanism, focusing on aspects of the 
external environment on which they can exert some influence. As shown in the 
discussion of the industry background (Sections 6.2 & 6.6), there is a long history 
of state intervention, which aims to promote the national tourism industry. In the 
past, state incentives and direct interventions were more frequent and this appears 
to be something the representatives of the less privileged hotel firms ask for. 
7.4.2 Organisational outcomes 
Hotel firms display an overall resistance to change, as the patterns of organisational 
outcomes remain inelastic over time. In addition, those patterns are, to a large 
extent, shared across the sample. Some patterns may appear irrational from the 
viewpoint of the external observer and separate from the context within which they 
occur, but become rational when seen in conjunction with the managers' common 
understanding. Through that lens, they confirm what has been claimed in the 
managers' constructs: the importance of developing a relational bond with the 
suppliers, and the need to protect the hotel firms' intangible resources: their 
reputation in the market and in the industry, as well as their contracts. 
More specifically, the hotels' composition of markets remains stable over time. The 
management justifies it on the grounds that a) the firm has an established image and 
a customer base at the existing market/s, and b) the firm would have to terminate 
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the symbiotic relationship with its existing suppliers. Thus, the observed pattern has 
to do with preserving the hotel firm's reputation in the market and its relational 
bond with the suppliers. The symbiotic relationship with the suppliers, in particular, 
is based on the expectation that the hotel would receive higher returns from existing 
partners, rather than new ones (Construct 12). Having established a long history of 
collaboration with existing partners, the management expects to get their 
commitment to the partnership by drawing on that history of collaboration. 
Obviously, this does not apply for new partners. Following the same rationale, 
when building a new relationship with a partner, the management faces the problem 
of forecasting the performance of the partnership (through historical analysis of 
previous contract performance with the supplier; Construct 11), and thus the 
partnership becomes a risk. 
The hotels' portfolio of partners would consist of at least one main supplier, to 
which the management would allocate the majority of the hotel's room capacity. 
This confirms what was described in construct 8. The main supplier/s are more 
likely to be big players in the industry and therefore have the capacity to generate 
high sales volumes to the hotel. They also differentiate from the smaller players in 
that they keep their financial commitments (Construct 13) and they pay their 
contract fee on a regular basis. The main suppliers, however, would have to pay 
much lower contract rates than those given to peripheral ones. For the hotel 
managers, this compromise is always a preferable option, showing their preference 
for long-term stability over short-term profit. 
The favouritism towards the main suppliers, in effect, the big players in the 
industry, is also demonstrated by how the management allocates the hotel rooms. 
The hotel's main partners are given a number of rooms that often fills the capacity 
of the hotel. While overalloting is a common practice in the hotel sector, it is done 
in a way that does not impact the hotel's main suppliers. Instead, it would impact on 
the peripheral suppliers, with which the management does not expect long-term 
returns and can afford to compromise their symbiotic relationship (Construct 12). 
That is why the overalloting of rooms is done based on the number and the capacity 
of the peripheral and not the main suppliers. For the hotel's main suppliers, the 
allocation of rooms will remain unchanged through the year. As such, it does not 
189 
follow the performance of the contract, but rather aims to demonstrate the hotel 
firm's commitment to the partnership with the supplier (Construct 13); offering 
allowances to the hotel's suppliers for displaying low contract performance, 
knowing that there will be no penalty with regards to the amount of resources the 
hotel firm wants to commit. This observation confirms that contracts are treated as 
intangible resources, or assets, serving to legitimise the negotiation of the resource 
exchange between the partnering parties. 
The hotels' traditional revenue sources are room sales and the revenue from the 
food and beverage (F&B) departments, which also happens to be the major cost 
centre. Additional revenue sources may offer a bigger margin for the hotel firms, 
but they are also negotiable with their suppliers. While the management cannot 
afford a decrease in the contract rates (Construct 9), which directly impact on the 
main revenue sources of the business, it can negotiate the additional ones. 
Moreover, we observe this phenomenon: diminishing returns from revenue sources 
will not prompt the management to create new streams, but instead 
strengthen/protect the main ones by offering their peripheral revenue sources as 
protection. Construct 14 shows that changing the hotel's type of operation is a 
means for consolidating their revenue sources into one all-inclusive package, which 
commands a higher contract rate. 
Composition of markets 
The composition of markets is an outcome that is strongly inelastic over time. The 
hotel managers display a resistance to changing their composition of markets and 
confirm what has been described in construct 7. They tend to stick to working with 
certain markets, with which their hotel firm is well established, and those that are 
more compatible with their hotel firm's capabilities. It is not uncommon to find 
hotels working predominantly with the British market as `the British typically 
spend more during their vacation', the Germans `working with Germans is 
problem-free', or the French `because the hotel product appeals more to the 
French'. As they noted, however, the choice of hotels was severely restrained in the 
last decade, as the accommodation offer became saturated, whilst market demand 
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stopped growing. Now, the management and the owners have to make compromises 
and sacrifice efficiency over profit by selecting less compatible markets: 
(Bb) It is not very wise to abandon a major market. It is easier to change 
T. O. partner, rather than change market... it is very risky to do something 
like that, unless there is a change in the hotel's operation and becomes a 
club. If it used to work with Germans and it became a club for the French 
then it cuts off from the first market 
(Ga) If we have the chance we would prefer certain markets, e. g. the 
English as they generate more revenues for the hotel 
(Ab) It would be better of course if we could have a German market instead 
of Czech or a Polish... On the other hand how can you reject a market? 
Especially if they give you a good price... 
(Eb) I avoid fly&drive packages because they are one night stay only and 
they are trouble... If we take them, we receive complaints because we do 
not have enough parking space... Roundtrip packages are another issue; 
they are groups doing one night stay. It is usually 10-20 people for a night. 
We have no problems with these bookings and they are always welcome 
There is, however, evidence that hotel managers may compose their markets in 
such a way as to mediate the effects of the erratic demand (see also Construct 8); 
although such actions will only be taken if they do not compromise the 
compatibility between their firm and those markets: 
(Ba) Sometimes we choose a T. O. or better the markets the T. O. deals with, 
knowing that the period when a market is up another one is down 
(Db) The good thing about working with different markets is that you do not 
have much discontinuity in the reservations... I know which ones sell better 
over the subseasons and I manipulate them in a way so that they cover each 
other 
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Portfolio of partners 
The portfolio of the hotel firms' partners is, according to the hotel managers, linked 
to the composition of markets, especially when the hotel's suppliers request 
exclusivity for their markets. For example, the 4* south resort hotel (Case D) had 
been working with big T. Os having exclusivity in each market. This is not the case 
for city hotels, since they have to deal with a lot of suppliers to compensate for the 
short stays of their customers. Consequently, the agent cannot guarantee many 
overnights or send back-to-back groups: 
(Fb) No-one has the capacity to fill the hotel. First because it has 136 rooms 
and you cannot simply say `I give my hotel to a T. O. and I am covered'. 
Here, for better or worse, because it is not good to be dependent on one T. O. 
alone. In order to fill these 136 rooms, we need to deal with everybody. So 
we take whatever comes to us, provided that it is within the boundaries of 
our pricing policy. 
In some resort hotels (Cases H&C, ) the portfolio of partners is formed 
incrementally over time and, in a way, through random encounters. That is when a 
T. O. may be interested in that particular hotel and starts a trial partnership, which 
may prove to be long-term. In case H, for instance, there is no stable pattern in the 
composition of partners. It is a pattern that is formed through random encounters 
and mediated by the extent of cooperation with each partner. 
(Hb) This is relative; since we try to disperse our markets, we are open to 
everyone; we do not have the right of selection of partners. There is no fixed 
number... whoever passes by our hotel becomes a partner. There are some 
who negotiate some groups in the low season and some others who appear 
only in the high season. Each one takes its own share of the pie 
The results also confirm what was described in construct 8, a common recipe for 
choosing their portfolio of partners is to have at least one main supplier, which 
often is a major player in the tourism industry, and a sufficient number of peripheral 
partners to cover the gaps. That is despite the fact that a big player in the industry 
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would demand much lower contract rates from the hotel, which seems like a 
compromise when compared to the rates given to other peripheral suppliers. It is 
important, though, to avoid a clash of interests between the main suppliers of the 
hotel firm, which is achieved by having each one specialising in a different market. 
Allocation of rooms 
Room allocation always follows the rule of overbooking; whereby the managers 
overbook their hotel's room capacity, knowing that their suppliers would not 100% 
fulfill the contract. 
(Db) You always give a 30-35% more than the hotel's actual capacity 
because it is not possible to have 100% contract performance from all the 
suppliers at the same time. The probability is one in a million. Of course 
you retain your right to do stop sales when you are within the release period; 
they cannot say anything because as they do not guarantee that they will fill 
the rooms, the same way you are not obliged to keep these rooms. Only if 
we make a guarantee deal, lets say for 20-30 rooms and they hold them for 
the whole season and you get paid no matter if they bring any customers or 
not 
Over time though, two additional patterns can be seen in the allocation of rooms: 
- The allocation of rooms follows the contract performance 
- The allocation of rooms remains stable, as long as the suppliers retain their 
status as ̀ core' to the hotel's network 
The first is a logical action, as it is a direct consequence of the performance of the 
transactional relationship between the hotel and the supplier, although it does not 
appear to be the rule in the hotels of the sample (except the 4* resort hotel, case B). 
The second, on the other hand, appears to be dominant, where the allocation of 
rooms remains almost unchanged through the years, at least for the main partners of 
the hotel firm: 
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(Aa) It has remained the same. Only sporadically it happens that you give 
more rooms and take the risk but you hope for greater returns. However, we 
do not want to create problems in the big and stable suppliers; it is logical 
that in August they will request more rooms and they expect to make more 
profit that period. If you do not accommodate them during that period, they 
might create problems for you in the future. That is why we are careful on 
where we give priority. 
As the respondents explained, the formula is to give the main partners the number 
of rooms that will cover the hotel's capacity and overallot the peripheral partners. 
This practice endured because it allows the management to accommodate all its 
main partners at any given time. Consequently, it has to do with maintaining a 
symbiotic relationship with the suppliers, adding to what was presented in construct 
12. The managers would not only give priority to their main suppliers when 
allocating their hotel's room capacity, but also keep this allocation pattern stable 
over time in order to demonstrate their commitment to the partnership. 
Consequently, they would keep a stable room allocation pattern even if the contract 
performance is not as desired. In such cases, short-term benefits from opportunistic 
behaviour (i. e. exercising pressure by decreasing the allocation of rooms to the 
suppliers in order to get better contract terms) are outweighed by the long-term 
benefits of continued cooperation with the supplier. 
This stability in the allocation of rooms is also explained through the breadth of 
transactions with the suppliers. For instance, a large contract would ensure the 
inclusion of the hotel in more brochures; or perhaps on a main page. In case D, the 
manager replied that with a large contract, the T. O. would send eight of its own 
animateurs to the hotel. If the contract was smaller, the T. O. would not bring eight, 
but only two: 
(Db) It is also to get some extra services. For the T. O. in order to bring you 
6-7 animateur to the hotel, it has to be a big contract. If I give them 50 
rooms, they will not bring 8 animateurs, it will be costly, they will bring 2... 
in order to include you in their catalogue, you need to have a minimum 
allotment contract. If you want to be included in a main page you need to 
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have a very big contract. It depends on what you give them to sell and they 
promote you accordingly. For example the First Choice with which we had 
an allotment with 100 rooms it had our hotel in 2 catalogues. This year we 
are in 6 catalogues. This counts irrespectively of whether you sell the rooms 
or not; you just need to be there. 
For city hotels, on the other hand, the allocation of rooms is of little strategic value 
because of the nature of demand. There, the management may retain formal 
contracts with certain partners primarily to be able to be advertised in the T. Os 
brochure. This is done irrespective of contract performance. 
Revenue sources 
The respondents confirmed that the main revenue source for each hotel unit is room 
sales (except Case I). The rooms division, along with the food and beverage (F&B) 
departments, are also the major cost centres. Other minor revenue sources are also 
subject to negotiation with the suppliers. It is not uncommon, though, to see minor 
revenue sources be incorporated in the standard contract agreement: 
Hotel firms were expected to create new revenue sources when other revenue 
sources diminished. Even city hotels which lost a substantial part of their income as 
they gradually ceased to have a double identity as city-resort hotels (a result of the 
gradual decrease in the travellers' average stay; Section 7.4.2), did not create 
alternative revenue sources. Their response was to divert their focus to new 
markets, not necessarily at the level of departmental revenue sources. Case F is a 
typical example; from the beginning of the 1990s, the hotel had to deal with the 
gradual decrease of F&B sales, which followed the fall of the vacation tourism in 
city hotels: 
(Fa) Before 1991, when it was still like a resort hotel, it had a restaurant that 
served approximately 100 meals a day. Today, it is forced to maintain the 
restaurant, maybe with less staff, maybe half, when it had 4-5 people 
working in the restaurant for 100 meals, now it has 2 people for 10 meals. 
The staffing levels did not drop accordingly by 90%. 
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Even though the hotel needs the sales' volumes, it cannot expect any dramatic 
increase. The management has to conform to the circumstances. The continuous 
reinvestment, which started in 1996, was meant to enhance the attractiveness of the 
hotel product, not necessarily create new revenue sources for the business. 
In all cases, diminishing revenue sources are not enough to convince the 
management to take action. In order for action to be taken, decisions have to be 
reinforced by the hotel's network. For instance, the dissemination of success stories 
by other professionals in the industry creates an awareness of the potential of 
certain organisational actions; for example, cases A, D and H and some of those 
that changed their operation to all-inclusive resorts. None of them were initiators of 
the trend, but rather, imitators of other hotels' successful actions. The suppliers 
would prompt the manager to take such actions in order to increase their synergistic 
potential. It is observed that major changes have to be reinforced by both elements. 
From the managers' perspective, their commitment to action is rationalised by the 
belief that `potential payoffs will be on par with those of comparable hotels' and 
`they will manage to retain, or even improve, the collaboration with their suppliers'. 
7.5 Summary of findings 
In the context of this local hotel sector, the managers appear to concentrate on their 
relationship with their suppliers in order to achieve the desired standards of 
organisational performance. While the hotel managers' aim is simple: to keep the 
hotel full while selling rooms at the highest possible prices, they struck upon the 
fact that they cannot reach their markets with their own resources and thus, have to 
rely on their suppliers for that purpose. The suppliers, in turn, allow the hotels to 
draw from their resources (e. g. promotion, sales, transfers etc) and be represented in 
their market through them. 
It is this exchange of resources, however, that is problematic. The hotel firms have 
low negotiating power to make the suppliers fulfill their contract deals and are 
always subject to their manipulation. As a result, the hotel firms' strategies aim to 
196 
leverage their bargaining power in order to maintain and improve their 
performance. The managers' role is prevalent here, as they are found to be the 
custodian of their firms' reputation, which is the main resource they can trade with 
their suppliers. More specifically, the managers' build the hotel firms' reputation by 
developing a positive history of collaboration with the suppliers over the years, 
upon which they draw to command a smooth performance curve from their 
collaboration with the suppliers. This is something that manifests at all levels of 
inquiry in the findings. For example, the hotel managers would be receptive to their 
suppliers' requests regarding promotional offers (Construct 5) or allocating more 
rooms (Construct 12). In the analysis of organisational outcomes (Section 7.4.2), it 
was also found that the allocation of rooms for the core suppliers of the hotel firm 
remains stable over time, something which is used to demonstrate the hotel firm's 
commitment to the partnership; thus complementing the findings from the practice 
of contracting (Construct 9). Finally, the managers utilise this history of 
collaboration by drawing upon it in their transactions with the suppliers, something 
they achieve by retaining the exclusivity of their involvement in certain work duties 
in order to become the central figure through whom any external agents have to go 
in order to reach their hotel firm (Section 7.3.3). This enables them to negotiate, 
drawing upon their history of collaboration with their suppliers in every transaction 
they make. 
In addition to the above ̀ strategy of collaboration', the hotel managers make efforts 
to avoid transferring problems to their suppliers. This is evident in the problemistic 
orientation of their work activity (Section 7.3.3), whereby they actively search for 
problems in order to be able to detect them early on and resolve them `on the spot', 
so that they will not reach their suppliers. This action, however, starts from their 
choice of markets where they select those markets that are most compatible with 
their firm's capabilities (Construct 7), and thus, minimise potential problems in its 
operation. The same internal focus appears in the managers' constructs (Construct 
6), where they build their reputation in the market, concentrating on doing in-house 
promotion. In turn, this helps them build a loyal customer base, and lowers the 
resource requirements they need to draw from their suppliers. Both the 'strategy of 
collaboration' and this `strategy of minimum disruption' aim to give value to the 
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hotel firms' offering; a value which is always relative to the partners of the hotel 
firm. 
One last element in the hotel managers' efforts to leverage their firms' bargaining 
power is their continuous struggle to maintain the balance of power between their 
firm and its suppliers. For that, they employ a `strategy of negotiation', whereby 
they negotiate the exchange of their hotel firms' resources. The main tool they have 
for this purpose is the contract (Construct 9); or more specifically, the contracts 
they have with their suppliers, which they use as a resource. While contracts alone 
cannot ensure the suppliers' collaboration, they serve to demonstrate their 
commitment to their partnership and are also used as a rule of thumb for future 
deals. The hotel managers protect their contract and they even go as far as 
compromising their peripheral revenue sources by incorporating them in the 
contract deal (Construct 14 & Section 7.4.2) in order to maintain or improve their 
contract rates. Negotiations of the contracts are based on expectations about market 
demand, something the hotel managers cannot perform accurately, as they are in a 
peripheral network position. In addition, they are subject to receiving second-hand, 
distorted information from their suppliers. More specifically, their suppliers are 
likely to manipulate the information environment (Section 7.3.2) by withholding 
critical information (i. e. bookings status) in order to create an artificial climate of 
uncertainty. In this manner, they force the hotels to give promotional offers so they 
are in an unfavourable position when it comes to negotiate the contracts of the next 
season. The hotel managers try to avoid such `tricks of the trade' by engaging in 
periodic practices demanding information (Section 7.3.4), and focus on indicators 
intrinsic to their firm (Construct 11), which help them to predict the demand for 
their hotel product based on their history of collaboration with the suppliers. 
Finally, they may choose to delay the contracting (Section 7.3.4) in the prospect of 
more favourable developments in the market. 
The findings presented in this chapter strongly support the case that was made in 
the literature review that the managers' contribution to strategy is not only bounded 
within context, but also linked to their everyday activity and practices. The nature 
of the hotel managers' contribution is certainly related to the specificities of the 
local context, which represents an institutional environment whereby the hotel 
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managers face some common problems/issues and have specific tools at their 
disposal to deal with them. Consequently, they develop distinctive strategies, which 
are commonly accepted as being typical for competitiveness in this context. The 
development of those strategies is, however, inseparable from their everyday 
activity, which sets the scene for the achievement of the desired outcomes in a 
piecemeal and incremental manner. In turn, the pursuit of these outcomes can be 
traced through the patterns of organisational action over time. These results further 
demonstrate that, from the researchers' standpoint, the managers' contribution to 
the strategy of their firm is interwoven along multiple levels. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws together key points from the findings of the study and relates them 
back to the literature in order to provide an answer to the research question. In 
particular, section 8.2 gives the background of the context within which the managers' 
contribution can be understood. It is explained that hotel firms are disadvantaged, 
being fragmented; in a saturated sector; equipped with an undifferentiated product and 
ultimately reliant upon their suppliers to reach their markets. As the hotel firms do not 
have any valuable resources to trade with their suppliers, they try to develop value- 
generating strategies. In turn, value-generating strategies are developed through the 
management of the intangible resources of the firm (Section 8.2.1), and by building a 
positive history of collaboration with the suppliers (Section 8.2.2); however, their 
capacity to develop value-generating strategies is always negotiated with their 
suppliers, described here as the `power game' (Section 8.2.3). Section 8.3 furthe r 
demonstrates how the hotel managers contribute to the maintenance and development 
of value-generating strategies through their everyday activity. Going back to the 
conceptualisation of the managers' contribution to strategy, section 8.4 explains how 
the hotel managers deal with uncertainty, concluding with an integrative framework 
that encapsulates the managers' contribution in the local hotel sector (Section 8.5). 
8.2 The hotel managers' contribution to the strategy of the firm 
The findings illustrate that the hotel managers' role is simple, with their aim being to 
keep the hotel full at the highest possible prices (Section 7.2). Their role, however, is 
limited by the nature of the business. The owners' influence is evident in the 
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independent hotels of the sample, which display idiosyncratic growth patterns 
(Constructs 1&2). Hotel business is locally confined within the locus of control of the 
owners, relegating the managers' role to optimising the performance of the hotel unit; 
therefore, their contribution to the strategy of the firm is defined by how they achieve 
optimisation of its performance. 
When speaking of optimising the hotel firms' performance, one has to acknowledge 
that hotel firms are, in general terms, at a competitive disadvantage within the industry. 
An industrial economics inspired competitive analysis a la Porter (1985) would 
confirm that for the hotels of the sample. Hotels are the last link in the supply chain of 
the travel and tourism industry, and to generate sales they require the collaborative 
action of other mediating organisations. Furthermore, a hotel unit on its own does not 
have the resources to reach its markets, that is, in terms of promotion or distribution. 
For those, they are reliant upon mediating organisations, T. As/T. Os that organise and 
distribute travel packages, and take responsibility for promoting the hotels. While all 
this reduces much of the uncertainty in the hotel firms' operation, the collaborative 
relationship with their suppliers is by no means balanced. The fragmentation of the 
hotel firms in the sector does not allow any single firm to become a significant player. 
The local sector accounts for approximately 3,000 hotels, whereas the major suppliers 
of the sector are a handful of T. Os. So, while the hotels are in a state of almost perfect 
competition with each other, the supply side is more of an oligopoly. 
Another feature of the local hotel sector is its saturation, where the managers have to 
deal with increasing competitive pressures. We see that the accommodation offer has 
kept increasing over years, despite the stagnant demand (Region of Crete, 2002). This 
has resulted in a gradual decrease of the hotel firms' sales, manifested primarily as the 
phenomenon of seasonality (the shrinking of the operating season; see Section 7.4.1). 
The impact, however, is more evident in certain types of hotels (Section 7.2.4); in this 
sample, those on the south axis of the island and also the lower category hotels (hotels 
on the periphery of the market) are not favoured by the suppliers and/or the consumers, 
pushing them to the margin. 
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In this context, hotel firms remain undifferentiated in their majority, being unable to 
secure an edge based on their offering alone. Normally, firms can secure a competitive 
edge when they consistently produce product/delivery systems with attributes which 
correspond to the key buying criteria for the majority of the customers in their targeted 
market (Gilbert and Strebel, 1989). These attributes, which will include price, quality, 
aesthetics, functionality, availability, image etc, will be offered in a package which 
optimises the ratio of perceived value: delivered cost. In the local hotel sector, such a 
competitive edge simply cannot be achieved through the attributes of their offering 
alone. Their undifferentiated offering and the fragmented nature of the sector do not 
help them to achieve any notable standing in the market, making them easy to 
substitute with other offerings. 
Being in a fragmented, saturated sector and equipped with an undifferentiated product, 
hotel firms can only achieve a relative standing in the market through the support of 
their suppliers, from which they can draw resources and reach their market/s. On the 
other hand, they do not possess any rare, unique, inimitable or non-substitutable 
resource to trade, restraining their strategic capability (see Barney, 1991: 105). As a 
result, the managers' challenge is to secure the suppliers' collaboration, by making the 
hotel firm's offering valuable to the suppliers. 
Given the common and undifferentiated nature of their firms' offering, the hotel 
managers develop value-generating strategies (Section 7.5), focusing not on what they 
offer but on how they offer it in order to draw resources from other mediating 
organisations and reach their markets. Knowing that the tangible product/price aspects 
of their hotel firm's offering cannot warrant them any competitive edge in the context 
of the local hotel sector, they focus on the intangible aspects of their cooperation and 
delivery of their service to the suppliers. A characteristic of those intangible resources 
is that they are unpriced, meaning that pricing does not serve in their allocation 
(Lippman and Rumelt, 2003). This way, the managers avoid using the firm's innate 
resources to compete in the open market, but instead use those intangible resources that 
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exist in relation to external agents in the industry. 
8.2.1 Managing intangible resources 
Previously, I argued that the managers focus on their firms' intangible resources to 
leverage their otherwise low strategic capability. Their focus, in particular, is not so 
much on what their firm offers, as the fact that their firm's offering is one of many 
other undifferentiated hotel products in the market. Therefore, trying to create value by 
trading the tangible aspects of their firm's offering (product/pricing) is ineffective, as 
the scarcity of the offered resource is the necessary precondition for the creation of 
value (Barney, 1991). Instead, they place an emphasis on how they offer their hotel 
product, on the basis of. the long-term symbiotic relationship with their suppliers 
(Construct 12), which is exemplified by the continuity of the formal contracts between 
them (Section 7.4.2). Furthermore, they highlight their firm's reputation (Constructs 7, 
12 & 13) and, at the same time, maintain a network of contacts within the industry, in 
order to protect and exploit their resources (Construct 10). The above intangible 
resources can be considered assets owned by the hotel firm, which are managed, 
maintained, and exploited by the managers. 
Contracts 
Contracts serve to create a formal partnership between the hotel firm and the supplier. 
A typical contract between a hotel and a supplier would create a formal commitment to 
allot a number of rooms at an agreed price (and a package of services that goes with it), 
when requested. Either party, however, is allowed not to fulfil its commitments, as long 
as it has given the appropriate notice (specified by the release period in the contract). 
Nonetheless, the value of the contract does not lie in the creation of obligations for 
each party to deliver. By establishing a formal partnership through the contract, the 
managers are able to legitimise the negotiation of the resource exchange. While the 
hotel firm does not have any rare or unique resources to trade, the managers can use the 
contract to demonstrate their firm's commitment to the partnership with its suppliers. 
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Section 7.4.2 of the findings shows that the managers maintain the same portfolio of 
main suppliers, allotting them a number of rooms that remains stable over time, 
disregarding the performance of the contract. Furthermore, the managers can negotiate 
on the basis of past contract performance and their commitment to the partnership, 
commanding a continuity of performance over time. Provided that there is a positive 
history of collaboration (Constructs 12 & 13), they would be able to demand an equal 
commitment of resources from the suppliers. 
Reputation 
Reputation is an asset the managers seek to develop and exploit, because it 
compensates for the insufficient value of the hotel firms' tangible (based on 
product/price) resources. Similarly, it has to be managed to avoid turning into a 
negative reputation and thus, a liability for the firm. Reputation is inimitable in the 
sense that it is built over years of operational competence. It is, however, equifinal as 
hotel firms can achieve a positive reputation in different ways. There are two domains 
within which reputation is built: the industry and the market (see Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990). 
In the firms of the sample, we see that reputation is built by working with the same 
markets for years (Section 7.4.2), those that are most compatible with the hotel firm's 
competencies (Construct 7), even if they are not the most profitable for them. If they 
sacrifice compatibility over profitability, they would have to deal with a more complex 
operation, e. g. by offering a richer or more diverse hotel product. Narrowing their base 
down to a limited number of particular customers or groups of similar customers 
reduces complexity by limiting the number of resources needed in delivering value to 
customers (Lowendahl and Revang, 2004). This contributes to a clear focus, 
consistency over time, and a gradually improving reputation. 
The managers also concentrate heavily on in-house promotion (Construct 6), with the 
intention of developing a loyal customer base. In turn, that loyal customer base, seen as 
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the current of repeat customers, can become a tangible resource that can be traded with 
the suppliers. 
(Db) there was a time we had 20% repeater customers in the hotel. This was 
very convenient for our partners, as they were getting `ready made' clientele. 
Till last year, we had a contract with Neckerman. Neckerman left the area and 
we substituted its contract with AirTours. AirTours found a ready-made 
clientele because we are working with the German market for 20 years... so our 
new partner covered a 40-45% of its allotment contract with our repeater 
customers 
In the domain of the industry, reputation is developed in terms of the hotel firm's 
history of collaboration with the suppliers. The history of collaboration is 
consecutively affected by the extent to which the hotel firm permits the suppliers to 
draw from its resources (i. e. rooms on demand; Construct 12) and on the extent to 
which the management responds to the suppliers' requests (Construct 5). 
(Hb) if I see a partner of mine being affected by something and his sales from 
25,30,40 bookings a day have dropped to 5,1 will find out what is going on; 
and of course it is always a promotional offer that helps the supplier 
Reputation in the domain of the industry can be cashed when it is preceded by a 
positive history of collaboration between the firm and the supplier, in which case the 
supplier may promote the hotel: 
(Aa) I may have a better hotel than my neighbour, offering more facilities and 
services, whereas my neighbour may try do cut corners here and there. Even if 
we have the same prices, my neighbour may sell better than me if he has a 
better relationship with the T. A. 
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Network 
The managers' network embodies their social capital (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005), which 
represents their ability to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks 
(Burt, 1997; Coleman, 1988). The existence of a network of external agents, with 
whom the managers liaise, compensates for the hotel firms' peripheral network 
position and extends their degree of control outside the organisational boundaries. 
Construct 10 shows how network interaction is embedded in organisational routines for 
the same purpose. By building a network involving a diverse set of actors within the 
industry, they minimise the search costs for critical information (i. e. level of demand, 
bookings status, group bookings). 
The value of the network is best shown when the managers receive offerings for group 
bookings. Group travel packages are isolated, irregular offerings; as such, the hotel is 
only part of the package, and because of their irregular nature, they are not included in 
the contract agreement with the hotel. Therefore, the choice of the hotel lies with the 
supplier. Usually, the suppliers call for a bid from a range of hotels they consider 
suitable to complement the package, or inform specific hotels with which they 
frequently liaise. So, if the hotel managers invest in their network, they can expect to 
be given privileges by their counterparts: 
(Aa) I received a call in April from a T. A. I know very well, who informed me 
about a group booking. He said ̀ Michael, I have a group booking and an offer 
from the ... Hotel. If you can match it, the group 
is yours'... See, it is primarily 
a matter of knowing people in the industry and not just about your hotel 
product' 
The usefulness of the network also lies in avoiding what the professionals in the 
industry call `tricks of the trade'. The most noteworthy example here is of the bigger 
suppliers purposely avoiding informing the hotels about their bookings status in order 
to force a renegotiation of their contracts or give promotional offers. In other instances, 
the bigger suppliers may even block the bookings of the hotels in a certain region in 
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order to promote their packages in other geographical regions. According to the hotel 
managers, this is mediated by maintaining contacts with the T. Os employees at various 
hierarchical levels: 
(Eb) it is necessary to keep in touch with them and especially with those 
responsible for the bookings. A good relationship with those who handle the 
bookings can give you access to information you cannot get otherwise. 
8.2.2 Developing a history of collaboration 
Managing intangible resources is important in order to create value-generating 
strategies for the hotel firm. The essence of the managers' effort, however, is to draw 
resources from mediating organisations, in the absence of a firm's capabilities to reach 
their markets directly. A prerequisite for doing that is to establish a history of 
collaboration with the suppliers. Contracts are the first step for forging a history of 
collaboration, which in turn become the basis for building the hotel firm's reputation in 
the industry. 
According to the respondents, conforming to the suppliers' requests (Constructs 5,8,9, 
12 & 13) is one common way to build a positive history of collaboration. At the same 
time, however, the hotel managers employ a tactical pattern of actions in order to 
support their efforts. In the eyes of the external observer, this pattern of actions may 
even seem irrational. For instance, the stability in the hotels' portfolio of partners 
(Section 7.4.2) contradicts their need to diversify their investment; the inelastic 
allocation of rooms which does not follow contract performance (Section 7.4.2); and 
the tolerance allowances with regards to the obligations of their partnering 
organisations (Construct 13), do not appear to be the result of rational decision making. 
When looked within the context of developing a history of collaboration, however, 
their contribution as value-generating elements for the hotel firm is apparent. 
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Demonstrating the hotel firm's loyalty to its partners 
The hotel firms' loyalty to their partners, expressed by the continuation of their 
relationship (Section 7.4.2), contradicts the need to diversify their portfolio of partners 
and spread the risk of low performing contractual relationships. While this 
predisposition for retaining their existing portfolio can be justified because suppliers 
are `few and recyclable' (Construct 8), it also serves to maintain continuity in the 
transaction history between the two parties. In turn, this offers the management 
predictability of performance, something which is achieved only by maintaining a 
long-term partnership: 
(Aa) I have to go back and see the performance of the contracts of a specific 
agent for the past years... I cannot compare it with the neighbouring hotel, 
because they have other variables there. I want to see the sales predisposition of 
my product 
(Ca) It is not good for us if we change our partners frequently. We need to 
maintain at least a `core'. You see, we can easily approach a long-term partner 
and talk about things like the low level of sales in May, whereas a new one 
would dismiss us saying that it is because of the low demand for our product. 
Our long-term partner simply cannot do that because there are previous sales 
data and certainly because we have a history together 
Giving allowances to their partners to fulfill their commitments 
Construct 13 showed that the hotel managers have tolerance allowances with regards to 
chronic low performance of the hotel firm's partners or even their partners' non- 
fulfillment of their financial obligations. It is common with peripheral suppliers, for 
instance, to delay their outstanding accounts with the hotel, sometimes for over a year. 
The managers would not only allow this practice but, in some cases, they would even 
write off their suppliers' debt. The managers may not have to deal with the same issue 
with the big players but they would accept their chronic low contract performance 
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without responding accordingly by allocating them fewer rooms (Section 7.4.2). 
The tolerance allowances described above are, however, taken into account in the 
history of collaboration between the hotel and the supplier. The managers treat those 
allowances as favours, which can be materialised in the form of resources and 
favourable contract terms from their partners. For instance, by maintaining a stable 
room allocation over time towards the big suppliers, the managers maintain a sizeable 
formal contract, which necessitates a higher level of support from the supplier. As the 
manager of the 4* south resort hotel explains: 
(Db) It depends on what you give them to sell and they promote you 
accordingly. If you want to be included in their brochures and in the main page 
you need to have a very big contract. For example First Choice with which we 
had an allotment with 100 rooms it had our hotel in 2 catalogues. This year, 
when we have a 220-room allotment contract and we are in 6 catalogues... It is 
also to get some extra services. For the T. O., in order to bring you 6-7 
animateurs to the hotel, there needs to be a big contract. If I give them 50 
rooms, they will not bring 8 animateurs, it will be costly, they will bring 2 
Preferential treatment of the big suppliers 
The managers typically give preferential treatment to the big suppliers who have a 
contractual relationship with their hotel firm. As seen in section 7.4.2, the managers 
allocate a number of rooms equal to their room capacity to the big suppliers, a pattern 
that remains stable over time, disregarding the performance of their partnership. Those 
suppliers will typically require more rooms in the high season and the management 
would give them priority (Construct 12). In addition, the big suppliers get consistently 
much lower contract rates compared to the peripheral suppliers. 
While this tactic denotes a stance of conformity, it helps the hotel firm develop the 
capacity to be of value for the suppliers it needs the most. A hotel is replaceable for a 
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supplier, whereas a core supplier is not. In this context, the acceptance of the low 
contract price the big suppliers offer is logical: 
(Eb) I have taken that increase from everyone except TUI but we knew that in 
advance. I do not want to lose TUI or Vacances Heliades... even if I lose all the 
other T. As I would not mind, or lets say I would be disappointed but I can 
replace them. I know of course that they will not leave me but I cannot fight 
TUI. 
At the same time, the managers ensure that the firm has the capacity to accommodate 
them when requested. In the high season, it is expected that all the suppliers will 
request more rooms and even fulfil 100% of their allocated rooms. By cumulatively 
allocating a number of rooms equal to their room capacity to their core suppliers, the 
managers make sure that they are able to respond to the requests of their core suppliers. 
The inevitable risks from overbooking their room capacity can be passed to their 
peripheral suppliers with little consequence, especially when those peripheral suppliers 
have received allowances in terms of fulfilling their financial obligations to the hotel: 
(Aa) ... we do not want to create problems to the big and stable suppliers. In 
August they will request more rooms and they expect to make more profit that 
period. If we do not accommodate them during that period, they might create 
problems for us in the future. That is why we are careful on where we give 
priority 
8.2.3 The Power game 
The hotel managers' ability to achieve a desirable outcome for their firms is dependent 
on the collaboration of their suppliers. By cultivating the bond with their suppliers, 
they seek to negotiate and control the extent of their collaboration. In Giddens' (1979: 
92-3) terms, they engage in a relationship of power, whereby they try to secure 
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outcomes depending on the agency of others. 
The power relation between hotels and suppliers can be understood by the need of each 
party to secure predictable behaviour from their counterpart (see Crozier and Friedberg, 
1980). As shown in section 8.2.2, the hotel managers employ a range of tactics to lock 
their firm's suppliers into a predictable behavioural path, based on their history of 
collaboration. It is not common, for instance, to drop the amount of sales they generate 
for hotels with which they have a long and positive history of collaboration without 
good reason. Section 7.4.1 of the findings demonstrated that one such reason is the 
state of the economic climate in tourist markets, something which is beyond the scope 
of the bond between the hotel firm and the supplier. In all other circumstances, though, 
the suppliers are entangled within the boundaries of their bond with the hotel firms. 
Thus, they are expected to collaborate and not make use of the hotel's resources 
unilaterally. 
While the suppliers' behaviour cannot deviate from the expectations derived from their 
history of collaboration with their partners, they manipulate the image of the market 
they portray, which is beyond the hotel firms' reach (Construct 10). By doing so, they 
create an artificial climate of uncertainty, which works to their advantage. As Crozier 
and Friedberg (1980: 52) say, the one who controls a source of uncertainty will make 
use of this power to increase his advantage over others. In this study, the suppliers are 
found to often create such a climate of uncertainty by withholding or manipulating 
information reflecting their own interests and not the actual facts: 
(Db) The suppliers always try to promote their own interests... they may even 
block the sales of our hotel by simply blocking the reservations in the system 
and show it as fully booked. This has occurred quite a few times. I have 
received calls from old customers who tell me that they were trying to book 
through Neckermann and they tell them that we are fully booked while I have 
ample availability. 
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(Aa) ... sometimes you will see that deliberately they will not inform us of the 
current status of the bookings in order to push us to give an offer. 
What the suppliers gain by nurturing this uncertainty is to force the hotels to take 
actions (seasonal promotions, lower contract rates for the next season etc) that are 
favourable to themselves. If the hotel firm succumbs to such pressures, it would lower 
its bargaining power, and it would affect the managers' capacity to deliver their firm's 
services on their own terms. In this sense, the manipulative use of the suppliers' power 
has a transformative effect on their bond: 
(Ia) ... if you start giving promotional offers then you will have to do it again 
because the T. A. will say ̀ you gave a special offer in June, give one in July as 
well'... If you do it you are looking for trouble because you provoke them to 
use their usual tactics... if you remain quiet then at least they do not have such 
requests. 
(Ba) Bear also in mind that if you give offers during the season and then you go 
to sign contracts with the T. A., what can you claim then? The T. A. would say 
`why do you keep asking for higher rates? If you cannot sell with your current 
rates and you give promotional offers, what do you expect for the next year? ' 
Even in such cases, the managers protect the most basic intangible resource of their 
firm, their contracts. As construct 9 shows, pricing agreements within the contracts are 
intended to flow in only one direction, disregarding the status of demand. Even if all 
circumstances indicate a negative climate for the next season, the contract rates will not 
decrease. This indicates the managers' avoidance of renegotiating the terms of their 
commitment, maintaining their capacity to negotiate a better deal in the future, even if 
it is not possible in the present situation. 
The power game shows how the hotel managers' efforts to create value for their firms' 
product offering are negotiated with their suppliers. While the managers seek to 
develop their bond with the suppliers in order to gain predictable behaviour from them 
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and secure desired outcomes for their firm, the suppliers resist displaying predictable 
behaviour in order to increase their bargaining power. We saw that the predictability of 
their behaviour is governed by a `ceteris paribus' condition, that is if all other constants 
remain the same, constants that are beyond the bond between the supplier and the hotel 
firm. By changing these constants, the suppliers are able to break through the 
boundaries of their bond with the hotels. 
8.3 Strategising in practice 
So far, I have explained that the managers' contribution lies in the development of 
value generating strategies, which aim to leverage their firms' strategic capability, 
taking into consideration that the hotel firms in this context are at disadvantage. In 
short, the hotel firms' disadvantages originate from the fact that they have to rely on 
mediating organisations, their suppliers, in relation to which they have low bargaining 
power. The hotel managers appear to have a shared, common knowledge on how to 
deal with the uncertainties of their environment. In particular, they focus on the 
development of intangible resources (see Section 8.2.1), which are brought into play 
through the bond with the suppliers (see Section 8.2.2). 
According to the findings of the study, the managers' common knowledge on how to 
deal with these uncertainties also becomes empirical, just as was suggested in the 
review of the literature (Section 4.3). Through their activity, they purposely support the 
development and maintenance of those value generating strategies by creating and 
manipulating resources and assets `in-house', which they use in their resource 
exchange with the suppliers. Their approach is different from that frequently cited in 
the strategy literature (see Galbraith and Stiles, 1984; Harrigan, 1985,1986; Michael, 
2000; Porter, 1980; Thompson, 1967), which focuses on market solutions (i. e. mergers 
and vertical integration) as the main sources of leveraging the bargaining power of 
firms. Instead, there is a greater similarity to the work of authors who recognise the 
role of managers in commanding critical resources and managing social relations with 
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their counterparts (see Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1992; 
Hardy, 1996; Child, 1972,1997; Pfeffer and Fong, 2005). 
The following examples illustrate how the managers' common knowledge becomes 
empirical and is manifested in their everyday practice by using the three forms of 
output generated by the managers' activity: the need to maintain consistency in the 
delivery of service; to protect the hotel firm's reputation; and to develop a capacity to 
negotiate the exchange of their firm's resources with the suppliers. 
Developing a tradeable resource by maintaining consistency 
Beginning with the hotel managers' need to maintain consistency, we can see that it 
targets a specific source of uncertainty, which is necessitated by the nature of their 
firms' offering. The offering, being service-based, cannot be standardised and therefore 
requires a higher level of coordination from the entire service delivery process (Argote, 
1982). Customers of service-based firms do not purchase a product, but the production 
process itself (Skaggs and Huffman, 2003). This suggests a heightened level of client- 
firm interaction in the production processes of service firms. As a result, the hotel 
managers focus their attention on this area, which is critical to their firms' operation: 
(Hb) I want to make sure that our customers receive what we are supposed to 
offer as a hotel. I am not talking just about the number of services; these cannot 
be quantified. I am talking about the whole experience they get by staying in 
this hotel... I am very close to my staff members and that is for a reason. I need 
to know that they can offer this experience to our customers... It is not me who 
interacts with the customers, it is my staff... What we achieve is a respectable 
percentage of repeater customers... 
The above response also typifies the hotel managers' efforts for in-house promotion 
(Construct 6), which aims to develop a loyal customer base. Over time, this tactic 
improves their reputation in the market, achieving outcomes; a repeat clientele and a 
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tangible resource they can trade with their suppliers. As a result, the strategic outcome 
of the hotel managers' efforts to maintain consistency is the increase of their `margin of 
liberty' (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980), making their firm less dependent on the 
suppliers' resources, and thus, leveraging their strategic capability. 
Ensuring their counterparts' predictability of behaviour by protecting their firms' 
reputation 
The hotel managers' efforts to protect the reputation of their firm are reflected clearly 
in the problemistic orientation of their activity, whereby they concentrate on 
minimising the problems that may occur in the hotel and be transferred to their 
suppliers. The manager of the 4* resort hotel described it appropriately: 
(Ba) it is very problematic for a T. O. if the tour rep sends them every week a 
report with 10-15 complaints, because then they need to have 2 people just for 
dealing with that hotel alone; not counting the legal issues they have to be 
concerned with as the customers claim their money back. Therefore the T. O. 
favours the hotel product which has the predisposition to sell without problems 
In order to do so, the hotel managers adopt activity patterns that help them identify 
problems in their genesis. This is exemplified by the routine patterns of their activity 
(i. e. the routine observational tours at times and locations where problems are more 
likely to occur, and the routine check of the reservations to avoid overbooking) which 
are driven by the need to resolve problems on the spot and not leave them to 
perpetuate. By doing so, the hotel managers protect their firms' reputation in the 
industry. The strategic outcome of their efforts is that they maintain the `ceteris 
paribus' conditions of their collaboration with their suppliers (Section 8.2.3); thus, 
maintaining predictability of behaviour from their partnering suppliers. 
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Capitalising on their history of collaboration by developing a capacity to negotiate 
Lastly, the hotel managers' effort to develop a capacity to negotiate the exchange of 
their firm's resources with the suppliers (Section 7.3.3) is driven by their need to 
leverage their firms' bargaining power. This is an output they achieve by preserving 
some of their work duties (Section 7.3.2); in particular, the handling of reservations 
and enquiries. At the same time, they keep the knowledge and expertise they possess 
esoteric and inaccessible to others. This is a political move to become a central figure 
in the hotel's operation, and serves to make them the only medium through which the 
suppliers can reach the firm. By doing so, the hotel managers are able to draw upon 
their history of collaboration (Constructs 12 & 13) with the suppliers, of which they 
possess exclusive knowledge. The strategic outcome of this purposeful political 
behaviour is that it enables the hotel managers to capitalise upon their h istory of 
collaboration with the suppliers, through which they can leverage their firms' 
bargaining power. 
8.3.1 Temporality and practices 
Previously, it was shown how value-generating strategies are maintained and 
developed by the managers in their everyday practice. In particular, based on the 
observation of their work activity in real time, I demonstrated how they manipulate 
assets and resources in-house to leverage their firms' bargaining power, and 
subsequently, their strategic capability. 
The managers' real time observation, however, tends to emphasise the introverted 
nature of their work (Section 7.3.2) and not their interaction with the external 
environment. While the managers do interact with the external environment, this is not 
shown in the real time observation of their activity, but rather in the temporal cycle of 
their work. The hotel managers' work, as shown in their yearly work cycle (Section 
7.3.4), follows a cyclical, recurrent pattern, making their input more variable than their 
observed work activity would suggest. Within that temporal pattern, the managers 
follow a relatively predictable action repertoire (see Figure 4), which is a consequence 
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of the hotel firm's repertoire of structural poses: the continuous and routine pattern 
during the tourist season, the transitional end of season, the renewal of the business 
during the off season, and the regrouping at the start of season. In this temporal cycle, 
the managers are found to engage in boundary spanning practices, through which they 
interact with the external environment. Such periodic, recursive practices are common 
in organisations (Clark, 2000; Cohen et al, 1996); however, they are not readily 
observable because they cannot be reduced to any single, isolated activity. They rather 
consist of bundles of activities which, if taken altogether, comprise practices not seen 
through the eyes of the external observer, as they depend upon the managers' tacit 
knowledge (Turner, 1994). As shown in section 7.3.4, these practices demonstrate the 
more outward oriented nature of their work, comprising boundary-spanning activities 
which purposely aim to influence elements of the external environment. Thus, through 
this lens, the managers bear more resemblance to Child's (1972) image of powerful 
actors within the firm, wh o can interact and exercise power over elements of the 
external environment. Some characteristic examples are given below: 
Controlling the timing of contracting: A tool for leveraging the managers' negotiating 
power 
Contracting is an institutionalised practice that takes place during the tourist season and 
serves to legitimise the resource exchange between the hotel and its suppliers. While 
the managers generally have little bargaining power, given the common and 
undifferentiated nature of their hotel product, they try to improve their negotiating 
position by controlling the timing of contracting. Frequently, the respondents noted the 
characteristic delay of the contracting from the hotels' side as a means of improving 
their negotiating position: 
(Eb) The hotel managers' association knew that the season was not going to be 
rosy but they were not quite sure. It is always better for the hotelier to sign later 
because they would have a better picture of the season, the results and the 
performance of the contracts 
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This delay gives them the necessary time allowance for the hotel managers to assess 
the market situation as the season progresses and use it as the basis for the negotiation 
of the contracts. This is also related to the preference the hotel managers give to 
intrinsic indicators to assess the demand from the market (Construct 11), taking into 
account that the suppliers will manipulate the information and not give them the full 
picture in order to create an artificial climate of uncertainty and use it to their 
advantage (Section 8.2.3). 
Using the Tuesday tour to maintain network interaction 
The Tuesday tour encapsulates the process of network interaction, in an effort to 
compensate for the scarce information environment of the hotel firms (Construct 10). 
As shown in Construct 10, it has become an institutionalised routine and maintains the 
same form, even though it has not got much practical purpose anymore and, in the eyes 
of an external observer, it may even seem irrational. Nonetheless, it allows the 
managers ̀to see and be seen' and nurture the interpersonal element with their supplier. 
One practicality of this routine is to provide the context for the hotel managers to liase 
with key actors within the supplying organisations, who may give them valuable 
information. Those key actors are often lower ranked employees who, unlike senior 
management, do not know about the supplier's `backstage' policies and are therefore 
much more penetrable to the hotel managers' status requests. By doing so, the hotel 
managers can cancel out the suppliers' tricks, which aim to create an artificial climate 
of uncertainty: 
(Hb) We receive calls from people who want to inquire about our room 
availability. They often inform us that the T. A. abroad tells them that we are 
fully booked and that they cannot book a room in our hotel. This is a common 
trick the T. Os (who provide the information and often control the T. As) use to 
channel the demand to other destinations or resorts that are more profitable to 
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them... That is why I frequently make requests about my hotel's bookings 
status; not to the bosses, they are not going to give me the real picture, but those 
front line employees who deal with the bookings... 
Reaching the market by participating in tourism exhibitions 
Hotel managers often participate in a number of international tourism exhibitions at 
fixed periods during the year (Construct 6& Section 7.3.4), seeing it as a way of 
reaching their markets with their own resources and not through the resources of their 
suppliers. In the past, this practice brought them tangible benefits in terms of direct 
sales to customers. As the nature of tourism exhibitions changed following the change 
of distribution channels in more recent years, this practice has been reassessed and 
adapted to the new market environment. For some managers, this change diminished 
any benefits they were receiving from their participation in tourism exhibitions. The 
manager of the 4* south resort hotel explains that they gradually reduced their presence 
in those international exhibitions. Since they cannot reach their markets and generate 
sales, they receive no tangible returns and therefore they have no incentive to maintain 
a strong presence in the exhibitions. This choice, however, has to do with the 
capabilities of the hotel firm. On the contrary, the manager of the 4* resort hotel 
participates in no less than four international exhibitions every year. Having 
maintained its position at the centre of the market, the 4* resort hotel is attractive to 
both suppliers and customers. That is why the benefit of liaising with suppliers is 
enough to warrant such an investment and maintain the practice. 
Controlling the structural pose of the hotel to demonstrate commitment to their 
partners 
As seen in section 7.3.4, the hotel managers' annual work cycle, the nature and pace of 
managerial activity, is roughly divided into two time periods, the on/tourist season and 
the off season. In the on/tourist season, the managers deal with the routine, day-to-day 
issues as described in the observation, whereas in the off season they are primarily 
219 
concerned with the renewal of the hotel. The commencement of each period depends 
on the level of demand and it is ultimately the choice of the manager. The manager's 
choice of transposing the opening or closing dates of the hotel does not only affect the 
nature and pace of its own activity, but also the structural pose of the hotel firm, which 
in turn affects its collaboration with the suppliers. A hotel unit that remains open can 
accommodate all the bookings of the T. A. /T. O. whereas, if closed, it would require 
additional effort from the supplier/s to distribute those bookings elsewhere. Therefore, 
the manager can choose to keep the hotel open for longer and feed the symbiotic 
relationship with the suppliers (see also Construct 12): 
(Hb) ... It is also a matter of being good to our suppliers. 
Instead of asking our 
suppliers to transpose the bookings at a later date and take the customers to 
other hotels, we would rather open earlier and help our suppliers accommodate 
those bookings. 
(Aa) ... when the flow is not what it's supposed to be... I will 
inform the T. As 
that we close the hotel at that particular date. Since the T. As have other 
alternatives they don't care much if I close earlier 15-20 days let's say, but if 
there are 500 people they have to take to other hotels, they won't like it 
IS THIS SOMETHING YOU COULDN'T DO IN THE PAST? 
No 
WHAT HAPPENED THEN? 
That time we stayed open even if there were five guests in the hotel 
8.4 Dealing with uncertainty 
My conceptualisation of the managers' contribution to strategy suggests that it is 
defined when managers deal with uncertainty. Here, I decompose the process by which 
they deal with uncertainty; firstly, by concentrating on selected elements of the external 
environment, focusing on what matters most, and secondly, by transposing uncertainty 
from the external environment to a more controllable domain. 
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8.4.1 Concentrating on selected elements of the external environment 
The hotel managers' focus of attention is evidently on their suppliers, which, as 
mediating organisations, can allow the hotel firm to reach its market. The suppliers 
possess critical resources that the hotel firm does not, and the hotel managers need to 
leverage their firm's strategic capability to secure their suppliers collaboration and 
draw resources from them. Taking into account that a hotel firm can approach a limited 
number of suppliers due to its finite capacity to accommodate their demand for rooms, 
we can infer that it can also reach a limited part of the market, the part that can only be 
accessed through the supplier. While the market is a domain largely beyond the reach 
of the hotel firm, it is possible for the managers to control parts of it through their 
relationship with the suppliers, which is manageable. 
Section 7.4.1 demonstrates this process of cognitive simplification, which allows the 
managers to focus on what, in their view, matters most. When interpreting issues in the 
external environment, the hotel managers would emphasise economic changes, as this 
is the basis of their transactional language with their suppliers. A change in the 
economic climate of their markets, for instance, may jeopardise the continuity of their 
contracts with the suppliers, or their ability to respond to their suppliers' requests, and 
hence, negatively affect their reputation. Other changes, in the majority, are considered 
as peripheral, inevitable or beyond their control. For example, developments in the 
industry are often considered short-lived, and therefore of no consequence to the hotel 
firm's operation. Also, when the managers have little control over iss ues that are 
immediate but external to the firm, they tend to be attributed to the actions and 
interventions of the state. 
8.4.2 Transferring uncertainty to a more controllable domain 
By focusing on the suppliers, which act as mediating organisations between the 
environment and the hotel firm, the hotel managers try to manage their relationship. By 
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doing so, they are effectively transferring uncertainty from the external environment to 
a more controllable domain, which they can manage. The first step for doing so is to 
have a contractual relationship with selected suppliers, which in itself does not 
guarantee that the supplier will generate sales for the hotel, but establishes a formal 
partnership upon which the resource exchange can be negotiated. 
The hotel managers would negotiate on the basis of their history of collaboration 
(Construct 12) with their suppliers, which is not based on a formal transaction, but 
instead on the history of transactions between the two parties. The hotel managers 
would also try to strengthen the bond with the suppliers by demonstrating their firm's 
commitment to the partnership (Construct 8& Section 7.4). For that purpose, they 
would typically seek to renew their contracts (Construct 9). In addition, they would 
maintain a stable allocation of rooms, at least to their key suppliers, disregarding the 
contract performance. Once a bond between the hotel firm and the supplier is 
established, the managers can manage this relationship through their history of 
collaboration. In order to develop and exploit this history of collaboration, the hotel 
managers establish themselves as the representatives of their firm, being the only 
medium through which an external agent can reach their firm (Section 7.3.2). 
Once the suppliers channel customers to the hotel firm, the managers can develop a 
customer base and make those customers their own. As a respondent notes: 
(Db) one of our strongest advantages is the level of repeater guests, which 
accounts for 25% from each market. These are the customers we offer as a gift 
to our suppliers. 
The hotel managers' emphasis on such in-house promotion is apparent (Construct 6). 
This is manifested in their everyday work through their effort to achieve consistency in 
their difficult-to-standardise delivery of their hotel product. In turn, by developing their 
own customer base, they obtain an asset which they can use to trade with their 
suppliers. 
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As the suppliers cannot generate sales consistently (Construct 5), particularly in the 
side seasons, the hotel managers employ the common practice of overbooking to cover 
the performance gaps from their partnership with suppliers. This practice entails risks, 
but this is something they can deal with by closely monitoring the bookings' status, 
something which is apparent in their everyday actions (encapsulated in the problemistic 
orientation of their activity). At the same time, they make sure that overbooking their 
room capacity does not impact their key suppliers. Section 7.4.2 illustrated that the key 
suppliers are allocated a number of rooms which equals the hotel's room capacity. 
Thus, they maintain their capacity to meet their main suppliers' demand for rooms at 
any given time. Any overbooking in the high season will affect the hotel's peripheral 
suppliers. In essence, the uncertainty of the low and erratic demand is transferred to the 
operational domain by overbooking the hotel's room capacity and treating it as risk in 
the high season. 
8.5 Towards a model of strategy making in the local hotel sector 
Having described the hotel managers' contribution to the strategy of their firm 
(Sections 8.2 & 8.3) under the umbrella of how they deal with uncertainty (Section 
8.4), we can begin assembling an integrative framework. An integrative framework of 
the hotel managers' contribution to the strategy of their firm requires an appreciation of 
several factors. The hotel managers' contribution to the strategy of their firm centres on 
drawing resources from other mediating organisations, which are indispensable to the 
hotel firm's operation; at the same time, they have to deal with the disadvantages of 
their business, which is equipped with an undifferentiated product, in a saturated and 
fragmented sector, and is reliant upon mediating organisations. The hotel managers' 
role is to draw resources from those mediating organisations successfully, even though 
the hotel firm's product offering is of nominal value. The hotel managers' response to 
this common problem is reflected in an equally common solution: the development of 
value-generating strategies which enable them to leverage their firms' strategic 
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capability (Section 7.5 & 8.2). These value-generating strategies consist of two 
elements: a) the intangible resources of the firm, which compensate for the nominal 
tangible product/price aspects of the hotel firm's offering (Section 8.2.1), and b) the 
development of a history of collaboration with the suppliers, which forms the basis for 
their bond (Section 8.2.2). Based on this information, we can encapsulate the hotel 
managers' contribution to the strategy of their firm in the following framework: 
The market 
Reach market 
A. External environment through suppliers 





--------------"---"----""" "--------"---- resources 
The 
managers' Collaborati Customers 
contribution on 
C. The hotel firm 
Figure 6: Strategy making in the local hotel sector 
The above framework builds upon the conceptual framework presented in the literature 
review (Section 4.4), portraying the hotel managers as a central figure within the firm, 
who act as mediators between the external environment and the firm. The hotel 
managers' immediate focus is on their suppliers, through which they can access their 
markets. Part of the interaction between the hotel firm and its suppliers can be seen as a 
formal transaction, whereby the hotel firm commits a number of hotel rooms to the 
supplier, and the supplier generates sales for the hotel by promoting it and organising 
the subsequent elements of the travel package for the customers. However, as the hotel 
firm's offering is of little value to the suppliers, being common and undifferentiated, 
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the suppliers' collaboration cannot be assured, not even with a formal contract. For that 
purpose, the hotel managers try to leverage the hotel firm's strategic capability by 
managing the intangible resources of the firm, seeking to build a strong bond with the 
suppliers. They utilise this bond with the suppliers, basing the negotiation of the 
resource exchange with the suppliers on their history of collaboration. This process is, 
however, dynamic, as it is constantly negotiated between the two parties. While the 
hotel managers try to leverage their firms' strategic capability by developing value 
generating strategies, the suppliers try to extend the area of their power and move the 





This discussion chapter reflects on the literature. In section 9.2, it is argued that the 
activity-based view of strategy can unearth some otherwise unobservable constructs 
that become apparent only through the micro-analytic approach of the activity-based 
view. It goes on to suggest a conception of strategy as an outcome upon which the 
activity-based view of strategy can usefully reflect. Section 9.3 goes back to the 
problem of generalising about the practitioners' contribution to strategy and argues that 
only local generalisations are possible. Section 9.4 reflects on the literature on 
managerial work activity, arguing that the study advocates its usefulness and 
application potential in an activity-based view of strategy. Finally, section 9.5 
examines the move of the research inquiry from unitary to pluralistic organisational 
contexts, suggesting that while the first simplify the research inquiry and assists 
generalisation attempts, the latter are more representative of modem organisations. 
9.2 Reflecting on the strategy literature 
9.2.1 The activity-based view of strategy 
The activity-based view of strategy is claimed to contribute to our existing 
understanding of strategy making by adding a 3rd level of analysis in strategy research, 
that of the practitioners who are involved in the process. A focus on practitioners and 
their contribution to strategy requires a step towards a more micro-analytic approach, 
inquiring about the practitioners' detailed inputs that relate to strategic outcomes. 
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The findings of this study support the notion of that 3`d level of analysis in strategy 
research and its significance in understanding strategy making. The hotel managers' 
contribution concerns the creation and support of value-generating strategies, helping 
their firms to overcome their disadvantage of being common and undifferentiated in the 
industry. In addition, they have significant, if not exclusive, input in developing and 
exploiting the intangible resources of their business, which is vital to leverage their 
firm's otherwise low strategic capability; this is besides their key role in developing a 
bond with mediating organisations, allowing the hotel firm to draw resources from 
them. The above cannot be seen separately from their everyday practice, as it is 
through their everyday practice that they manage to produce the desired outcomes for 
their firm. 
Most importantly, this study demonstrates that mainstream strategy research is not able 
to observe the managers' contribution to the strategy of the firm as illustrated above. 
This is not only because of its focus on the macro level of analysis, as illustrated in the 
literature review (Section 2.3), but primarily because of the lack of an appropriate 
operationalisation of strategy that accounts for the managers' inputs. The activity-based 
view of strategy asserts the importance of the managers' detailed input into shaping the 
strategy of the firm and also allows the identification of what Johnson et al (2003) call 
micro-assets, which play an important role in leveraging the firm's strategic capability. 
Having stated the above, the micro-analytic approach of the activity-based view of 
strategy can go beyond content specific generalisations of the practitioners' 
contribution and provide insights into unobservable constructs that cannot be identified 
through mainstream macro-analytic approaches alone. 
9.2.2 Unobservable constructs and the managers' contribution 
Following the argument in the previous section, the managers' contribution in this 
study can be instilled in unobservable constructs, which are evident through the micro- 
analytic approach taken here. While unobservable constructs lie at the core of 
influential streams of research in strategic management (Godfrey and Hill, 1995), we 
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can argue that a micro-analytic approach can unearth such unobservable constructs. As 
shown in this study, this can be achieved in two ways. 
Firstly, its focus on individuals provides an understanding of how they utilise 
organisational resources and transform them into revenue. Spender (1994: 354) had 
called in the past for such an understanding: 
`The processes of resource acquisition and protection merely create and sustain 
the rent-potential, not the revenue... Focusing only on the acquisition and 
protection of resources, we overlook how the resources are applied and 
transformed into revenue' 
Spender had pointed towards more in-depth approaches to studying an organisation. A 
micro-analytic approach with a focus on individuals may well provide the depth 
required, as it can offer a holistic understanding of how the resources available to 
actors are applied. Actors carrying out an individual activity or practice have to deal 
with the resources at hand, so it is interesting to see how they make do with the 
resources they have in their everyday lives (de Certeau, 1984). In this study, the 
resources available for the managers are common and undifferentiated across the 
sample. The managers use the resources at hand in an integrative manner, creating 
value for their firms' offering, something that cannot be achieved through their 
separate use. For example, seeking to maintain the bond with the suppliers by renewing 
their contracts; demonstrating their commitment to the partnership by allocating a 
consistent number of rooms, disregarding contract performance; giving priority to their 
core suppliers when it comes to requests; negotiating based on their history of 
collaboration with the suppliers, effectively bypassing transactional formality; 
converting the existing customers they receive to a loyal clientele which they can trade; 
all are used to leverage their firm's strategic capability. 
Such a focus reasserts Penrose's claim (1959: 5) that value does not lie in the creation 
and delivery of resources and services, but in their integrative utilisation. Therefore, 
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the managers' role in utilising and combining the available resources, however limited, 
should be the focus of an understanding of how these resources are applied and, 
ultimately, how their transformation into revenue is to be achieved. 
Secondly, the micro-analytic approach gives a more holistic view of the assembly of 
organisational competencies. Organisational competencies by nature are assembled 
internally. As various authors claim, the very essence of most capabilities/competences 
is that they cannot be readily assembled through markets (Teece, 1982,1986a; Zander 
and Kogut, 1995). That is because competences/capabilities are ways of organising and 
getting things done, which cannot be accomplished merely by using the price system to 
coordinate activity. Managerial input is integral to this process of organisation. In this 
study we see the managers, through their everyday activity and practices, supporting 
the value generating strategies of the firm. In particular, they leverage their firm's 
bargaining power over the suppliers by creating and manipulating resources and assets 
`in-house', which they use in their resource exchange with the suppliers. This is 
something which cannot be achieved through market solutions, as frequently suggested 
by the strategy literature (Galbraith and Stiles, 1984; Harrigan, 1985,1986; Michael, 
2000). 
One can understand the managers' behaviour through the context of their firms' 
limited, and of nominal value, tangible resources. As Teece et al (1997: 514) note, 
resources are sticky because businesses are to some degree stuck with what they have 
and may have to live with what they lack. Having to cope with what they have, they 
concentrate on developing the intangible resources of their firm in-house. Their effort 
is evident in their transactions with mediating organisations, whereby these 
transactions are supported by value-enhancing assets uniquely tailored to that 
transaction (what Williamson, 1985, calls asset specificity). Overall, the micro- 
analytical focus provides a more detailed account of the internal assembly of 
organisational competencies. 
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9.2.3 Strategy in practice, strategy as an outcome 
Strategy has traditionally been seen as the result of the interaction between the 
environment and the firm, as well as intraorganisational processes. The activity-based 
view adds to this concept of the role of managerial inputs. The managers' practice, as 
claimed by several authors (Johnson et al, 2003; Whittington, 1996,2002,2004; 
Whittington and Melin, 2002; Whittington et al, 2003) and also demonstrated in the 
results of this study, has an impact, though partial, on the formation of strategy. Having 
confirmed this claim in this study, one has to reconsider the enduring conundrum of 
what is strategy (Farjoun, 2002; Porter, 1996; Whittington, 2002)? 
In the light of these observations, we can redefine strategy as an outcome, formed at 
multiple levels, with strategy practice (or the practitioners' activity) partially 
accounting for the strategic outcome. Such arguments are not new in the literature. 
Allison (1970), in his study of the Cuban missile crisis, shows how outcomes unfold 
from the interplay of multiple levels of analysis. Chaffee (1985) conceptualised the 
levels of analysis as coexisting in hierarchical order and established that they may 
occur concurrently or sequentially. She identified three types of strategy: the linear 
model, which focuses on planning and methodical action; the adaptive strategy, which 
refers to the fit and alignment of the organisation with the environment; and the 
interpretive model that is based on a social construct, where strategy is defined by the 
shared frames of reference of the organisational members. The integration of the above 
types, according to Chaffee, is shown implicitly in the literature. Perhaps the 
conception of strategy as an outcome can be better demonstrated through Mintzberg's 
(1978; see also Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) fundamental distinction between 
deliberate and emergent strategies. Although strategies lie on a continuum between 
deliberate (intended) and emergent strategies that can be realised in the absence of 
intentions, they are always an outcome. 
The practice, or activity-based view, of strategy can usefully add to the multi-layered 
conception of strategy as outcome. Reflecting on Mintzberg's fundamental distinction 
between deliberate and emergent strategies based on the degree of intentionality, we 
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can add that the context of intention can be better understood in conjunction with the 
observation of the practitioners' activity. Intentionality is not always explicit and it is 
often contained in the managers' practice. As Crozier and Friedberg (1980: 25) have 
argued, intentionality can be understood on an inferred basis, ex post facto, from the 
empirically observed regularities of behaviour. Chaffee's (1985) model could similarly 
be enriched with the inclusion of a micro-individual level, whereby strategy is 
generated through the practitioners' activity and temporal practices. 
Similarly, existing operationalisations of strategy can be reassessed. Common 
operationalisations of strategy as a plan, a pattern in a stream of decisions/actions, or 
the organisation's adaptation to the state of the external environment, have been found 
(Section 2.2) to be single-dimensional, conflating levels of analysis, or to ignore the 
individual level of analysis. What has been argued in this study is a pluralist approach, 
which allows for their multi-layered integration, in addition to the inclusion of the 
individual level of analysis. The results of this study strongly suggest such integration. 
If we look, for example, at the individual level of analysis and focus solely on the 
managers' decisions, we would neglect the rest of the managers' inputs that contribute 
to the strategy of the firm. As the findings show, the hotel managers' contribution to 
strategy is inextricably linked to their everyday activity (Sections 7.3,7.3.3 & 8.3), 
which supports, in a piecemeal manner, their efforts to leverage the strategic capability 
of their firm. 
9.3 Generalising about practitioners 
9.3.1 The problem of generalising about strategy practice 
This study provided an exploratory account of how practitioners strategise within a 
specific context. While generalisations about practitioners appear variously in the 
strategy literature (Daniels et al, 1994; Porac et al, 1989; Reger, 1990; Reger and Huff, 
1993; Spender, 1980,1989), they leave the critical aspect of their contribution to 
strategy untouched. The adoption of an activity-based view in this study shed light on 
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the managers' contribution to the strategy of their firm, but generalisations across the 
context in question are not unproblematic. A review of the existing classic strategy 
literature and a reflection of the S-a-P literature revealed two things: a) the inability of 
the classic strategy literature to account for the managers' contribution, and b) the 
voluntary confinement of S-a-P to generalising only within organisational contexts. 
Focusing on the S-a-P literature, we see that the micro-analytic approach adopted by 
the research community is used to add to the body of knowledge on specific strategy 
content issues or process inspired topics. As authors within the community comment: 
'we need to understand the patterns of micro-activity associated with particular 
organisational actions, from diversification to strategic change' (Whittington et 
al, 2004: 20) 
`The content tradition gives us major issues to study at the micro level, 
diversification, restructuring and much more. Process studies have contributed 
further crucial questions, such as strategic decision-making and change' 
(Johnson et al, 2003: 16) 
The above assertions, however, are limiting with regards to the extent of 
generalisations that can be made about managers. So far, studies following this line of 
inquiry have made generalisations within limited organisational boundaries/contexts 
(see Blackler et al, 2000; Eden and Ackerman, 1998; Jarzabkowski and Wilson 2002; 
Maitlis & Lawrence, 2003; Samra-Fredricks, 2003). In the literature review (Section 
2.3), we made the claim that studies within the S-a-P field avoid generalising about 
practitioners in broader (sectoral/industry) contexts in order to compensate for the 
apparent difficulty in linking managerial and organisational action. While the S-a-P 
field has the integration of the micro and the macro contexts of action firmly on its 
research agenda, it has not yet addressed the aforementioned problem of the 
incommensurability between managerial activity and organisational strategy. So far, 
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the problem has been dealt with via integrative accounts which include a micro level of 
analysis (Balogun 2003; Denis et al, 2004; Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2002). 
By tracing the issue of incommensurability at the more fundamental problem of the 
indeterminacy of managerial inputs to outputs at the organisational level, we tried to 
conceptualise the managers' contribution to strategy in a way that links managerial 
activity and organisational strategy. Our conceptualisation suggested that the 
managers' response to uncertainty has the integrative capacity to link the two levels. A 
limitation of this conceptualisation is that it can only be applied to unitary 
organisational contexts, whereby power is concentrated on one, or a few, individuals. 
Otherwise, the output at the organisational level would be the result of collective 
action; however, it does demonstrate that a conceptual/theoretical resolution of the 
problem of the incommensurability can be applied. 
9.3.2 Generalising locally 
One of the S-a-P community's concerns is the question of whether any degree of 
generalisability can be inferred if complex and detailed descriptions of action are all 
that is achieved (Jarzabkowski and Seidl, 2005; Whittington et at, 2004). 
Generalisations, however, can be made within local contexts; they may be limited, but 
they are always defined by the scope of the research study. In this study, the scope is to 
abstract how the managers' strategise within a local hotel sector. Other studies may 
focus on project teams across different organisations (Blackler et at, 2000) or 
executives within an organisation (Samra-Fredericks, 2003), but all are able to 
generalise, depending on the reference group of practitioners they have chosen. 
Generalisations about the practitioners and their contribution to strategy, however, can 
only be within local boundaries. Lowendahl and Revang (1998) noted that the nature of 
modern organisations requires local knowledge about the context. According to the 
authors, the notion of a grand theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), model or framework 
that applies to all organisations in a population collapses, as the characteristics of the 
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organisation by definition will be local, unique, and temporary. One characteristic 
example of the distinctiveness of the organisational context is the temporality in 
organisational and managerial action. The hotel firms of the study have an annual work 
cycle, roughly divided between the on/tourist and off season; within each phase, a 
distinct set of organisational and managerial activities take place. Clark (2000) gives a 
similar example of a British sugar beet factory with an annual work cycle, illustrating 
temporal differentiation and distribution of activities. Not all examples are annual, 
however: car designing is a 30-40 month cycle, in the pharmaceutical industry the 
cycles are more than a decade, whereas in supermarkets the cycle is weekly (Clark, 
2000). 
Another major differentiating factor of the context in this study is that the focal, local 
sector is service based. This entails a substantially different operation than a firm in a 
manufacturing sector. These differences can be encapsulated within three points (Mills 
and Moberg, 1982; Mills and Moshawi, 1999; Normann, 1984): Firstly, within the 
service sector, production and consumption occur simultaneously. This observation 
suggests that customers are interacting with these production processes. Secondly, 
customers participate to varying degrees in the production of service offerings. Thirdly, 
service offerings are typically intangible products. The implication is that what 
customers actually purchase is not a product, but the production process itself. Skaggs 
and Huffman (2003) note that, taken together, these differentiating aspects suggest a 
heightened level of client-firm interaction in the production processes of service firms, 
the major element of which is its complexity. The complexity of service production 
refers to the level of coordination present in an entire service delivery process (Argote, 
1982). As such, it is a specific form of coordination that is affected by the number of 
processes required to produce the service, as well as by the dependency among these 
processes. The element of complexity of service production identified by Skaggs and 
Huffman (2003) is a critical factor that can even define the nature of the managers' 
contribution to strategy in service firms. As shown in this study, the managers adopt an 
activity pattern which is purposeful, aiming to coordinate the service delivery process 
in a way that supports their value generating strategy. 
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Whittington et al (2004) have called for systematically comparable studies to address 
the problem of generalisation. In the lines of the discussion above, we can also add 
that, once there is enough mass of micro-analytic studies achieving generalisations 
across specific local contexts, it would be feasible to develop a broader understanding 
through empirical comparisons. 
9.4 The activity based view of strategy and the study of managerial work 
activity 
The study of managerial work activity, as was argued in the literature review, can 
contribute to a more informed understanding of the managers' role and contribution in 
strategy formation. In S-a-P literature, authors frequently refer to the importance of the 
focus on the managers' detailed activity which leads to strategic outcomes (i. e. Brown 
and Duguid, 2001; Chia, 2004; Johnson et al, 2003; Whittington, 2002). Those 
managerial activities as they suggest, may be often mundane, but they shed light on the 
`internal life of process' (Brown and Duguid, 2001: 95) by which strategy is created. 
Authors within the S-a-P community, however, have tended to study specific 
managerial inputs. Whittington (2002) and Johnson et al (2003), for instance, 
suggested starting with the formal work of strategic and organisational design. The 
reason for that is the relative ease with which it can be traced empirically, as it offers 
units of analysis that are small enough and defined enough to allow for comparative, 
and even quantitative, case analyses. 
An inquiry on the managers' work activity, on the other hand, interprets the activity- 
based view of strategy in a literal sense, looking at the sum of managerial inputs; 
namely, what managers actually do in order to explore their contribution to the strategy 
of their firm. As the findings demonstrate, the managers' contribution is inseparable 
from their day-to-day activity. The hotel managers' daily practice is purposeful, and 
contributes to the leveraging of the strategic capability of their firm, in particular, the 
generative mechanisms of their activity (Section 7.5.3): the need to achieve consistency 
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in the delivery of the hotel product and its associated services; to search for and resolve 
problems as soon as they occur and to preserve their work duties, retaining the 
exclusivity to perform certain tasks; all contribute to the management of the intangible 
resources of the hotel firm and the development of its bond with the suppliers. 
While the linkage between patterns of managerial work activity and organisational 
strategy is empirically demonstrated, attention needs to be given to the interpretation of 
managerial work. Managerial work, at face value, would seem disjointed, remedial, and 
fragmented, a general finding of the managerial work literature to date (Hales, 1986, 
1999; Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 1982; Stewart, 1976). Mintzberg (1973: 5) described 
the managers' reactive work as breeding superficiality and a `stimulus response 
milieu'. Even Whittington (2002) suggested that an emphasis on the managers' work 
activities may be more focused on its unromantic realities, expressing a concern for 
being unable to account for the managers' `strategic' activity. 
An `objective' analysis of managerial work, as seen through the eyes of an 
ethnographer, will most likely confirm the above observations; however, managerial 
work activity needs to be seen through the context of intention and its output at the 
organisational level. Here, the hotel managers' intention is to develop value-generating 
strategies to compensate for the competitive disadvantage of their firm. To achieve 
that, they need to utilise the resources they have and live with what their firm's lack. 
Given the common and undifferentiated nature of their firms' resources, the hotel 
managers' effort concentrates on managing the intangible resources of their firm. The 
value of those intangible resources is relative and contingent to the relational bond of 
the firm with its suppliers, which the hotel managers try to develop. 
9.4.1 The context vs. the content-specific contribution of managers 
Research inquiries into the managers' contribution to strategy, based on detailed 
accounts of the managers' work activity are, however, different from the current 
empirical body of the S-a-P research. The focus of the S-a-P research on the detailed, 
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but specific, managerial inputs is evident in its empirical body, which has variously 
looked at the managers' talk-based interaction (Blacker et at, 2000; Eden and 
Ackerman, 1998; Huisman, 2001; Samra-Fredericks, 2003); formal strategic activities 
(Jarzabkowski, 2003; Langley, 1990) and managerial sensemaking in strategy 
formation (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Levitt et al, 1999). As a result, this empirical 
body generalises about specific managerial contributions to strategy and, if combined 
with an integrative, multi-level approach, it remains confined to organisational 
boundaries. This approach, as argued in the literature review (Section 2.4.3), provides 
context specific accounts of the managers' contribution to strategy. 
In contrast, the inquiry into the managers' detailed work activity is an approach that 
necessarily encompasses all managerial inputs, allowing for a more holistic 
understanding of the managers' contribution. What managers do to contribute to the 
strategy of their firm is maximise the effect of their resources at hand. They have the 
inherent drive to transform their available resources so that their integrative utilisation 
generates more value than their separate use (Tsoukas, 1994; Whitley, 1989). As 
Brunsson (1982) concluded, in a culmination of his research on project teams, 
managers aim to mobilise resources within the organisation, create commitment to 
action amongst organisation members, and get things `done'. Similarly, based on our 
findings, we described managerial work activity as purposeful, creating output to the 
organisation incrementally, which is not identifiable within the managers' isolated 
tasks. If, on the other hand, the focus is on specific managerial inputs, we can only 
achieve a partial understanding of how managers use the resources at hand, and thus, 
an incomplete picture of their contribution to strategy. 
Furthermore, a research inquiry based on the managers' detailed work activity allows 
the selection of wider reference groups of practitioners within specific contexts. Thus, 
this approach can be seen as providing context specific accounts of the managers' 
contribution to strategy, just as the empirical body on managerial work activity has 
achieved generalisations about managerial work within contexts. Authors like Hales 
(1987), Hales and Tamangani (1996), and Hickson (1973) demonstrated the links 
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between managerial work and particular organisational and sectoral contexts. Stewart 
et al (1994), in their well-known comparative study of British and German managers, 
showed how managerial work is influenced by the national context. 
9.5 From unitary to pluralistic contexts 
The unitary view of organisation taken in this study (Section 4.2) puts the focal 
managers at centre stage, cancelling out issues of collective action and minimising 
intraorganisational complexity. By doing so, it emphasises the managers' role as the 
mediator between the environment and the firm. Conceiving the interaction with the 
environment is also simpler, which can perhaps be best encapsulated in Ester's (1984) 
`two step' model of human action. Elster suggested that human action is the product of 
two successive filtering processes. The first is a set of external structural constraints, 
which narrows the range of feasible options to the actor. The second filter is the 
mechanism by which the actor selects one desired action from the set of feasible 
actions. Here, the structural constraints are reflected in the nature of the context, 
whereby the focal managers have a limited set of tools/resources to use. The 
mechanism by which the manager selects the desired action denotes a cognitive 
process, which is influenced by the manager's interpretive understanding. In the 
context of the occupational community, the managers would draw upon their shared 
`stock of knowledge' (Berger and Luckman 1971; Schutz, 1967; Schutz and 
Luckmann, 1973), especially when dealing with uncertainty (Spender, 1980,1989). 
The simplicity achieved through the adoption of a unitary view of organisation, and the 
relative homogeneity of the focal managers being from the same occupational 
community, in turn permits a focus on their detailed work activity. The managers' 
response to uncertainty does not only define their contribution to strategy but is also 
reflected in their activity (Section 4.3), thus establishing a conceptual link between 
managerial activity and organisational strategy currently unattainable in pluralistic 
organisational contexts. 
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However, the simplifying assumption made through the unitary view of organisation is 
often non-applicable. In more complex organisations with multiple hierarchical levels, 
power would not be centred on one or a few individuals but on groups of individuals 
(popularly described as the dominant coalition by Cyert and March, 1963). Moreover, 
some social contexts may be inherently pluralist (Calori et al, 1998; Kagono et al, 
1985; Schneider. 1989; Schneider and De Meyer, 1991). Studies in the process 
tradition (Johnson, 1987,2000; Pettigrew, 1985; Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991) have 
demonstrated how strategy development is dependent on complex factors: power 
structures, politics and organisational routines/structure/culture. In such pluralistic 
contexts, individual action may not have a direct or discernible impact on strategic 
outcomes, as its output at the level of the firm would be negotiated with other actors. 
S-a-P research has focused on pluralistic organisational contexts, which are undeniably 
more representative of modem organisations, but has to deal with increased 
complexity. While the challenge for S-a-P research to span levels of analysis has been 
particularly noted by authors (Johnson et al, 2003: 16-17), the continuing problem of 
generalising about the practitioners' contribution is more evident here. Given the sheer 
complexity of in-depth, fine-grained, and multi-layered inquiry, the S-a-P research, in 
order to establish linkages between the micro-managerial and the macro- 
organisational/institutional level, demands a restricted selection of wide reference 
groups of practitioners, being confined within strictly organisational boundaries. 
Authors within S-a-P literature call these reference groups `communities of practice' 
(Brown and Duguid, 2001; Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2002; Liedtka, 1999; Samra- 
Fredericks, 2003), denoting organisational activity systems whereby the managers' 
practice has meaning in relation to the community they participate in. 
Therefore, a move towards pluralistic organisational contexts may be more 
representative of a typical organisational environment but, on the other hand, it 
necessitates narrow empirical investigations of the practitioners' contribution to the 
strategy of the firm. In stark contrast, research on unitary organisational contexts, while 
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not as representative, simplifies the research inquiry, allowing the selection of wider 
reference groups of practitioners and thus enabling context specific accounts of their 
contribution to the strategy of the firm. 
9.5.1 A focus on routines and dynamic capabilities 
Research inquiries in unitary and pluralistic organisational contexts make different 
assumptions and necessitate different methodological approaches. They can, however, 
communicate on the basis of routine activities and processes that constitute strategic 
outcomes. Assuming that the focus of the first is on individual managers and the focus 
of the latter on organisational communities of practice, we can infer the following: 
At the level of the individual manager, routine activity will occur as an established best 
means of dealing with the organisation's situation and is subject to change when the 
manager perceives a change in the organisation's situation (Bowman and Ambrosini, 
2000). Based on the results of this study, we can also note that, although the managers' 
routine activity may seem operational (Sections 7.3.1 & 7.3.2), it is purposeful (Section 
7.3.3) and it is part of the managers' approach to managing uncertainty (Section 8.4.2). 
Therefore, the managers' routine activity is inextricably linked to their manner of 
strategising (Section 8.3). 
Similarly, authors within the S-a-P community emphasise that strategising is embedded 
in organisational routines (Hendry and Seidl 2003; Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2002; 
Samra-Fredericks, 2003; Whittington et al, 2004). Whittington et al (2004: 6-7) 
particularly noted in the literature the growing theoretical recognition of the 
significance of routines or dynamic capabilities that support particular strategies 
(Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Feldman, 2000; Teece et al, 
1997). Organisational routines are considered to be the basis for the development of 
organisational capability (Porter, 1991; Winter, 2003). 
`An organisational capability is a high-level routine (or collection of routines) 
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that, together with its implementing input flows, confers upon an organisation's 
management a set of decision options for producing significant outputs of a 
particular type' (Winter, 2003: 991) 
Organisational routines/capabilities therefore reflect the way the collective action of 
organisation members produces output at the level of the firm. This conception is 
significant. In the literature review, we asserted that, in order to link managerial 
activity and organisational strategy, it is necessary to first identify what is the 
managers' output at the level of the firm. Organisational routines/capabilities 
demonstrate that they have the capacity to encapsulate the focal managers' collective 
output. 
The dynamic capabilties perspective, which sees strategic initiatives as resulting from 
the multi-layered recombination of firm-specific resources and competences (Teece et 
al, 1997), has the potential to go deeper into the black box of pluralist organisational 
contexts. Although this perspective still lacks some in-depth empirical analyses of the 
microprocesses and the role of practitioners that form these capabilities (Galunic and 
Eisenhardt, 2001), it can offer rich insights in this direction. According to Eisenhardt 
and Martin (2000), d ynamic capabilities are used by the management to alter the 
resource base. A micro-analytic approach can then examine the way they are acquired, 




10.1 Operationalising the managers' contribution to strategy 
This thesis sought to generalise about the managers' contribution to the strategy of the 
firm. Based on the fact that strategy formation is context-specific, it considered 
essential to generalise about a particular context, and thus, about practitioners within a 
specific context. This, however, is something which has been poorly examined in the 
previous literature. The classic strategy literature simply fails to account for the 
managers' contribution to strategy, as it diminishes their inputs or relegates them in 
single-dimensional forms. Gaps also exist within the S-a-P literature. While its focus 
on more micro levels of analysis reasserts the role of managers to strategy, it tends to 
make content, rather than context specific generalisations of the managers' 
contribution, as it has not progressed with regards to the conceptual integration of 
managerial activity and organisational strategy. 
My argument in this thesis diverges from the previous literature in that managerial 
activity should not be arbitrarily linked to strategy. I have argued that, conceptually, 
the two terms are incommensurate: strategy is something an organisation ̀ has' whereas 
practice (or activity) is something an individual `does'. As such, the managers' 
contribution to the strategy of the firm needs to be operationalised by providing a 
conceptual linkage between managerial activity and organisational strategy. 
The literature on managerial work activity provides insights into the problem of 
incommensurability, showing that it lies within t he more fundamental problem of 
linking managerial inputs (activity) to outputs (or what is achieved) at the 
organisational level. Thus, the problem can be decomposed into two parts: a) the 
difficulty of moving from managerial inputs to outputs at the organisational level, and 
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b) the problem of identifying those outputs that lead to strategic outcomes. My solution 
to this problem was given by conceiving the managers' contribution to strategy as their 
response to uncertainty. The managers' response to uncertainty reflects a common 
knowledge, shared among the practitioners within the industry, on how to deal with 
problems in the operating environment of their firm; in other words, how they form a 
strategy to respond to issues in the external environment. In addition, the managers' 
response to uncertainty should be reflected in their work activity, thus making it 
possible to extrapolate the linkage between what they do and how this affects their 
firm. 
10.2 The epistemological and methodological bases of the study 
In developing this operationalisation, a simplifying assumption was necessary: the 
adoption of a unitary view of organisation. This is a necessary precondition for the 
development of the aforementioned operationalisation, as it allows the research to 
concentrate on the focal managers and not on other actors within the firm. I 
acknowledge this as a limitation. The operationalisation that I have developed to study 
the managers' contribution to strategy cannot be applied unproblematically in pluralist 
organisational contexts. In pluralist organisational contexts, the reference group of 
practitioners can be the community of practice within the organisation, and the 
practitioners' work patterns may be incomparable or irrelevant to one another; strategic 
outcomes would be produced from the collective action of organisation members, upon 
which their activity may have no discernable impact. In stark contrast, unitary 
organisational contexts eliminate issues of collective action, allowing the grasp of the 
managers' output at the level of the firm. 
Methodologically, the study of the managers' contribution to strategy has to be a multi- 
level exercise. This is a necessity, as the micro-analytic focus of studies of this kind has 
to be examined within the wider organisational context in order to establish reciprocal 
relations between the micro processes of strategising and organisational outcomes. 
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Therefore, just as other authors (Balogun et at, 2003; Denis et al, 2004; Jarzabkowski, 
2004; Johnson et at, 2003; Whittington, 2002; Whittington et at, 2004) have stressed, 
research inquiries of this kind have to have sufficient breadth to capture the 
complexities of strategising. In this study, the use of multiple methods was useful in 
complementing or triangulating the research data. For example, the observation of the 
managers' work activity would have represented only a snapshot of their inputs but, 
when complemented with the inquiry on their annual work cycle, it sheds light on the 
temporal practices used by the managers, by which they interact and control elements 
within the external environment. On the other hand, the inquiries on the patterns of 
organisational outcomes and on the managers' perceptions of changes in the external 
environment, offered little additional knowledge and served primarily for triangulating 
the research data. 
10.3 Results and implications 
The results of the study show that the managers in the hotel sector are not only aware 
of those issues that are critical to their hotel's operation and performance, but also 
share a familiarity, or common understanding of the ways they can deal with their 
organisation's uncertainties. They deal with uncertainty by focusing on what matters 
most, in this case their suppliers, who are indispensable for the hotel firms as they are 
the only means through which they can reach their markets. As the hotel firms are 
distanced from their markets, the managers seek to control an area of the market by 
managing the relationship with their suppliers; in effect transposing uncertainty to a 
more controllable domain. 
The hotel managers' contribution focuses on developing value-generating strategies for 
their firm; a necessity due to the fact that they are at a disadvantage, being in 
a saturated sector and equipped with an undifferentiated product. Having little to trade 
with their suppliers, they create value by managing the intangible resources of their 
firm and negotiate on the basis of their relational bond with the suppliers. 
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The hotel managers' contribution is not only evident in their process of knowing how 
to deal with organisational uncertainties, but also becomes empirical and is manifested 
in their everyday practice. As this study shows, managerial activity is purposeful, 
assisting in the development and maintenance of value-generating strategies. While this 
is not evident in their detailed activity, which may seem preoccupied with the day-to- 
day and the routine, it becomes apparent when taking into account the intended 
contribution of their activity, which demonstrates its overarching purpose. 
In the light of the findings of the study, the activity-based view of strategy can shed 
light on unobservable constructs in strategy formation, which are evident only through 
the inclusion of the micro level of analysis. For instance, a focus on the hotel firms 
would show that they are at a disadvantage, being restricted in terms of what they can 
achieve with their resources. On the other hand, a focus on the hotel managers provides 
an understanding of how they utilise the limited resources that are available and 
transform them into revenue. As Johnson et at (2003) have similarly argued, a focus on 
practitioners would unearth the micro-assets of the firm and demonstrate how they 
develop those micro-assets to leverage the strategic capability of the firm. 
The approach I have taken, in addition to the results of the study, challenge the 
common preconception within S-a-P literature that certain types of activity can be 
labelled as `strategic'; a linkage between managerial activity and organisational 
strategy that appears frequently within S-a-P literature (see Chia, 2004; Clark, 2004; 
Hendry and Seidl, 2003; Whittington, 2002), but has been assumed rather than 
demonstrated. As I have argued earlier in the literature review, the managers' 
contribution to the strategy of their firm is necessarily encapsulated in the patterns of 
their activity and not isolated within any identifiable tasks. This contrasts with 
Whittington's (1996,2002) concern that the study of the managers' work marginalises 
`strategic' activity. This concern does not come as a surprise, though, given the 
generally accepted characterisation of managerial work as fragmented, disjointed, 
remedial, and preoccupied with day-to-day issues; thus, portraying a `non-strategic' 
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orientation; however, when taking into account that the managers' output can be 
understood from how their detailed activities are interrelated, their work can be seen 
from a whole new perspective. Their seemingly ̀ non-strategic' work makes sense, as it 
allows them to best deal with uncertainties in the organisational environment and gets 
things done. If strategic activity is defined as planned and extrinsically organised, it 
may not exist in real life organisational environments, as has been the case of 
Mintzberg's (1973) study of American CEOs. An extreme example of a manager with 
a planned activity pattern would rather portray a blue collar worker producing output in 
a Fordist manner. 
While the value of the activity-based view to understanding strategy formation is 
demonstrated, it should be seen as distinct but complementary to existing views of 
strategy. Traditional outlooks view strategy as attached to organisations; as something 
organisations have, resulting from exogenous (the interaction between the environment 
and the firm) and endogenous (organisational structure and intraorganisational 
processes) factors. A focus on practitioners and their contribution could well be the 
third level of analysis in strategy research, seeing strategy formed through the 
practitioners' activity. As such, strategy can be redefined as an outcome, formed at 
multiple levels, with strategy practice (or the practitioners' activity) to partially account 
for that outcome. 
10.4 Contribution to the body of knowledge 
The contribution of this study to the body of knowledge is concentrated in four areas. 
In particular, this study: 
I. Offers a context-specific understanding of the hotel managers' contribution to the 
strategy of their firm. The context itself, the local hotel sector on the island of 
Crete, is of particular significance, as it is unexplored and provides the opportunity 
to investigate strategy making from the perspective of other cultural foundations. 
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Various previous studies have focused on demonstrating the context specific nature 
of strategy formation (Birnbaum-More and Weiss, 1990; Calori et al, 1998; Kagono 
et al, 1985; Schneider. 1989; Schneider and De Meyer, 1991; Sorge and Maurice, 
1990; Sorge, 1991; Spender, 1980,1989). By assuming the boundedness of 
strategy, this study provides a practitioner-informed account of the hotel managers' 
contribution. As such, it can provide the basis for future comparative studies in 
different domains and contexts. 
2. Contributes to the activity-based view of strategy by offering an empirically 
grounded description, which ties together managerial activity and organisational 
strategy. A requirement, as suggested in this study, is the adoption of a unitary view 
of organisation, whereby power is concentrated on one or a few actors within the 
firm, and whose influence directs organisational action. While this simplifying 
assumption does not allow generalisations across pluralistic contexts, it is a starting 
point for future investigations of a similar kind. Studies of a similar kind would 
include those corresponding to the centralised power characteristics of the firms of 
this study. These features have been previously acknowledged in the literature. Hart 
(1992) encapsulates them in his `command' mode of strategy making, whereas 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) refer to it as the `entrepreneurial' strategy. Since the 
central feature of this study is represented in the aforementioned authors' work as 
one of the multiple types or modes of strategy making, we may as well assume that 
the managers' contribution will vary across each different type or mode. 
3. Develops a theory for linking managerial activity and organisational strategy. 
Having reasserted the importance of this linkage for the S-a-P literature, in order to 
allow generalisations about the practitioners' contribution to strategy, this study 
addressed the problem of incommensurability. While the strategy literature falls 
short of addressing the problem of incommensurability between managerial activity 
and organisational strategy, insights were given from the field of managerial work 
activity. It was found that the problem lies in the more fundamental issue of the 
indeterminate nature of managerial inputs to outputs at the organisational level. 
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Having grasped managerial output as the intended contribution of the managers to 
the organisation, it conceptualises the managers' contribution to strategy through 
their response to uncertainty, making it possible to identify those outputs that lead 
to strategic outcomes, based on the observation that uncertainty is a driver of 
organisational action and a generative mechanism of managerial action. While 
these are acknowledged in the existing literature, they are not integrated as such. 
Spender (1980,1989), for instance, used uncertainty as the element that brings out 
the managerial judgments that drive organisational strategy. In his conception, 
however, Spender does not provide links with managerial activity. Similarly, other 
management and organisation theorists (Chandler, 1962; Scott, 1987; Thompson, 
1967; Williamson, 1985) focus on the effects of uncertainty at the organisational 
level without providing that integrative link. The operationalisation of the 
managers' contribution to strategy that was made in this study can set the scene for 
further future theoretical development. 
4. Demonstrates empirically the need for pluralist methodological approaches for 
studying the managers' contribution to strategy in order to show that the managers' 
contribution lies at two diverse and interrelated domains: the domain of knowledge 
and the domain of practice; each one requiring a different type of research inquiry. 
A narrow focus on either one would not allow a clear picture of the managers' 
contribution. In addition, it shows that the same breadth in the research inquiry can 
be useful when the study spans levels of analysis, demonstrating the reciprocal 
influence among them. As illustrated in this study, the use of multiple methods was 
helpful in complementing or triangulating the research data. 
10.5 Limitations of the research 
1. The generalisation of the results is limited by definition, as the thesis advocates the 
notion of the context specific nature of strategy formation. The firms of this study 
have a competitive disadvantage, being in a fragmented, saturated sector, equipped 
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with an undifferentiated product, and reliant upon mediating organisations. As a 
result, the managers' contribution focuses on overcoming that disadvantage. These 
results may not be consistent with other studies conducted in a different context, 
which may not involve organisations operating under the same market conditions. 
The boundaries of relevance are, therefore, limited; the results are useful only for 
the firms and the practitioners within their limited context of applicability. 
2. The adoption of a unitary view of organisation may have been a required 
simplifying assumption in order to achieve a relative conflation between the 
managerial and organisational context of action, but its degree of applicability is 
limited. A unitary view of organisation assumes that power, and therefore 
authority, is centred on one or a few individuals within the firm. The nature of the 
hotel firms as unitary contexts permitted such an assumption, justifying the focus 
on the general managers. Other studies, however, that are conducted in pluralistic 
organisational contexts need to acknowledge the role and contribution of multiple 
actors within the firm. The process tradition in strategy research has long 
acknowledged these complex dynamics and set a long chain of contributions 
grounded on the plurality of interests and conflicts within the organisation, showing 
that organisational action is the result of collective action of organisation members. 
Thus, the assumptions made in this study can be replicated by other studies 
conducted within unitary organisational contexts (i. e. SMEs or with unitarist 
organisational cultures; see Section 4.2) but not pluralist. 
3. Given the multi-level nature of the research inquiry, it was necessary to employ a 
wide range of data collection techniques. The collected data were on occasion, 
complementary, i. e. the observation of the hotel managers' work and the inquiry 
about their annual work cycle, but also overlapped, i. e. some of the respondents' 
constructs (particularly those presented in theme 2) intersected with the inquiry 
about the patterns in organisational outcomes. This required a great deal of 
discretion on behalf of the researcher regarding how to integrate and interpret the 
available data and provide an answer to the research question. As such, the answer 
249 
provided was strongly based on the researcher's interpretation, bringing about the 
issue of `construct validity' in methodological terms. This issue, however, was 
mediated by the researcher's own knowledge of the context of the study, which 
provided a useful guide for the interpretation of the data. 
4. The sample taken in this study to explore the managers' contribution to the strategy 
of their firm was based on organisational, rather than managerial, variables. Hence, 
it was assumed that the membership of the focal managers within an occupational 
group has a homogenising effect on their contribution, whereas the organisational 
context may create variances in their contribution. In this conception, managerial 
demographics and traits were ignored in the analysis, something which was a 
necessary trade-off. Data were, however, collected about the managers' 
demographics, background and experience, although they did not play any role in 
the analysis and overall interpretation of the data. An analysis of managerial 
variables would be meaningful in a larger sample of managers within homogeneous 
firms, where statistical generalisation can be achieved. 
10.6 Recommendations for further research 
1. This study focused on unitary organisations, a choice that allowed context-specific 
generalisations about the managers' contribution to strategy. Future studies in 
pluralist organisational contexts may generalise about the managers' contribution 
by taking a different approach. They could provide pluralist accounts of strategy 
making by focusing on the `micro' aspects of intraorganisational processes. Such 
studies could benefit from a focus on organisational routines/dynamic capabilities, 
which encompass the process of strategising (Hendry and Seidl 2003; Jarzabkowski 
and Wilson, 2002; Samra-Fredericks, 2003; Whittington et al, 2004). A focus on 
organisational routines/dynamic capabilities can give insights into how managers 
alter the resource base of their firm. A micro-analytic approach can then examine 
the way they are acquired, integrated together, and recombined to create value 
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generating strategies. 
2. Further research could also be conducted on unitary organisational contexts in a 
manner similar to this study, allowing for context-specific generalisations of the 
managers' contribution to strategy. This type of research inquiry could also look 
specifically at the process of strategising through the managers' work activity, in 
order to allow for systematic comparison. This study showed that the managers' 
process of knowing becomes empirical and is manifested in their everyday practice. 
Strategy creation, in this respect, is not only intentional but also maintained through 
the managers' everyday practice. Future research could study the recursive process 
of knowing and practice, making links with the context in question. 
3. Future research could replicate this study in different sectors and different contexts. 
This would require making similar assumptions and using a comparable 
methodology. In effect, this study could be replicated in any sector or context 
where the study of unitary organisations is possible. It would be interesting to see 
whether (and how) the managers' contribution to organisational outcomes would 
change if a similar study was conducted in the hotel sector in the UK or in another 
hotel sector in the Mediterranean region. Any differences could be attributed to 
cultural and institutional factors. Moreover, a replication of the study in a different 
sector would offer further insights on the influence of institutional and market 
forces. 
4. Future research could emphasise the unobservable constructs that arise from a 
micro-analytic approach on strategy making and a heightened awareness of the role 
and contribution of the practitioners. Such studies could draw from the resource- 
based view of the firm and focus, not on the resources as such, but on how they are 
applied and transformed into revenue. In particular, they could look into how the 
practitioners utilise and combine/recombine the resources available to them to 
create value for the firm. 
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10.7 Learning outcomes 
This study commenced from the interest of the researcher in the area of strategy and his 
conviction of the context-specific nature of strategy. Combined with the researcher's 
previous knowledge and experience within the hotel sector, this study was a vehicle for 
the researcher to go deeper into academic research and contribute, not only within the 
area of the study, but also to develop himself. From the systematic comparison and 
contrast of differing views in the field, and the search for conceptual integration to the 
methodological choices made to elicit the desired data; the data collection process and 
the interpretation of these data; all contributed to the researcher's personal 
development. If the process of reviewing the literature was solitary, the data collection 
stage required opposite skills. The researcher had to exercise his communication skills, 
use personal contacts and establish new ones. It was also essential to establish 
credibility with the researched hotel firms, but also to maintain it. In the interpretation 
of the data, the researcher had to deal with his own preconceptions, given his previous 
familiarity with the subject and, at the same time, confront the conventions of previous 
research in the field. Therefore, the outcome of this thesis is not only the contribution 
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Appendix 1: Participant information form & 
consent form 
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Participant information sheet 
Title: The role of the hotel general manager in the Greek hotel sector 
You are invited to participate in a doctoral research project. This research has been 
approved by the School of Hotel and Restaurant Management at Oxford Brookes 
University. Your participation is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time. If you 
decide to take part you will be given a consent form. 
This research examines the decision-making and the responses of the hotel units in Crete. 
Furthermore the practices used by the occupational group are investigated and these in 
turn will be related to the broader social environment. In this study a sample of 9 
independent hotels will be selected. The research methods will take the form of at least 
one interview with the general manager, deputy general manager or business owner and 
each one is estimated to last at least one and a half hour. The study will also include a 
two-day observation of the general manager's activities. 
The information given to the researcher will be confidential and the anonymity of the 
respondents as well as of the hotel units will be maintained. In case any quotes from the 
respondents are used in the study, these will be paraphrased and the name will be 
disguised (e. g. respondent A, hotel B). 
For further information please contact: 
Pavlos Stavrakakis - Doctoral candidate 
e-mail address: pavlos_doc@yahoo. co. uk 
+0044 1865 483858 
School of Hotel and Restaurant Management 
Oxford Brookes University 




Title: The role of the hotel general manager in the Greek hotel sector 
Pavlos Stavrakakis - researcher 
e-mail address: pavlos_doc@yahoo. co. uk 
+0044 1865 483858 
Please initial below 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the 
information sheet for the above study and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions 
2.1 understand that my participation is voluntary and 
that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving 
reason 
3. I agree to take part in the above study 
4.1 agree to be audio recorded 
Name of participant Date Signature 
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Appendix 2: List of respondents 
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Reference Organisation Respondent 
Aa 3* resort (3N) Owner 
Ab General Manager 
Ba 4* resort (4N) General Manager 
Bb Deputy General Manager 
Bc Owner 
Ca 3* resort on the south axis (3S) Owner-manager 
Cb Financial director 
Da 4* resort on the south axis (4S) Owner 
Db General manager 
Ea 3* city hotel (3C) Owner 
Eb General Manager 
Fa 4* city hotel (4C) General Manager 
Fb Assistant Manager 
Ga 3* owner-managed hotel (3OM) Owner-manager 
Gb Deputy General Manager 
Ha 4* owner managed hotel (40M) Founder 
Hb Owner-manager 
Ia Specialist hotel (Polar) Owner-manager 
Ib Owner-manager 
Agent 1 Travel agent General manager 
Agent 2 Specialist travel agent Owner-manager 
Agent 3 Specialist travel agent Owner-manager 
Pilot study 
Sta 5* resort hotel on the south axis Sales director 
Xat 3* resort on the south axis Owner 
Fal 3* resort Owner-manager 
Asl 4* resort General manager 
Apo 3* resort General manager 
Apl 3* resort (state owned) General manager 
Dim 4* resort General manager 
Ian 4* city hotel (UK) General manager 
Kar 4* resort General manager 
Som 3* city hotel General manager 
Xei 3* resort General manager 
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Icebreaking session 
Could you tell me how you decided to enter the industry? 
Could you tell me a few things about the hotel? 
What are your work responsibilities? 
What (activity/ies) takes you more energy and time? Why? 
Main part 
What are the main problems you face as a hotel in this industry? 
(prompts relating to the mechanisms and tools for the resolution of the problems) 
(prompts relating to the structural inertia of the hotel) 
(prompts linking the problems to the nature of the industry and the structure and 
positioning of the hotel in the market) 
How did these trends and developments affected the industry and subsequently, the 
hotel's operation? (projectory assisted question) 
How did the following patterns of action changed over the history of the hotel? 
a. Composition of markets 
b. Portfolio of partners 
c. Allocation of rooms 
d. Revenue sources 
Could you give me further information regarding your yearly work cycle? (projectory 
assisted question) 
Closing-up session 
(respondents are asked to fill in a form requesting information about their background) 
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Appendix 4: The observation procedure 
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Ref Location Time Activity Comments 
Start - e. g. tours, Source: extent of responding to others' 
end, un/scheduled request or initiate activities to be 
Total meetings, performed by others (e. g. principal, 
minutes phone calls, mutual, opposite party, clock, also 
spend on deskwork, negotiation of involvement, other... ), 
issues/ travel, purpose of contact (e. g. scheduling, 
activities, personal, ceremony, status/action request, 
calculate observer, observational tour, information exchange, 
frequency interaction, review, negotiation, other... ), handling of 
of other... information (extent of confidentiality), 
activities selection of other actors, links with other 
refs, communication (meaning language, 
physical movements, speech, writing etc), 
limits (goal and time orientation) 
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Appendix 5: Trends and developments in 
























Appendix 6: Background information form 
311 
Age: 
Tenure in the position of the general manager: 
Tenure in the hospitality industry: 
Tenure in the current hotel unit: 
Education 
Have you gained any other qualifications? Please specify: 
312 
Work experience 
Before you started working professionally in the tourism industry did you have any 
other traditional ties with the industry (e. g. family business or occupation)? Please 
specify: 
313 
Appendix 7: The organisation's life cycle 
(example) 
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